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Summary of Contents 
The concept of job mobility is useful to sociologists who see inequality as stemming 
from positions in a social structure, instead of the characteristics of those holding the 
positions. Yet, authors more often explore the causes of job mobility than its 
consequences. An important but rarely tested assumption in the labour market literature 
is that job mobility leads to better positions.  
This research explores the assumption, asking “what do workers get from mobility?” It 
considers three aims. First, it explores the relationship between mobility types and 
subjective and objective outcomes. Second, it explores differences between labour 
market insiders and outsiders in the relationship between mobility and outcomes. Third, 
it compares institutional differences between liberal and coordinated economies in the 
mobility-outcomes relationship. The thesis uses two longitudinal panels to analyse the 
outcomes of different forms of job mobility in the UK and Germany during the pre-
crisis years of 2000-2008.  
The three aims act as configurations of the mobility-outcomes relationship, shedding 
light on how it shapes worker action. Regarding mobility types, inter-firm mobility 
leads to subjective gains, but does not result in objective ones. Intra-firm mobility leads 
to objective gains, but has minor effects on subjective outcomes.  
Differences between workers rely strongly on the institutional context. British women 
appear to gain more from mobility than men; yet the gains are subjective or tied to 
hours. German women are unaffected by mobility, whereas men make subjective 
bargains using changes. Education differences suggest non-tertiary groups gain the most 
from mobility when outcomes are subjective but the least when outcomes are objective.  
Institutional comparison shows separate opportunity structures and separate meanings to 
mobility in both countries. German institutions internalise workers with high promotion 
premiums, which are smaller in the UK. The UK has a wide variance in working 
conditions which may explain large subjective premiums tied to inter-firm change. In 
Germany, quits may be fuelled by a want for more interesting or satisfactory work, at 
the compromise of other outcomes. In the UK, quits may be fuelled by a need to 
improve one’s immediate environment or responsibilities. The thesis concludes that the 
promises of mobile markets should be treated with scepticism. 
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1. Introduction 
Writing for Bloomberg Kitroeff (2016) asks “Have Millennials Made Quitting More 
Common?” The number of quits reached a 7-year high in December 2015 with 3 
million Americans leaving their job for a new employer, a figure which has continued to 
rise. Kitroeff (2016) suggests younger workers, who have embraced mobile-lives, are 
behind the increase. Although the Bureau of Labour Statistics does not separate the quit 
rate or the layoff rate by age group, younger workers make up the largest segment of the 
labour market and are the most likely to want to “leave their job in the near future”. 
Kitroeff (2016) also cites polls, showing younger cohorts hope “to have a different job 
in the next 5 years” or plan a “quit in the next 2 years”. This is interpreted as “a sign of 
a bustling economy”, a wider indicator of a competitive market. Further, movers 
themselves are expected to benefit- they want something more from work than 
“spending their lives at one desk”.  
Guo (2014) writing a column for The Washington Post suggests the opposite, workers 
are not mobile enough. Young cohorts are immobile, “sticking with their jobs longer 
than their counterparts did a decade ago”. He cites longer tenures among younger 
cohorts, arguing that this is bad for “Millennial careers”. Job hopping is cited as an 
integral part of earnings growth, and mobility is “a process of trading up” in the labour 
market. Casselman (2015) agrees, pleading in the data blog FiveThirtyEight1 “Enough 
Already about the Job-Hopping Millennials”. Considering similar data to Guo (2014), 
he compares cohorts, claiming mobility is an important strategy for US workers, not just 
the young, “changing jobs is a key way for workers to make more money”; by moving 
less, workers limit their potential earnings growth.  
                                                 
1 FiveThirtyEight is a data-driven news blog, covering politics, economics, and society.  
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Earnings growth is not the only benefit promised by journalists. Writing in Forbes 
McGrady (2016) lists three reasons why young workers change employers, none of 
which are tied to earnings. Respondents want “meaning from work”, “training and the 
opportunity for development”, and “approachable managers” who are open to 
considering working conditions and their workload. In fact, House (2014) writing for 
The Wall Street Journal cites that movement for wages is just one aspect of mobility 
bargaining; work environment, retention programmes, and bonuses also play a part in 
shaping the decision to change employers.    
The articles above agree; job mobility is “good” for the economy and workers. Some 
describe it as “crucial”, or the main mechanism used to improve pay and conditions. 
However, three points of contention can be singled out. First, each author cites the US, 
implying workers in less mobile countries, by proxy, are worse-off than those in 
America. Second, authors use a limited definition of job mobility, focusing on quits but 
ignoring promotions. The authors write about inter-firm mobility, but the workers 
themselves could be referring to internal promotions when answering the polls. Many of 
these do not imply a break with the firm and could be interpreted as the natural 
progression of an internal career; the first author claims Millennials want “a different 
job in the next 5 years”, which could mean either a quit or a promotion. As a result, 
none of the authors discuss the effects of moving internally when considering mobile 
markets. Third, the columns above are split on outcomes. Mobility has a positive effect 
on earnings, but elsewhere authors promise improved softer outcomes like “better work 
environment” and “meaningful work”, outcomes other than wages. While some claim 
job mobility is a good strategy for improving earnings, others promise improved 
subjective feelings and a sense of fulfilment.  
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This thesis considers the promises above, focusing on one research question “what do 
workers get out of job mobility?” Employers may be frustrated by workers’ “lack of 
commitment” to firms (Cappelli, 1999), and the economy may depend on large rates of 
turnover between firms, but asking what workers get from mobility sheds light not only 
on the complexities of micro-level bargaining, but also on differences between workers, 
and differences between institutions. Throughout, the thesis argues mobility is less often 
a strategy for increasing utility and advancing careers (as proposed by theory), and more 
often a strategy for dealing with poor working conditions. Countries with high mobility 
rates seem less like spaces facilitating attainment, and more like systems which 
maintain a wide spectrum of working conditions, where mobility is a release valve. 
Countries with low mobility rates seem focused on protecting the core workforce, the 
goal of ensuring predictable pay and conditions for the economic core results in a lower 
rate of mobility. 
The rationale for the thesis stems from a widely held (but rarely tested) assumption in 
the theoretical literature, which has spurred mixed results in empirical articles. 
Sociologists exploring mobility focus on the patterns and causes of job mobility, 
typically citing Sørensen’s (1979, 1975, 1977, 1978) attainment theory (or in earlier 
years the theory of occupational achievement) for the perspective of the worker, or 
efficiency wage theory (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986) for the perspective of the firm (on the 
topic, some use internal labour market theory (Althauser, 1989, Doeringer and Piore, 
1971, Royal, 2000) although the theoretical discussion is similar). Less often, authors 
explore the causes or the consequence of mobility itself. Each of the theories above 
holds a central assumption that voluntary mobility leads to better jobs with better 
outcomes, bringing workers closer to attainment. Some consider voluntary movement 
alone as important (attainment theory), some consider movements within the firm as 
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important (efficiency wage theory), but in both cases, movement is assumed to entail 
“gains”.  
Mobility’s positive impact on outcomes is treated as a given. Throughout this focus, the 
rationale for mobility is simplified. In attainment theory, mobility is driven by the utility 
of the worker, who aims to maximise his or her reward (or attainment) as much as 
possible. For this reason, he or she takes promotions and fills vacancies where available; 
no mobility takes place without utility gain. For efficiency wage theory, employers aim 
to shape mobility action, limiting the amount of quits and increasing promotions. 
Higher wages (and higher utility) are offered in the form of promotion opportunities, in 
an effort to deter workers from quitting. In internal labour market theory too, mobility 
through a metaphorical ladder explains the correlation between worker tenure and 
chance of promotion, both of which increase the chance of attainment better than a 
career outside the firm. 
This assumption has two complexities, routinely captured by empirical papers which 
show nuance in the relationship between mobility and outcomes. The work presented 
here focuses extensively on these complexities. First, outcomes are multi-faceted. The 
columns listed at the start of the chapter switch between pay, working conditions, 
training, or the general feeling of understanding and empathy. Each of these is predicted 
to improve following mobility. Yet workers will likely make trade-offs, sacrificing 
longer hours for higher pay, or giving up tenure and job security with an old employer, 
for a well-paid position with a new one. Depending on the mobility type, the worker’s 
resources, and the structure of inequality they find themselves in, workers will make 
trades in outcomes by bargaining with employers. Second, there is a specific difference 
between subjective and objective outcomes, and although these are correlated, mobility 
will impact each differently as workers move to new positions with new responsibilities. 
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Workers who take promotions with an existing employer will see a rise in pay, but this 
comes with the added responsibility of a new role. Thus the idea that satisfaction will 
increase both pay and satisfaction is unrealistic. Both of the complexities above stem 
from the assumption that workers who move for voluntary reasons move to better jobs, 
where subjective and objective outcomes will improve and hence, are the same. Thus, 
the theories (especially attainment theory, where this is central) assume each voluntary 
move is driven by a better vacancy, which will bring better pay and higher status. Job 
mismatch, poor conditions, and movement for other, long-term opportunities are not 
considered. Thinking of the sharp rise in labour market mobility since the 1980’s 
(Osterman, 1999, Osterman, 1987), attainment theory would see these changes as 
pursuits of better vacancies.  
This thesis considers three configurations of the mobility-outcomes relationship. First, 
mobility and outcomes will differ by mobility type. The theories above consider 
voluntary mobility most often, giving only minor attention to involuntary mobility, yet 
involuntary mobility will also shape outcomes. Beyond this, inter-firm and intra-firm 
mobility are treated as one and the same by attainment theory, although efficiency wage 
theory and internal labour market theory tackle the distinction. Both mobility types 
differ in the effects they have on outcomes, if only due to differences in poaching (inter-
firm) and promotion (intra-firm). Second, worker characteristics will shape the 
mobility-outcomes relationship. Although attainment theory considers education or 
racial differences in attainment, these are explained as differences at the point of skill 
acquisition, not at the point of mobility. Several authors see this definition as a 
shortcoming, and have developed theoretical inequality regimes, and job queue 
discrimination theories which occur in the wider labour market, past the point of skill 
acquisition. These theories predict differences not only in the likelihood of experiencing 
mobility, but in the consequence of mobility. Third, countries differ in mobility rates, 
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and in capitalisms encouraging and discouraging collective or individualised 
bargaining. These country differences will shape the mobility-outcomes relationship 
further. Although Sørensen (1975) discusses this, considering separate structures of 
inequality, sociologists note the distinction less often, and most sample on single 
country cases, despite clear differences in welfare states, modes of skill creation, and 
labour market types (O Riain, 2011, Mills et al., 2006b, Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2004).  
These three configurations of mobility and outcomes inform the aims of this thesis. 
Without the complexities above, configurations would be simple. First, voluntary 
mobility would have a positive effect on outcomes, regardless of the location of the 
change, while involuntary mobility would have a negative effect. Second, differences 
between workers would favour labour market insiders, men would benefit over women, 
third level educated workers would benefit over other education groups. Third, country 
differences would also be basic; countries with high rates of mobility would also have 
the highest rewards tied to mobility. Once the complexities are considered, each 
configuration reveals its own advantages and disadvantages for workers; the thesis 
explores these.  
The aims of the thesis are stated below, alongside a list of objectives; these later inform 
a set of hypotheses. Each aim stems from a gap in the literature, but overall the thesis 
tests a key assumption that voluntary mobility leads to improved outcomes, and 
involuntary mobility worsens outcomes.  
To explore the relationship between different types of mobility and outcomes 
Estimate the effects of (in)voluntary mobility on subjective/objective 
outcomes 
Consider the nuance of (in)voluntary mobility between and within firms 
7 
 
To explore the differences between insiders and outsiders in the mobility-outcomes 
relationship 
Consider a gender effect in the relationship between (in)voluntary mobility 
and outcomes 
Consider an education effect in the relationship between (in) voluntary 
mobility and outcomes. 
To explore institutional differences between liberal and coordinated economies in 
the mobility-outcomes relationship 
Consider the strength of mobility as a predictor in the UK, a liberal market 
economy 
Consider the strength of mobility as a predictor in Germany, a coordinated 
market economy 
The thesis offers a comparative analysis of Germany and the UK, using longitudinal 
data.  Specifically, it considers employee history files over an eight year period to test 
mobility’s impact on three subjective and three objective outcomes.  Mobility is defined 
using two dimensions. First, whether respondents leave work for voluntary or 
involuntary reasons; and second, whether respondents leave an employer, or whether 
they remain with the same employer following the change (changing jobs without 
changing employer). Other dimensions could be considered, such as movement between 
occupations or industries, these are omitted due to limitations of space. Due to the 
design considered, the sample covers the core workforce in each country, those who 
remain employed from 2000 to 2008 without interruption. Models do not consider those 
in the economy’s periphery, who fall in and out of employment or inactivity during that 
time. A summary of the chapters follows.  
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Chapter 2 considers job mobility as it appears in the literature, pointing to three 
configurations of the mobility-outcomes relationship which inform the aims of this 
work. First, I summarise the theories and empirical findings linking voluntary and 
involuntary mobility with outcomes. Second, I review the authors who consider the 
theoretical and empirical reasons for differences between workers in the mobility-
outcomes relationship. Third, I summarise authors who find country differences in how 
job mobility is organised and how mobility impacts outcomes. Before summarising the 
findings tied to each aim, I review the theories cited. Four limitations emerge from the 
literature that motivates this thesis. First, each of the three theories assumes voluntary 
mobility is “good”, movement leads workers to better jobs. However, the empirical 
literature routinely shows strong effects when outcomes are subjective, but weak effects 
when outcomes are objective. Further, authors reveal that not all outcomes are affected 
by mobility, and not all change in unison, resulting in a type of bargaining that occurs 
when workers change jobs. These are the complexities noted earlier. Second, several 
empirical papers focus extensively on quits but rarely on promotions, a separate 
mechanism for movement. Despite their decline in recent years promotions remain an 
important mechanism for improving outcomes. Where authors do consider promotions, 
they rarely compare and contrast the effect of promotion against the effect of a quit; 
instead conflating results as two types of voluntary mobility. Third, authors assume all 
workers benefit roughly equally, without considering the gender, and class advantages 
tied to mobility. A small number of papers correct for this, where some authors return to 
worker differences having covered the basic principles of mobility-outcomes. These 
papers are few and often contain mixed results depending on the country sampled. 
Finally, linked to the previous point, most studies consider the effects of mobility on 
outcomes using single country samples. The last point is particularly important as it 
explains the many conflicting reports of mobility’s effects. Authors report conflicting 
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results, with mobility being either effective or ineffective depending on the institutional 
context of the labour market. A sample of papers in the comparative political economy 
literature find country differences in how voluntary mobility rewards workers, but most 
often researchers use single country samples. This chapter also presents the hypotheses.  
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology, listing the approach, summarising the design and 
presenting the data in both longitudinal panels. It considers the British Household Panel 
Survey as representative of workers in the UK, and the German Socio-Economic Panel 
as representative of workers in Germany. It briefly lists the subjective and objective 
outcomes used throughout the work, and explains how measures are made comparable. 
It also presents the main method of estimation, linear fixed-effects, outlining why this 
method is suited to the predictions of attainment theory, and its superiority to ordinary 
least squares regression. Lastly, the chapter outlines the weighting strategy, and states 
the limitations of the design. Despite these, two comparable case studies are possible 
after some basic checks. 
Chapter 4 considers country differences in mobility, outcomes, and institutions. Here 
the first argument emerges through the data, and sets up the main analysis for country-
specific chapters. It first considers the country differences in mobility types. 
Surprisingly, both countries do not differ in their rates of involuntary mobility. The 
main difference between Germany and the UK is in their rate of voluntary mobility. 
This story develops further when considering the longitudinal data, which shows that 
British “movers” move more often. Germany has fewer “movers” moving less often. 
The chapter also lists how outcomes vary more in the UK than they do in Germany. 
Generally there are wider differences in outcomes throughout an average British 
worker’s time in the panel, when compared to an average German worker’s time in the 
panel, suggesting working life in Germany is more predictable than in the UK. Lastly, 
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the chapter considers the institutional differences in both countries, summarising the 
institutional measures which shape mobility, and the institutional measures which shape 
outcomes. Both Germany and the UK present different social structures which reflect 
their previous patterns of movement and outcomes.  
Chapters 5 and 6, push the argument further by considering each country specific panel, 
separately. I estimate the effects of mobility types on outcomes, consider differences 
between workers, and discuss the results.  Large differences emerge not only in 
voluntary and involuntary mobility, but also in the nuance of each. As above, the 
chapter argues that the mobile markets found in the UK, are mechanisms for dealing 
with varied outcomes where occupational achievement or attainment is not guaranteed 
through mobility. Instead workers use mobility to improve subjective outcomes, 
suggesting job mismatch, or a poor working environment. In Germany mobility has 
only minor effects on outcomes, hardly improving the working conditions and pay of 
workers. The effect comes down to Germany’s collectivised form of bargaining, which 
limits the importance of personal characteristics. Here, the argument also stands. A key 
reason behind Germany’s low mobility is down to the minor returns on mobility, since 
conditions vary little between firms. Once wages and conditions are set at the industry 
level, workers do not require mobility to exit job mismatch and poor conditions. Instead 
they leave firms for more interesting work, or other subjective reasons. Differences 
between workers are minor but highlight important bargains in working time and pay, 
which have country specific differences also.  
Chapter 7 compares both countries. Here the thesis considers the final aim and discusses 
the results further. The chapter also considers the main contributions of the work, and 
its place in the wider literature. In the British market, voluntary mobility produces 
significant positive effects for subjective outcomes, but these rarely reflect objective 
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improvements (like increased wages). In the German market, voluntary mobility has 
almost no impact on subjective outcomes, yet is crucial for increasing pay. The chapter 
follows with a wider discussion of country differences in the meaning of “quits” and 
“promotions”. The predictions of internal labour market theory and efficiency wage 
theory emerge in both countries, suggesting internal promotions carry the largest 
premiums for workers.  
The thesis casts doubt over the claim that workers gain from mobile and dynamic labour 
markets. Instead mobile markets may be an institutional consequence for wide ranging 
working conditions and individualised bargaining, one which does not emerge in 
countries where bargaining occurs at the industry level, and where good pay and 
working conditions come as standard. It calls for further research into the claim that 
mobile markets are good for workers. The next chapter considers mobility, as it appears 
in the literature.  
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2. Literature Review  
This chapter considers the literature exploring job mobility and justifies the main aims 
of the thesis. It also lists the hypotheses as they emerge from the literature. Four gaps 
appear in the review, three inform the aims. First, in the theoretical literature voluntary 
mobility is driven by utilitarian gain, but empirically, voluntary (and involuntary) 
mobility has varied effects on subjective and objective outcomes. These often reveal 
bargains and compromises, depending on the type of mobility considered (inter or intra-
firm). Second, the theoretical literature often treats voluntary (henceforth VM) and 
involuntary mobility (henceforth IVM) as homogenous events. It rarely distinguishes 
between inter- and intra-firm mobility, yet these are separate structures with separate 
vacancies or opportunities. Third, articles exploring differences between workers are 
uncommon, authors often assume VM and IVM affect all workers equally. At the very 
least, they see inequality as stemming from skill acquisition before labour market entry. 
Last, articles providing an institutional context are also rare. As a result, authors assume 
mobility affects workers in different countries equally despite differences in labour 
markets and capitalisms. 
Overall, theories of income attainment contain an implicit assumption; job mobility, if 
voluntary, leads to better jobs. This is often stated but rarely tested; authors focus more 
on the determinants of job mobility than on their consequences (Le Grand and Tåhlin, 
2002). The assumption is particularly important to sociological perspectives of labour 
markets, since these see inequality as tied to positions in a structure, rather the 
characteristics of those occupying the position (Sørensen and Kalleberg, 1981). 
Mobility between positions is therefore the best strategy to achieve attainment or 
satisfaction, because workers slot into vacancies which contain their own rewards and 
premiums, independent of the characteristics of the worker. By contrast, economists see 
inequality as tied to the characteristics of individuals, where all premiums tied to 
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mobility can be explained by human capital; workers gain tenure and experience and 
then seek additional rewards to compensate for this. The literature review presented 
here justifies the aims in chapter 1. These aims inform the hypotheses developed below.  
2.1. Mobility and Outcomes 
The first aim of the thesis considers the relationship between basic mobility types and 
outcomes. In this section, the key theories appearing in empirical articles are 
summarised and critiqued. The complexities discussed in chapter 1 emerge from this 
summary. Utilitarian gain is predicted to driven job mobility, thus VM is assumed as 
mobility to a better job. This prediction is somewhat supported by empirical articles. 
Most authors are in agreement, overall VM correlates positively with a number of 
outcomes like satisfaction and earnings. Although authors differ in definitions of 
mobility, and the types of mobility considered, a general agreement emerges.  
Empirical nuance appears when authors consider separate structures of VM. 
Theoretically, attainment theory makes no distinction between mobility within and 
between firms, by the same token, human capital theory, expects no difference in 
voluntary mobility between and within firms in its effects on outcomes. Yet, some argue 
intra-firm mobility is more important, citing internal labour market theory, career 
ladders, and efficiency wage theory (Osterman, 1999, Althauser, 1989, Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1986). In these structures, workers wait for vacancies in order of tenure and 
seniority; thus promotions increase a respondent’s pay and working conditions. Other 
authors use results to argue the wider market is more important, citing attainment theory 
and the benefits of networks and occupational structures (Sørensen, 1975, Sørensen, 
1977, Sørensen and Tuma, 1978). In these accounts, workers use their skills and 
productivity to match with a level of reward they believe they are most capable of 
earning. Thus quitting increases a respondent’s pay and conditions, improving outcomes 
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better than promotions. From the empirical literature it is clear that VM is not so 
homogenous to benefit both workers who quit and workers who find promotion equally, 
but it is also unclear whether one systematically rewards workers less than the other.  
Authors do not reach a consensus on the effects of IVM on outcomes. Here, papers are 
split by those finding negative relationships (Keith and McWilliams, 1999) and those 
finding no relationship (Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 2001) between IVM and outcomes. 
Some cite the importance of direct moves (Schmelzer, 2010), while others cite the 
importance of labour market institutions (Fasang et al., 2012, Kalleberg and 
Mastekaasa, 2001). Generally, the effect of job loss and demotion on outcomes is 
unclear.  
2.1.1. Theoretical Considerations 
Several authors call for greater research into the link between job mobility and 
outcomes (Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 2001, Kronberg, 2013, Kronberg, 2014). While 
sociologists have focused extensively on the causes of mobility, they have focused less 
on its consequences. One reason for the limited research in this area is that the 
theoretical link between job mobility and outcomes is basic, and has lead to 
contradicting empirical results. Commenting on the literature overall Le Grand and 
Tåhlin (2002) suggest “the interrelations between tenure, mobility, and earnings 
[outcomes] are not well established empirically, which may be one reason why they 
continue to be subject to theoretical controversy”. With this in mind, the section below 
summarises and critiques three key theoretical perspectives; attainment theory, internal 
labour market theory, and efficiency wage theory. Each of these shares the assumption 
that job mobility contains an inherent premium for workers, although internal labour 
market theory and efficiency wage theory expect a premium for intra-firm mobility 
alone.  
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Attainment theory described by Sørensen (1975) states VM stems from a worker’s 
pursuit for the highest level of reward and satisfaction. The process of attainment is 
summarised as one where “change is brought about by utilising opportunities for 
change of position in a predetermined structure of inequality” (Sørensen 1977: p967). 
A “structure of inequality”, may be a firm, a market, an occupation, no distinction is 
made in the literature, only that it is a social structure where positions are organised 
from most to least favourable. “Positions” are jobs with specific rewards; only a change 
in job can produce a change in rewards, which take many forms. “Jobs may be 
characterized by the economic, social and psychological rewards they provide 
incumbents. It is assumed that only a change in jobs can provide a change in the level 
of rewards” (Sørensen 1977:p967). Workers seek to maximise rewards, and VM is the 
best way of achieving this. The process is motivated by utilitarianism where utility is 
increased through VM and decreased through IVM (Sørensen, 1975), independent of a 
worker’s characteristics.  
 Worker resources are assumed fixed from labour market entry (a controversial 
assumption, admitted by Sørensen (1977 p972) “No claim for the universal validity of 
the assumption of no change in resources over time can be made, but neither can such a 
universal claim be made for the validity of the assumption that all changes in 
attainment are due to changes in resources.”. Attainment theory expects workers to use 
mobility to navigate vacancies in a given structure of inequality (either a firm or a wider 
market). These vacancies carry premiums which workers compete or queue for, having 
gained most of their experience and human capital before entering the labour market. 
By contrast, human capital theory (Becker, 1994) expects no premium tied to mobility 
once tenure, age, experience and other human capital factors are considered. Mobility is 
simply the mechanism that matches a worker’s human capital to their reward. Since 
sociologists see inequality as stemming from positions, rather than the characteristics of 
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the people holding these positions, the positive effect of job change is attributed to 
obtaining the rewards of new positions (Sørensen and Kalleberg, 1981). Hence the 
assumption that job mobility rewards workers is particularly important to sociologists. 
Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) offer the values-rewards hypothesis, which strongly 
resembles the theory of attainment, in that worker characteristics are expected to remain 
unchanged and rewards are tied to vacancies found in the market. Job satisfaction is 
shaped but “personal unchanging values” on one hand, and “changing or dynamic job 
rewards” on the other. Since job mobility gives workers the chance to renegotiate their 
pay and working conditions, VM leads to increased rewards, while IVM leads to 
decreased rewards. Empirically, the positive link between VM and “reward” is evident, 
but the negative link between IVM and “reward” or outcomes, is not, even in Kalleberg 
and Mastekaasa’s (2001) own results. They rationalise this by claiming Norway’s 
welfare state protects workers from the negative effects of involuntary job mobility. It is 
likely that Sørensen (1975) is right to consider that theoretical rationale for IVM as 
more complicated than that of VM. Both of the theories above share a prediction, 
voluntary mobility will lead to a positive change in outcomes, beyond a worker’s fixed 
resources. They also apply this assumption to mobility between and within firms 
equally, without distinction. 
The theoretical relationship between intra-firm mobility and outcomes has received less 
attention by authors citing attainment theory. Many cite efficiency wage theory instead 
(Akerlof and Yellen, 1986), which predicts employers create vacancies with above-
market wages and “better” working conditions, in an effort to internalise labour. Since 
wage cuts are said to increase costs through a negative effect on productivity, and 
poaching comes with replacement and retraining costs, employers will create vacancies 
with above market-wages and internal career ladders, in an effort to internalise staff. 
17 
 
Thus respondents who leave a firm (even voluntarily) will see no gain from the change 
and a possible loss, since wages are set above their efficiency within the firm. Further, 
promotions will raise wages higher than quits, since vacancies within the firm will 
contain rewards higher than a worker’s efficiency.  
The theory strongly resembles internal labour market theory (Althauser, 1989, 
Doeringer and Piore, 1971, Royal, 2000) and dual labour market theory (Averitt, 1987, 
Piore, 1970) which claim that internal career ladders are the best mechanisms for 
attainment. Internal labour markets are “anchored in the administrative rules governing 
hiring, promotions, layoffs, and the pricing of labour”. In this way firms or occupations 
(for occupational labour markets) contain career ladders, entry points, and progress 
through training. Desirable jobs and higher pay are placed higher on the “career ladder”. 
Internal promotions reward workers beyond their fixed resources as employers try to 
incentivise workers to pursue promotions, instead of quits. Here too, intra-firm 
movement is predicted to have the strongest effect on wages (at times authors cite 
working conditions and subjective feelings about work, but wages are the most 
prominent outcome) (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, Burawoy, 1982). Le Grand and Tåhlin 
(2002) claim one of the least studied aspects of internal labour markets is this link 
between mobility and earnings.   
Two issues stand out above. The first lies with the utilitarian view of mobility and 
outcomes, the second lies with the broader definition of mobility. Both critiques apply 
more to attainment theory and the values-rewards model, than to efficiency wage 
theory, or internal labour market theory. Regarding the first, authors take a utilitarian 
view of attainment. Although Sørensen (1977) routinely operationalizes attainment 
using pay or status (objective outcomes), the concept is theoretical and “gains” may also 
be subjective, like satisfaction. In this way, mobility is assumed to move workers to all-
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round better jobs. Workers and employers likely bargain over gains and working 
conditions in order to achieve a match between effort and reward, a utilitarian view 
misses this. Empirical articles routinely show workers making trades through mobility, 
earning more after a voluntary change, but not becoming more satisfied with pay due to 
the increased responsibility of movement (Gesthuizen and Dagevos, 2008).  
Second, the authors’ view of mobility is also limited. Throughout examples, Sørensen 
(1977) considers the impact of promotions in closed vacancy-chain systems. However 
mobility to a new employer also features, without acknowledgment that these changes 
rely on separate structures. Hachen (1990) raises the point, arguing that intra-firm 
mobility is more complex than the theory of attainment allows, since the employer (and 
the politics of the firm) determines if workers receive promotions or new opportunities 
even when vacancies emerge. The wider market (inter-firm) may be more worker-
driven, workers themselves are able to explore wider opportunities and contrast 
vacancies against one another (with reference to their current job). Importantly, he later 
developed this idea further; showing that industry specific mobility rates are shaped by 
the wage practices and employment opportunities afforded by a firm’s “production 
regime” (Hachen, 1992). Thus both inter-firm and intra-firm mobility rates are set by 
the wider strategy of the firm and the economy, and crucially, they are separate 
processes. However, in both cases Hachen is more interested in predicting the 
likelihood of movement, asking if firms encourage or discourage inter and intra-firm 
mobility. In neither work are the consequences of mobility explored. In neither work is 
the assumption tested: what do workers get out of mobility?” 
Hachen (1990) further argues that attainment theory is unable to predict the effects of 
IVM, since the model calls for individuals to be self-reflective. Sørensen (1975) admits 
that the main focus of attainment theory is VM but addresses the point briefly, 
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“Involuntary job shifts are important for the occupational achievement [attainment] 
process because they are likely to produce a loss in status and/or income. Any gain a 
person may obtain should be obtained through a voluntary shift, before the firing takes 
place...” (Sørensen 1975: p469).  
As a summary, much of the literature above focuses on the patterns and causes of 
mobility, predicting who moves where and for what reason. Each contains an implicit 
assumption, that VM is inherently “good” (and IVM is inherently “bad”) as it moves 
workers to better (or worse) positions. When predicting the consequences of mobility, 
authors typically describe worker utility, which can apply to several empirical measures, 
either subjective or objective. This is an oversimplification, as evident in several 
empirical papers. The complexities above emerge routinely; with mobility increasing 
certain outcomes over others and producing different effects on the same outcomes 
measured objectively and subjectively. Further, although few authors make the 
connection, there are obvious differences in the effect of mobility between and within 
firms. Overall, the relationship between mobility and outcomes is “a theoretically 
important but empirically neglected issue” (Le Grand and Tåhlin, 2002). 
2.1.2. Empirical Findings 
Authors routinely comment that despite its theoretical importance, empirical work 
testing the relationship between mobility and outcomes is scarce. Despite this, a core 
group of papers are summarised here. Most of the literature is in agreement; VM on 
average has a positive effect on several outcomes. Although important distinctions 
should be made between papers, several results from a broad range of countries point to 
a similar relationship. In the US, Keith and McWilliams (1999, 1995, 1997) , and Cha 
(2014) report a positive link between “employee-initiated” mobility and wages. In the 
Netherlands, Gesthuizen (2009, 2008) finds a positive link between VM and both 
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objective and subjective outcomes. In Germany Latzke et al. (2016), Pavlopoulos et al. 
(2014), Reichelt and Abraham (2017),  and Schmelzer (2010) find similar links between 
VM and wages or satisfaction, although some suggest its emphasis in Germany is over-
stated. In the UK too, Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) report significant wage gains for low 
paid workers who move for voluntary reasons. Lastly, Fasang et al. (2012) consider a 
European-wide sample, reporting similar results. Most of these cite at least one of the 
theories discussed above, and most find voluntary mobility carries a premium, beyond 
the characteristics and skills of the worker. 
The definition and operationalisation of VM differs across articles, but most capture a 
similar phenomenon. The majority define the concept subjectively using survey data, 
although not all authors use valid categories for definitions. Gesthuizen (2009), 
Gesthuizen and Dagevos (2008) use a Dutch panel to separate voluntary inter and intra-
firm movements based on questions of “recent change” and the “reason for the change”. 
Latzke et al. (2016) and Schmelzer (2010) define VM as a recent change (direct to a 
new employer) after an “own resignation”, only inter-firm VM is considered. Keith and 
McWilliams (1999, 1995, 1997) do not use subjective categories in the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Instead they operationalise VM (which they call 
employee-initiated quits) as respondents who “quit for pregnancy or other family-
related reason” or “a quit for other reasons”. This likely underestimates the effect of 
VM on outcomes, as respondents who leave for every other reason fall into the “other” 
category. This definition too considers only inter-firm movement. Kalleberg and 
Mastekaasa (2001) define half of their categories subjectively, and the other half 
objectively. Using Norwegian panel data, “quits” are defined using survey categories, as 
clear inter-firm changes for voluntary reasons. “Promotions” are operationalised as 
large changes in pay between survey rounds, without a change of employer. In this way, 
respondents who simply ask for a raise, also fall into the “promotion” category. The 
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design still considers both inter or intra-firm mobility even if the validity of intra-firm 
changes is questionable. Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) define the categories objectively, 
unlike most of the authors above. Voluntary mobility is taken to mean any change that 
does not result in a period of unemployment. Hence respondents who manage to move 
directly to a new employer after a dismissal are defined “voluntary”. Reichelt and 
Abraham (2017) consider only regional and occupational mobility, thus they focus 
specifically on inter-firm mobility which results in changing regions or professions. 
Overall, definitions of “voluntary mobility” differ across authors based on the available 
data. Few authors compare and contrast inter and intra-firm mobility against one 
another, most focus on inter-firm mobility alone.  
Papers also differ by analytical strategy, although most consider unbiased estimates. 
Some authors do not control for individual heterogeneity, the person unchanging 
characteristics which make workers more likely to pursue promotions and quits. Instead 
researchers assume that job mobility is a random event, where respondents have a 
roughly equal chance of experiencing job mobility. Keith and McWilliams (1999, 1995, 
1997) are the most prominent example, although their estimates do not differ radically 
from other authors. At times, their results may over-estimate the effect but generally 
resemble the estimates of others. They consider the effect of VM on wage growth using 
OLS, and so cannot distinguish if the effect of mobility is the product of moving, or the 
product of respondents who are most likely to move. This criticism does not nullify their 
findings; the goal of the papers is to estimate gender differences in mobility and 
outcomes (discussed later). The remaining authors consider unbiased estimates using 
some variation of panel techniques. Several use linear fixed-effects (within-estimator 
models or difference in difference models) (Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 2001, 
Gesthuizen, 2009, Gesthuizen and Dagevos, 2008, Schmelzer, 2010, Pavlopoulos et al., 
2014, Reichelt and Abraham, 2017, Cha, 2014). Latzke et al. (2016) combine panel 
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techniques (propensity score matching) with OLS regression to gain unbiased estimates 
of the effect of mobility. These methods are particularly suited to attainment theory, 
which assumes that worker characteristics remain unchanged while workers are in the 
labour market. Thus, the coefficient estimating the impact of mobility captures the 
premium tied to a position, instead of a worker’s characteristics. One limitation of the 
method is omitted variable bias, which may increase the importance of mobility, if 
other theoretically important measures are left out. This limitation is particularly 
important for human capital theory, which often seeks different measures of education 
and skill acquisition to “explain away” the effect of mobility. One important paper 
stands out from the works above but contains significant findings. Sallaz (2017) carries 
out a ethnography of a call centre, categorising various “exit strategies” which move 
workers from bad jobs to improved ones (or into unemployment). Here, in depth 
interviews and participant observation provide deep insight into the logic of quitting a 
bad job, something statistical modelling cannot capture.  
There are also clear differences in the outcomes used by authors. While some focus on 
objective measures alone, like wages (Keith and McWilliams, 1999, Keith and 
McWilliams, 1995, Keith and McWilliams, 1997, Pavlopoulos et al., 2014, Cha, 2014, 
Reichelt and Abraham, 2017), others consider subjective satisfaction or “soft outcomes” 
alone (Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 2001, Gesthuizen, 2009, Fasang et al., 2012). A 
smaller group of authors consider both (Latzke et al., 2016, Gesthuizen and Dagevos, 
2008). The findings of these three groups are summarised below. VM (overall) appears 
to impact each group of outcomes slightly differently, it is important to note that both 
inter- and intra-firm mobility are considered together in the summary below. 
First, the link between objective outcomes and VM is clear, workers who move increase 
wages and improve earnings growth. Keith and McWilliams (1999, 1995, 1997) 
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confirm this for “employee initiated mobility” in the US. Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) 
report the same in Germany and the UK (although the relationship only applies to low-
paid workers, discussed later). Hence when models estimate the effect of mobility on 
pay or status, mobility tends to increase the outcome (in Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) this 
effect goes beyond the characteristics of the worker).   
Second, the link between VM and subjective outcomes is less clear. Results begin to 
differ somewhat depending on the outcome considered. These are typically satisfaction 
scores measuring the job, security, wages, or time. Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) 
find mixed results between VM and satisfaction with pay, interest in work, how pleasant 
work is, and security. Mobility has a positive effect on the first three outcomes but a 
negative effect on security, suggesting workers make trade-offs through VM. 
Gesthuizen (2009) finds that out of four subjective outcomes, only two are improved by 
mobility. When considering satisfaction with pay, the work itself, hours, and the job 
match. VM improves the first two outcomes, but not the second two. This too suggests 
VM prompts workers make trades for outcomes using mobility, gaining in one outcome 
but compromising in others.  
Lastly, some authors use both subjective and objective outcomes which reveal 
important differences (Gesthuizen and Dagevos, 2008, Latzke et al., 2016). As 
Gesthuizen and Dagevos (2008) show, VM has a minor positive effect on socio-
economic status and wages (objective), but a far greater effect on subjective measures of 
similar outcomes. Thus, subjective satisfaction is more influenced by VM, than 
objective reality. In this sense, the biggest gains tied to mobility are likely a 
renegotiation of responsibilities, or a better match between responsibility and a worker’s 
reward, rather than the actual pay received. Latzke et al. (2016) also find VM has a 
strong positive effect on subjective outcomes, but a weaker effect on objective pay, one 
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that has been declining over time as mobility becomes more common. In both papers, 
there is strong evidence that subjective and objective measures of the same outcome are 
differently affected by mobility. In each of the papers above, human capital theory 
explains a portion of the variance in outcomes (older, more experienced workers earn 
more and are more satisfied than younger, less experienced ones). However, a premium 
tied to the job, still remains, although it is largely subjective.  
In the summary above several types of voluntary mobility are considered together. Yet, 
authors consistently find nuance in the effect; different types of VM have different 
effects on the outcome. Some authors compare and contrast inter- and intra-firm 
mobility against remaining in the same job with the same employer (Kalleberg and 
Mastekaasa, 2001, Pavlopoulos et al., 2014, Gesthuizen, 2009, Gesthuizen and 
Dagevos, 2008, Fasang et al., 2012). Others consider inter-firm movements for 
economic reasons on one hand, and family reasons on the other, against years where 
respondents stay in the same job with the same employer (Keith and McWilliams, 1999, 
Keith and McWilliams, 1995, Keith and McWilliams, 1997). Others still estimate the 
effect of inter-firm mobility as a direct change (job-to-job) and indirect change (job 
change via unemployment) (Schmelzer, 2010). Unpacking the importance of inter-firm 
mobility further, Reichelt and Abraham (2017) divide the difference between regional 
and occupational mobility among inter-firm changes. They find the effect differs 
between workers who change regions, and workers who change occupations. Each of 
these differences reveals important aspects of wage inequality, it is argued. As with 
several authors above however, internal mobility and promotion are not controlled for.  
 Each of the papers suggests VM is nuanced, and theories that consider VM as a whole, 
do not account for these differences. This criticism can be applied to both attainment 
theory, and human capital theory.  Neither of these expects a difference in terms of 
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inter-firm or intra-firm mobility, with attainment theory predicting a similar premium 
for both, and human capital theory predicting a premium for neither. Results are further 
complicated by the use of subjective and objective outcomes; which the cited authors 
consider less often.  
Gesthuizen (2009) reports a positive effect between VM and 4 subjective outcomes 
(satisfaction with hours, wages, match, and the job itself). He considers the effect of 
inter-firm and intra-firm mobility separately, citing attainment theory (Sørensen, 1977). 
Results show a clear difference between inter-firm and intra-firm mobility, where the 
former improves subjective outcomes far better than the latter. This suggests internal 
structures and career ladders are not able to improve subjective outcomes as well as 
wider networks or structures. As proposed by Hachen (1990) and Hachen (1992) 
attainment theory works best for predicting the effect of inter-firm mobility, but is less 
effective for intra-firm mobility, since both rely on separate social mechanisms. This 
finding is almost the opposite of that predicted by efficiency wage theory, and internal 
labour market theory. However, it confirms that positions or vacancies hold a premium 
independent of the characteristics of those filling the position; this premium however 
appears higher between firms than it is within firms.  
 Elsewhere Gesthuizen and Dagevos (2008) find further nuance to VM. Again, the 
authors cite attainment theory. They find that inter-firm VM increases subjective 
outcomes best, but has a limited effect on objective outcomes. Further, intra-firm VM 
increases objective outcomes best but has a limited impact on subjective outcomes. 
Here, attainment theory would expect a roughly similar result for both mobility types, 
yet a clear divide exists between the type of VM and the type of outcome. According to 
these results, efficiency wage theory is in effect for objective outcomes. Workers who 
take promotions see higher premiums attached to the job; these are above what can be 
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explained using their personal characteristics and resources. However, movement 
between firms contains higher premiums in terms of subjective satisfaction, than staying 
in the same firm and pursuing promotion. 
Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) show that promotions and quits (both VM) yield 
improved subjective outcomes. However, while promotions improve near every 
subjective outcome in their models, quits improve only “interest in work” and 
subjectively “pleasant work” at the expense of job security (which declines). Here it 
seems that workers who change firms make trade-offs, giving up job security for more 
interesting work. Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) do not comment on this, despite the 
fact that internal labour markets or efficiency wage theory may be at play where 
employers try to internalise staff.  
Fasang et al. (2012) compare the effects of internal and external upward mobility on 
three subjective outcomes; satisfaction with the contract, satisfaction with work life 
balance, and satisfaction with career prospects. Overall, upward mobility improves 
outcomes. But splitting the effects by inter-firm and intra-firm changes reveals nuance; 
external mobility has a significant impact on contract satisfaction and work-life balance, 
but internal mobility has a positive impact on satisfaction with careers. Here, two 
separate processes are happening, respondents who want to correct for poor working 
conditions may be moving externally, respondents who are focused on improving their 
careers may be moving internally, yet both types of mobility are considered voluntary 
and both types of mobility “make people happy”. Thus the nuance of VM is an 
important distinction, and intra-firm mobility contains a premium in career prospects (or 
perceived prospects) while inter-firm mobility contains a premium in job satisfaction, 
suggesting it may be fuelled by dissatisfaction at work.    
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Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) are one of the few listed authors who acknowledge any nuance 
in mobility between or within firms; considering attainment theory for inter-firm 
changes alongside efficiency wage theory for intra-firm changes. Although other authors 
test for these differences, they hardly comment on the clear difference between inter-
firm and intra-firm change. Both inter-firm and intra-firm mobility results in increased 
wages for low paid workers. However, the UK is more likely to reward intra-firm 
mobility with higher wages, while Germany does not reward intra-firm mobility. 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) cite institutional differences for the result. In both countries 
inter-firm mobility holds a stronger pay premium than intra-firm mobility. This finding 
is also the near opposite of efficiency wage theory for obvious reasons, but importantly, 
in both countries a premium tied to change exists even when controlling for time-
invariant characteristics of workers, like education or skill.  
Lastly, in an ethnographic study of exit strategies, Sallaz (2017) captures a nuanced and 
important relationship between inter-firm mobility and outcomes. Here, mobility is 
expressed as a process of bargaining and compromise. Workers leave well paid jobs, 
with poor conditions and no chance of progression, for “better” jobs, with less pay but 
better working conditions and opportunities. The process is nuanced, where bargaining 
and strategy does not resemble the attainment presented by  but instead a patchwork of 
loss, gain, and compromise. In fact, this is especially true of workers who strategies 
their mobility, in that they plan ahead and by all accounts appear to behave somewhat 
“rationally”. Other workers merely quit, unable to deal with the conditions of their 
position. Here, the full conflict of bargaining, which happens at the point of mobility, is 
fleshed out.    
The papers summarised above differ from the previous summary because they consider 
the importance of career ladders and promotions. Ignoring the impact of intra-firm 
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mobility offers an incomplete picture of mobility. A number of authors do not consider 
the change (Keith and McWilliams, 1999, Keith and McWilliams, 1995, Keith and 
McWilliams, 1997, Latzke et al., 2016, Schmelzer, 2010), making it difficult to assess 
whether the reference category (non-movers) contains workers moving through internal 
career ladders, or not. This is especially true for Schmelzer (2010) since the work 
underscores the importance of labour market tenure and experience, as a proxy for 
human capital. Both of these measures are also important predictors for internal 
changes like promotions as explained by internal labour market theory (Althauser, 
1989, Althauser and Kalleberg, 1981), yet these mobility types are ignored. 
Intra-firm mobility is a crucial event, and is at the heart of the “traditional career model” 
(Tilly, 1998, Althauser, 1989, Althauser and Kalleberg, 1981). Considering the effect of 
internal promotion, and how it weighs against external quits shows a more complete 
picture of job mobility. It presents a dichotomy between voluntary exits versus internal 
commitments. Based on the readings above I propose the first set of hypotheses, linking 
voluntary mobility and outcomes. 
Hypothesis 1a: Voluntary mobility will have a positive effect on outcomes 
(attainment theory, efficiency wage theory). 
Hypothesis 1b: Voluntary mobility will differ based on movement between and 
within firms.  Intra-firm voluntary mobility will have a positive effect on objective 
outcomes (efficiency wage theory, internal labour market theory). 
Hypothesis 1c: Inter-firm voluntary mobility will have a positive effect on subjective 
outcomes (attainment theory). 
Many of the authors above also consider the effect of IVM, to mixed results. Kalleberg 
and Mastekaasa (2001) find no effect between IVM and subjective outcomes in 
29 
 
Norway. Keith and McWilliams (1999, 1995, 1997) find significant negative effects for 
IVM and wage growth, using US data. Results differ somewhat by gender, but generally 
apply to both and men and women. Schmelzer (2010) finds no effect between indirect 
mobility and both subjective and objective outcomes in Germany, although the sample 
of indirect movers may contain a mix of those dismissed and those who resign. Fasang 
et al. (2012) find a negative relationship between IVM and subjective outcomes using 
data from the Eurobarometer for a broad sample of welfare states.   
Authors differ in terms of how IVM is defined. Keith and McWilliams (1999, 1995, 
1997) consider respondents who change employers due to dismissal or layoff, grouping 
these together as involuntary or “employer initiated” mobility. Kalleberg and 
Mastekaasa (2001) consider both inter and intra-firm involuntary changes. They use 
survey data to compare respondents who move to a new employer between years for 
involuntary reasons (dismissal) and those who remain with the same employer, but see a 
sharp fall in pay between rounds (demotions). Schmelzer (2010) defines involuntary 
changes as those who move indirectly to a new employer after a period of 
unemployment, or without setting up employment directly after the change. Lastly, 
Fasang et al. (2012) consider downward mobility as involuntary, operationalised as a 
downward change in the scaled question “skills necessary to complete the job”. Author 
differences in defining IVM may explain differences in estimates, since a number of 
different strategies are considered. However, samples generally contain respondents 
who remain employed between survey rounds (round t, and round t-1) but report an 
involuntary change somewhere between the current and previous round.  
Regarding estimation, papers differ in statistical techniques which also could explain 
differences in results. As before, not all authors consider individual heterogeneity, 
which is to say, they do not consider the person specific reasons why a respondent may 
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lose their job or be demoted. Keith and McWilliams (1999, 1995, 1997) for example, 
estimate wage growth models using OLS, in this way the strong negative effect they 
find, may be the product of person-specific errors, which correlate with movement for 
involuntary reasons. Fasang et al. (2012) estimate the effect using pooled ordinal 
logistic regression, and find a negative relationship between IVM and subjective 
outcomes, although they too fail to consider person-specific errors which likely 
correlate with IVM. Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) consider the importance of 
person-specific errors, estimating the effect of IVM using linear fixed-effects models. 
They find no significant result between outcomes and IVM. Thus person-specific errors 
may explain the estimates proposed by Keith and McWilliams’ results (1999, 1995, 
1997). The lack of negative effect is problematic for Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) 
as their findings run counter to the values-rewards model which they present in the 
same paper. The authors (and elsewhere Fasang et al. (2012)) propose the effect is the 
result of Norway’s generous welfare state, which offers unemployment benefits that 
allow workers to remain in the labour market, and recreate their conditions and pay with 
a new employer. Schmelzer (2010) estimate the effect of “indirect” mobility to a new 
employer (with a minor period of unemployment), also finding no relationship between 
IVM and wages in Germany.  Both findings challenge attainment theory in a way. If 
premiums are attached to jobs, less so than individuals, then dismissals and demotions 
should lead to lower pay and status. Although Sørensen (1975) comments on the 
relationship between IVM and outcomes, he generally states the process is more 
complicated than VM.  
The most interesting results stem from the varied types of IVM, although admittedly 
these are few. Keith and McWilliams (1999, 1995, 1997) do not consider intra-firm 
demotions; as a result they offer an incomplete picture of mobility. However they show 
different estimates for respondents who are laid off and those who are dismissed, both 
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seen as involuntary inter-firm changes. Considering these separately, dismissals produce 
large negative effects on wages, suggesting respondents who report a recent dismissal 
earn less than those who remain in the same job with the same employer. Layoffs 
however, produce minor negative effects. Both changes are examples of involuntary 
inter-firm mobility, but one is tied to demand, while the other is tied to performance. It 
could be that workers who experience dismissals fall into lower quality jobs, while 
those who experience layoffs are able to recreate their pay somehow through labour 
queues.  
Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) test IVM separately, intra-firm IVM (demotions) has 
no significant impact on four subjective outcomes but inter-firm IVM (layoffs) has a 
negative impact on job security alone. This suggests workers are able to recreate their 
working conditions after a demotion, and after a dismissal (save for a fall in job 
security). These findings stand opposite Keith and McWilliams (1995), whose results 
may be unique to a US sample, where the labour market is dynamic and competitive. A 
dismissal has consequences in the US, since labour markets are individualised. These 
consequences are less common in Norway, where a collectivist labour market exists. 
Alternatively, the negative effect in Keith and McWilliams (1995) could be the result of 
not correcting for person-specific errors, which Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) 
consider in their work. 
Fasang et al. (2012) too find nuance in the effect of IVM. Downward (involuntary) 
changes have a negative effect on each measure of satisfaction. However, looking 
further, Fasang find that downward mobility contains different effects based on the 
location of the move, similar to previous authors. Internal downward mobility 
(demotion) has a negative effect on work-life balance, and satisfaction with career. It 
does not have an effect on contract satisfaction. This is likely because workers must 
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spend time investing in new positions after a demotion. Inter-firm downward changes 
have only one negative effect on workers. Workers who move to a new employer and 
take a job of lower skill are less satisfied with their contract, possibly because of lower 
working conditions. Otherwise downward inter-firm mobility has no effect on workers. 
Again, IVM produces a small negative effect on outcomes overall, but when explored 
further, differences in internal and external IVM emerge. Further, Fasang et al. (2007) 
find welfare state differences in how unemployment affects satisfaction, which I discuss 
later.  
In an analysis of US panel data Cha (2014) finds significant negative effects of IVM on 
earnings, but these are specific to women. More importantly, the penalty does not differ 
between women with children and those without. She further argues that the 2008 
economic recession exacerbated the negative effect.  
The papers above are mixed; IVM seems to have either an insignificant or a negative 
effect on outcomes. In a review essay, Kalleberg (2009) notices a similar puzzle. He 
proposes that terminations of the past fluctuated with the business cycle. Workers lost 
their jobs en masse during downturns, where unemployment grew and growth declined. 
In the modern labour market, workers are equally likely to lose positions during periods 
of stability and downturn, reflecting a “way of increasing short-term profits by reducing 
labour costs, even in good economic times”. Workers who lose their position are now 
able to search for new positions quickly, and both blue and white collar workers are 
equally likely to see an involuntary change (Osterman, 1999). IVM is thus 
“normalized”. The wage penalty associated with the past may be tied to declines in 
demand, where workers entered the labour market in the down turn, not person-specific 
wage penalties or scarring effects. On the other hand, the results found by Keith and 
McWilliams (1995) show this is unlikely, as dismissals and layoffs produced different 
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outcomes for workers during the same time period. Based on these readings, I propose 
the next set of hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2a: Involuntary mobility will have a negative effect on outcomes 
(attainment theory). 
Hypothesis 2b: Involuntary mobility will differ based on movement between and 
within firms.  Intra-firm involuntary mobility will have a negative effect on objective 
outcomes (efficiency wage theory, internal labour market theory). 
Hypothesis 2c: Inter-firm involuntary mobility will have a negative effect on 
subjective outcomes (attainment theory). 
The next section considers the second aim of the thesis; worker differences in the 
mobility-outcomes relationship.  
2.2. Worker Differences 
The second aim in the thesis explores the differences between workers in the mobility-
outcomes relationship. Previous authors, (Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 2001, Gesthuizen 
and Dagevos, 2008) treat the effects of mobility as roughly equal for all respondents, 
which is a limitation. Although the topic has largely been ignored, a number of authors 
find subtle worker-differences in the relationship between mobility and outcomes. 
Gender, race, and education may shape the effect of changing employers or taking a 
promotion, not just the chances of changing employers or taking a promotion. These 
differences are enhanced by the complexities described earlier. It is not simply enough 
to say that men hold an advantage over women, or that third level educated workers 
benefit at the expense of other groups. Instead it seems that workers see advantages and 
disadvantages depending on the type of outcome considered and the way mobility is 
defined. In short, the theoretical predictions do not always match the empirical works. 
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Below, I summarise the theoretical papers predicting worker differences in the mobility-
outcomes relationship. I also consider eight empirical papers which explore worker 
differences in the premiums tied to VM. Authors sample the US, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK, offering several institutional contexts. They consider gender, 
education, and race as important. Throughout, I list the next set of hypotheses, linked to 
the second aim. Overall, I argue that gender and education are distinct dimensions of 
worker-differences. Between-worker hypotheses should use these dimensions.  
2.2.1. Theoretical Considerations 
The theory of attainment and efficiency wage theory assume the effects of movement 
apply to all workers roughly evenly, given their resources. Differences in “worker 
resources” (Sørensen and Tuma, 1978) explain differences in outcomes gained through 
mobility. Thus any difference between genders, education groups, races, or classes is 
assumed to be a difference at the point of obtaining resources, not at the point of 
mobility. This view is surprisingly similar to human capital theory (Becker, 2010, 
Becker, 1994) which assumes that differences in skill acquisition and education are 
responsible for differences between workers in terms of mobility. Hachen (1990) takes 
issue with this, as this implies there are no restrictions on the ability of individuals to 
“reach their expected attainment level” through mobility. It’s well documented that 
gender, race, and education will play a part in determining chances of VM and IVM 
(beyond resources). A further issue with both Sørensen (1975) and Hachen (1990) is 
that both maintain VM leads to improved outcomes or increased utility. Neither 
considers the possibility that different groups of workers see different consequences 
from mobility.   
In a summary of gender and racial based discrimination (at the point of hiring and 
promotion), Hachen (1990) proposes the limited-opportunity model, to be considered 
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alongside attainment theory and efficiency wage theory. The key distinction is that the 
limited-opportunity model considers the effects of discrimination after the point of 
resource acquisition. It encompasses a number of predictions of between-worker 
differences, I focus on two specifically. First, overt discrimination (Becker, 2010) refers 
to employers singling out gender and education groups as a matter of taste, holding a 
preference for tertiary-educated men. Thus employer preferences get in the way of 
rationale choice, and a competitive market is the “easiest” solution to the problem. 
Second, is statistical discrimination, where beliefs about specific groups (like the 
overall productivity of minorities) limit opportunities for hiring and firing of workers 
“[they] are not hired because of the objective characteristics of the group to which they 
belong, although they themselves, are satisfactory” (Thurow, 1976: p172). Both factors 
predict discriminated groups will see lower rates of mobility and fewer chances for 
bargaining. Pushing these theories further, discrimination will likely impact the rewards 
tied to VM itself.  
Citing Hachen (1990), Rosenfeld (1992) proposes that “easily observed markers such as 
education, race, or sex” are important for inter-firm mobility, since employers have 
limited information about potential employees and must make snap judgements. In this 
way the tastes and prejudices of employers (discussed above) will play a key role in 
giving advantage to men over women, and highly educated over less educated workers 
(signalling theory). The mechanism is similar to statistical discrimination but focuses 
specifically on inter-firm movement, since employers have more knowledge on their 
staff when intra-firm mobility is considered.  
Acker (2006) develops the mechanism behind the theories, referencing to gender, class, 
and race, arguing that structures of inequality within the firm deter women from 
progressing (to the advantage of men). She summarises inequality regimes within firms, 
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which are defined as “interrelated practices, processes, actions, and meanings that 
result in and maintain class, gender, and racial inequalities within particular 
organizations.” (Acker, 2006: p443). Her definition of inequality considers the 
organisation of work, the work process, as well as promotion, hiring and firing. Again, 
she does not consider the point of resource acquisition, like the previous authors. The 
mechanisms most relevant to the discussion here is recruitment, and training. Firms tend 
to display preferences for “unencumbered” white males when designing work, both men 
and women are expected to fit this role. Elsewhere firms rely on social networks for the 
process of hiring staff, a process which generates gender and racial inequalities (see also 
Petersen et al. (2000)). Further, Acker (2006) contrasts the support men and women 
receive at work. Men regularly receive training and “...were groomed for managerial 
jobs... The women... were not groomed for managerial jobs” (Acker, 2006: p447). In 
this way, men may be less dependent on the rewards that come with mobility, gaining 
new skill from training and productivity. Women on the other hand would see far larger 
returns from mobility to a new position, which would have greater rewards than their 
resources could explain. 
Considering these, gender plays a mitigating role in the mobility-outcomes relationship, 
which goes beyond the life-chances of mobility itself. Mobility will yield gender 
specific consequences (in terms of outcomes), according to the predictions laid out 
above.    
Education also plays a significant role in how mobility affects outcomes. Thurow 
(1976) predicts opportunities for less educated workers are fewer than opportunities for 
educated workers, due to assumptions made by employers (statistical discrimination). 
Since workers gain most of the skills necessary to complete jobs after they obtain the 
job, he proposes that the labour market as not a place for buying and selling existing 
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skills, but rather a “training market where training slots must be allocated to different 
workers. The distribution of training slots and the allocation of individuals among these 
slots depend upon two sets of factors. One set of factors determines an individual's 
relative position in the labor queue; another set of factors, not mutually exclusive of the 
first, determines the actual distribution of job opportunities in the economy. Wages are 
paid based on the characteristics of the job in question, and workers are distributed 
across job (training) opportunities based on their relative position in the labor queue.” 
(Thurow, 1976: p76). This definition is a founding concept of the sociological 
perspective on labour markets, where positions contain rewards, and the individual 
characteristics of the worker come secondary (Sørensen and Kalleberg, 1981). Natural 
ability is not solely responsible for the differences between educational groups. Thus 
when employers reward higher educated workers they “reward the higher expected 
productivity of the higher educated” (Gesthuizen, 2009). Considering the theories 
above; significant differences in the consequences of mobility are also expected 
between education groups.  
Several authors have applied the theories above to gender and education, producing 
mixed results. The section below summarises a number of findings, mostly focusing on 
authors who consider either overt discrimination or statistical discrimination alongside 
attainment theory. 
2.2.2. Empirical Findings: 
Some work finds gender, race, and education differences in the mobility-outcomes 
relationship. Considering gender first, Kronberg (2013) takes note of the theories above, 
and estimates gender differences in the effect of VM using a US sample. Keith and 
McWilliams (1999, 1995, 1997) estimate similar models in the US with different 
definitions of VM, limited by the survey. Cha (2014) too considers the effect, 
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comparing men and women before and after the US recession. Gesthuizen (2009) 
considers gender differences in VM’s effect on subjective outcomes in the Netherlands. 
Latzke et al. (2016) explore the same effect in Germany.  
These papers differ by statistical approach and outcomes, although less so than previous 
papers. Kronberg (2013) and Keith and McWilliams (1999, 1995, 1997) both consider 
objective wage growth. Cha (2014) estimates the fixed-effect of mobility on wages. 
Gesthuizen (2009) uses 4 subjective outcomes, satisfaction with hours, job match, wage, 
and the job itself. Latzke et al. (2016) use both objective income gains and subjective 
changes in job satisfaction. Regarding estimation, Kronberg (2013) and Keith and 
McWilliams (1999, 1995, 1997) use an Ordinary Least Squares approach and do not 
consider individual heterogeneity. As a result, they likely overstate the premium tied to 
VM; however, the goal of these papers is to consider gender differences, rather than a 
causal impact of mobility itself, which their work achieves.  Gesthuizen (2009) 
estimates the effect using a difference in difference approach, and so accounts for the 
fact that certain workers are more likely to move than others. Latzke et al. (2016) use 
propensity score matching followed by OLS regression in an effort to find statistical 
“twins” for movers and non movers. Thus, they control for the non-random nature of 
VM. Only Gesthuizen (2009) estimates both voluntary inter-firm and voluntary intra-
firm mobility, the remaining authors consider only inter-firm changes, limiting their 
view of mobility and making it difficult to fully consider theories like overt 
discrimination as proposed by Becker (2010). Nonetheless, I consider each below. 
In an extensive paper, Kronberg (2013) explores the effects of VM on wage growth in 
the US, and how the effect differs by gender. Results reveal that the effects of 
movement differ by gender and job quality (good jobs versus bad). In the past (late 
1970’s), respondents in “bad” jobs (occupations without health insurance or pensions, 
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where earning are not 120% of the federal poverty threshold) gained nothing after a 
voluntary change. Over time, a penalty developed where workers in bad jobs saw a 
decline in earnings after VM. Those in “good” jobs benefited, seeing greater earnings 
after a voluntary change, this premium has grown over time. A gender effect also exists. 
Men gain more from VM than women. This effect was larger in the past, but has 
declined over time. Despite this, VM has a higher yield in wages for men than for 
women even in the modern labour market. Regarding “bad” jobs, the effect of VM also 
differs by gender, with men seeing a greater return than women after the change. As a 
strategy, men earn more from VM than women, in both good and bad jobs. The results 
show (beyond the distribution of life-chances) that the effects of life-chances are 
gendered. Importantly, the models used control for human capital variables, suggesting 
that the vacancies filled by men contain a higher premium (unrelated to their 
characteristics)   than the vacancies filled by women.  
Remaining with the US, Keith and McWilliams (1995) estimate the effect mobility has 
on wage growth using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979-1988). They 
find no gender difference in the effects of VM, with both genders increasing earnings 
following VM. However, when VM is split for family and economic reasons, nuance 
emerges. Both men and women benefit from “economic mobility” to a new employer. 
Yet, women see a fall in pay following a quit for “family or related” reasons, while men 
are not affected. Expanding their study to include more data, Keith and McWilliams 
(1997) find that men see a 35% greater return on VM when compared to women. But 
again, splitting VM into economic and family related quits reveals that both genders 
benefit equally from economic mobility, but women see penalties following a family 
related quit (defined as a voluntary change). The male advantage is mostly the product 
of moving for economic reasons more often. Finally, they find men and women are able 
to increase returns on mobility through prior job search (Keith and McWilliams, 1997), 
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but no gender difference exists in the premium tied to mobility. Here, the difference in 
the mobility-outcomes relationship does not emerge, despite emerging in a previous US 
sample, although interesting differences between genders are evident. Again, despite 
controlling for a number of human capital measures, like age and tenure, a distinct 
premium tied to the vacancies persists, although this premium is not gendered.  
Using a US panel, Cha (2014) considers the immediate return on VM for men and 
women separately. She also compares two periods, pre and post-recession US. The 
findings suggest that women see the highest premiums from VM than men, a finding 
that goes completely against the theory of discrimination. Digging deeper, Cha (2014) 
finds that the positive effect is attributed to women without children alone, and that 
women who have children typically see a fall in earnings after VM. Thus the female 
penalty tied to change is presented as a motherhood penalty, one that “reflects mothers’ 
negative selection into job related quitting” (page 167 (Cha, 2014)). The author goes on 
to suggest that mothers who quit jobs for economic reasons may be making 
compromises in working time. Thus, women with and without children may be split in 
the working time of their new jobs. I note this difference in the analysis.    
Gesthuizen (2009) runs similar, fixed effects models using Dutch data, predicting 
gender differences in worker “returns on mobility”. He finds no significant difference 
between men and women in the premium tied to mobility (changes in subjective 
outcomes following the move). However, a gender effect emerges in factors influencing 
VM (push-factors). Dissatisfaction with the job match and dissatisfaction with hours 
pushes women to voluntary intra-firm mobility, but does not affect men, contrary to the 
author’s hypothesis. Further, dissatisfaction with wages pushes women to inter-firm 
mobility, but not men. In discussing the result Gesthuizen (2009) suggests mobility may 
be “less costly” for women. Male jobs are typically “breadwinner” roles, with less room 
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for risk-taking. Women’s labour market positions are closer tied to “supplementary 
income strategies”. Overall, men and women benefit roughly equally from voluntary 
inter-firm and intra-firm mobility, improving every subjective outcome, in the Dutch 
sample.  
Lastly, Latzke et al. (2016) consider gender differences in VM’s effect on objective 
wages, and subjective satisfaction with work. VM contains financial gain, with movers 
earning 6% more after the move. The difference between genders is significant. Of this 
6%, women see a 5% lower income gain compared to men, even when controlling for 
tenure. Although the difference is statistically significant, it is minor, suggesting women 
hold only a small disadvantage to men following a change. No gender differences exist 
in subjective satisfaction following a change; both men and women see equal increased 
satisfaction after changing employers.   
The papers above appear split, with the US offering significant (Kronberg, 2013) and 
insignificant (Keith and McWilliams, 1995) estimates. Cha (2014) is an exception, in 
that she finds a positive effect for women who quit, but not men. No relationship 
emerges in the Netherlands, although a gender differences in factors influencing 
workers emerges. Lastly, a gender difference appears in Germany (Latzke et al., 2016) 
although the estimate is minor and may not be socially (but statistically) significant. In 
almost every paper, the authors consider inter-firm mobility alone, suggesting statistical 
discrimination is not at play in rewarding mobility. However, it is harder to pinpoint if 
overt discrimination is at play, since authors do not consider intra-firm mobility. Do 
employers limit the rewards of workers based on taste alone instead of efficiency? Intra-
firm mobility is the best movement for determining this since employers get to know 
the workers within firms, instead of having to rely on resume information alone. A 
legitimate criticism of the approaches above is the focus on discrimination within 
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occupations and industries. Authors suggest overt or statistical discriminations are 
stronger in filtering genders into specific occupations, rather than the open gender 
difference of paying men and women different wages for the same job (Cooke, 2016, 
Cooke, 2014).   
Regarding IVM, three authors test for gender differences. The samples and methods 
remain the same, I list the results alone. Kronberg (2013) considers the impact of IVM 
on wage growth in the US. She estimates the effect of movement in good jobs and bad 
jobs separately, as above. Respondents in good jobs who move for involuntary reasons 
manage to increase their pay, a finding that runs completely counter to several theories 
discussed previously. It is possible experience transfers to new firms after job loss. 
Whatever the reason, she claims “...whether employees left voluntarily or involuntarily, 
leavers earn increasingly more than non-movers in good jobs...” ((Kronberg, 
2013):p1130). IVM in bad jobs is associated with a fall in earnings growth, a 
disadvantage which has grown over time. The effect is also gendered. Men in good jobs 
gain more from IVM than women, an advantage which has widened significantly since 
the 1980’s. Men in bad jobs see no premium after an involuntary change, thus no gender 
difference occurs. Thus in the US, wherever mobility is advantageous, even IVM, men 
hold an advantage over women in terms of improving pay.  
Keith and McWilliams (1999, 1995, 1997) consider the gender differences stemming 
from IVM and earnings growth, (the authors refer to these as employer-initiated). IVM 
has a negative effect on earnings growth, with dismissals having a greater effect than 
layoffs. However, no gender difference emerges in the effect of IVM on earnings 
growth. Men and women are equally affected by dismissal. However, in terms of life-
chances or the mobility event itself, men are more likely to experience IVM than 
women, according to the authors.  
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Cha (2014) too finds no effect of IVM on wages for men and women in the pre-
recession period. However, she too finds that women are less likely to experience the 
event, and so the lack of a significant effect may be the product of few observations in 
the panel. There are some negative effects in the post-recession period but men and 
women experience both equally.   
With reference to the papers above, I list the hypotheses tied to gender; 
Hypothesis 3a: Gender differences will exist between workers. Men will benefit 
from voluntary mobility more than women (statistical/overt discrimination). 
Hypothesis 3b: Men will be hindered by involuntary mobility less than women 
(statistical/overt discrimination). 
Others explore worker differences in terms of class and education. Gesthuizen (2009) 
interacts years of education with voluntary inter-firm and intra-firm mobility in the 
Netherlands. Latzke et al. (2016) consider loose class categories (blue-collar, white-
collar, and professional groups) and the effects of VM in Germany. Pavlopoulos et al. 
(2014) estimate the effect of VM using quintile income groups to separate low-paid, 
medium, and high-paid workers in both Germany and the UK. I summarise their 
findings below, having discussed the data and estimation techniques previously.  
Gesthuizen (2009) measures the impact of education by estimating an interaction 
between mobility types and years of education. This conceptualisation fits with 
Sørensen’s (1975, 1977, 1978) theoretical model, which predicts higher reward with 
higher education. Yet, the interaction is not a significant predictor of subjective 
outcomes, implying more educated workers benefit equally from VM compared to less 
educated respondents. There is an education effect in terms of push-factors affecting 
mobility, but it runs counter to the hypothesis. Dissatisfaction with hours pushes 
44 
 
respondents to take a promotion (voluntary intra-firm), but the effect is weakest for 
respondents with more years of education, a counter intuitive finding. Here, lower 
educated workers, who are dissatisfied with hours, are more likely to change jobs within 
the firm, than higher educated workers who are dissatisfied with hours. It is possible 
that these workers are moving “laterally” with the same employer, rather than pursuing 
promotions within a career ladder. Since lower educated workers are less committed to 
an occupation and more reliant on the firm, they may move through categories more 
often than third level educated workers, who would lose significant resources by 
switching occupation. 
Latzke et al. (2016) find a significant difference in the wage premium earned by class 
groups through VM. Professionals earn the most from the change, followed by white-
collar workers, and lastly, blue collared workers. Importantly, each class group sees a 
significant increase in pay after the change, but professionals see a 16% greater return 
than blue collar workers, and white collar workers see a 5% better return than blue 
collared workers. This suggests that upper class groups have the most to gain from job 
mobility, at least in Germany. This finding fits with attainment theory, and statistical 
discrimination as described by Thurow. It runs counter to human capital theory, since 
the premiums should not exist after controlling for human capital measures, especially 
education.  
Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) makes a near opposite argument considering both Germany 
and the UK. Dividing workers into low paid, medium paid, and high paid quintiles, the 
authors find that low-paid workers see the highest returns from VM. These results 
emerge in both countries, with the UK showing a positive effect for inter- and intra-firm 
changes, and Germany showing a positive effect for inter-firm mobility alone. Beyond 
this, British high-earners see a fall in pay after an inter-firm VM, compared to movers 
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who remain with the same employer. Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) suppose that high 
earners may reach a ceiling in both countries, where transitions carry fewer premiums in 
pay; this ceiling is further for low-paid workers. The models estimating pay do not catch 
other premiums that are open to high-earners, such as bonuses, shares, or changes in 
working conditions. All of these bonuses are particularly important for upper quintile 
groups.  
Again, a number of conflicting results emerge in the papers above. Germany is 
presented as a country which rewards both the lower class best (Pavlopoulos et al., 
2014) and the upper class best (Latzke et al., 2016). While Gesthuizen (2009) finds no 
difference between education groups, save for a lower tolerance for poor conditions 
among less skilled workers. Based on the findings presented above, I list the next set of 
hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 3c: Education differences will exist between workers. Those with a third 
level education will benefit from voluntary mobility more than those without 
(statistical discrimination).  
Hypothesis 3d: Those with a third level education will be hindered by involuntary 
mobility less than those without (statistical discrimination). 
The next section turns to country differences and how institutions configure or affect the 
mobility-outcomes relationship. 
2.3. Institutional Context 
If countries organise labour markets in ways that can’t be explained by micro and macro 
economic variables alone, they contain institutional differences. These factors point to 
different patterns of job movement, which then affect the mobility-outcomes 
relationship. Here I review the theoretical literature on country labour market 
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differences and explore some of the empirical work on the topic. Authors have mostly 
focused on country differences in mobility types. Research exploring country 
differences in the consequences of mobility appears less often. Not only do countries 
differ by mobility rates, they also differ in how mobility affects outcomes, this is the 
final configuration of mobility and outcomes mentioned above.  
2.3.1. Theoretical Considerations 
The empirical papers is previous section give few theoretical reasons for why mobility 
would differ by country (the work by Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) is an exception). 
However a number of citations exist. Fasang et al. (2012) and Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) 
cite Hall and Soskice (2001) when justifying country differences the relationship 
between mobility and outcomes. Both claim liberal and coordinated economies will 
produce separate pathways to quitting and promotion, which will in turn affect the 
consequences of quits and promotions. Others cite the Worlds of Welfare Capital 
presented by Esping-Andersen (2013). For this reason, the theoretical suggestions in 
these works are summarised below with specific focus on labour markets and mobility.  
The Varieties of Capitalism literature is presented by Hall and Soskice (2001). 
Technically, the authors consider the perspective of firms not workers which are 
embedded in two distinct forms of capitalism; liberal and coordinated. Germany is an 
example of a coordinated market economy, while the UK is a liberal market economy. 
When considering the importance of industrial relations in maintaining coordinated 
market economies in Germany, Hall and Soskice (2001) cite wage setting at the 
industry level. Coordinated market economies rely on skilled production which leaves 
employers vulnerable to poaching. Institutional agreements like standardised wages and 
working conditions foster firm-commitment and employer loyalty, hence the lower rate 
of VM in Germany (Thelen, 2014). This theoretical sketch is rarely tested but “fits” 
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with Germany’s low rate of inter-firm mobility. VM between firms does not reward 
workers significantly; hence workers commit to pursuing movement within the firm. 
Hall and Soskice (2001) propose that scientific and skilled workers foster inter-
company relations to make up for the lack of mobility between firms, however several 
authors have noted significant movement between firms in Germany, suggesting Hall 
and Soskice (2001) likely overstate Germany’s immobility. Germany’s strong wage 
coordination will likely affect intra-firm mobility’s impact on wages, and limit the 
negative effect of IVM’s effect on wages. On one hand, it seems that German 
institutions reward German workers best through commitment and tenure, on the other  
Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) argue that Germany has no need for an efficiency wage, since 
poaching and competition is limited, as a result the job queue will not reward workers 
above their tenure and experience.    
When turning to Liberal Market Economies, Hall and Soskice (2001) first cite the 
importance of individualised bargaining between the worker and employer, leading to a 
wide variance in pay and a freedom in firing and hiring employees. The freedom to hire 
and fire will likely play a part in shaping the rate of mobility, but crucially Hall and 
Soskice (2001) cite market competition which keeps wages and inflation low, hence 
there is an outcome component to mobile labour markets. Liberal Market Economies 
offer a “general” skill-set to young workers which is better transferable between firms, 
“Educational arrangements that privilege general, rather than firm-specific skills, are 
complementary to highly fluid labour markets; and the latter render forms of 
technology transfer that rely on labour mobility more feasible” ((Hall and Soskice, 
2001):p32). The UK is presented as a mobile market where movement is encouraged by 
firms and employers, whether this movement is beneficial for workers is not explored. 
In fact, mobile markets in Liberal Market Economies may be mobile purely because of 
increased deregulation rather than a desire to improve the lives of workers (Thelen, 
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2014). Looking back on attainment theory Sørensen (1983) suggests “One may see the 
considerable amount of inequality in personal attainments found in labor markets... to 
be created in large organization as deliberate devices to move employee performance 
from perfunctory to consummate.” Whether mobile labour markets in the UK exist to 
give workers the best chance for attainment, or a consequence of short term efficiency, 
is worth exploring. Again, the importance of intra-firm mobility is rarely considered for 
UK data, however Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) make the case that efficiency wage 
premiums will be more likely in the UK as an answer to poaching.  
For further country differences, authors cite Esping-Andersen (2013), who created the 
typologies of welfare capitalism. Liberal market economies are characterised by strong 
support for the open market and low decommodification. The system overlaps with the 
“open labour market” typology as shown by Mills et al. (2006b). Alongside low 
decommodification, economic and employment security is low. Labour is expected to 
be flexible for employers not workers, meaning “flexicurity2” is not supported by 
institutions. Precarious and insecure work is common, and human and social capital is 
important for explaining inequalities. Re-entry after unemployment is easy, since labour 
markets are mobile. The rate of job mobility is high and Employment Protection 
Legislation is low.  
Conservative welfare states are their near opposite (similar to the Varieties of 
Capitalism distinction). These systems have lower support for market driven 
competition and an intermediate level of decommodification (Esping-Andersen, 2013). 
Decommodification applies to a specific group of workers, mainly those with industry 
tenure or a history of employment. Conservative welfare states tend to overlap with 
closed markets as described by (Mills et al., 2006b). Closed labour markets foster high 
                                                 
2 Flexicurity is a welfare state strategy which encourages predictably mobile working-
lives paired with a strong commitment to decommodification (Thelen 2014) 
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levels of economic and employment security, providing workers with stable and 
predictable forms of work. Precarious and flexible employment still exists, but is 
concentrated to specific worker groups, mainly young workers and those without a basic 
level of human capital. However, the importance of human capital in closed labour 
markets is low, as is the rate of job mobility between and within firms.  
Social democratic welfare states are defined by a pursuit for equality and citizenship-
based rights. Decommodification is high and available to all (Esping-Andersen, 2013). 
Here labour markets are a mixture of open and closed systems as outlined by Mills et al. 
(2006b), with an emphasis on flexicurity. Thelen (2014) presents the system as one of 
embedded flexibility, where strong active labour market policy is tied to large levels of 
labour market mobility. Economic security is high, as is employment security. The 
guarantees of economic security are not tied to a single employer but rather the state. 
Precarious and insecure work in uncommon and a strong pursuit of full employment 
expects large numbers of participation in the public and the private sectors. 
The Worlds of Welfare Capitalism contains three categories for grouping countries; 
Liberal, Conservative, and Socially Democratic, with corresponding mobility rates, 
shaped not only by time-varying economic measures but also by institutional variables. 
The two most relevant categories to this thesis are Liberal and Coordinated capitalisms. 
Both are shaped by institutions, each makes corresponding predictions about the labour 
market which are likely to affect the mobility-outcomes relationship also. A number of 
authors have explored both the rates of mobility in these institutions, and the 
consequences of mobility. 
2.3.2. Empirical Findings 
This section is concerned with two groups of articles. The first outlines country 
differences in mobility rates, offering comparative analysis of institutions. The second 
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outline country differences in the mobility-outcomes relationship, providing an 
institutional context to the markets which reward or punish change. I summarise both 
groups below.  
As with the previous summaries, the works differ by samples and methods, but are in 
agreement; country differences in mobility rates and country differences in the mobility-
outcomes relationship cannot be explained by micro and macroeconomic variables 
alone, institutional differences persist. The section below summarises the first group, 
papers outlining institutional differences in rates of mobility alone. 
 The OECD (2010) explore the rate of job mobility across OECD countries. DiPrete et 
al. (1997) offer a typology of “mobility regimes” for Germany, the US, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden, which go beyond the Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and the Varieties of 
Capitalism typologies. Mühlau (2007) describes country differences in inter and intra-
firm mobility in the Netherlands and Japan, comparing an occupational labour market 
with an internal labour market. Finally, Eyraud et al. (1990) contrasts UK firm tenure 
against French firm tenure using a sample of manufacturing-sector workers. 
Most of the authors consider job mobility using univariate, simple descriptive tables 
(Mühlau, 2007, OECD, 2010, Eyraud et al., 1990), although advanced, exploratory 
analysis estimating the likelihood of mobility also exists (DiPrete et al., 1997). Both 
methods make the same argument, institutions shape the rate of mobility beyond firm 
and worker differences (size of firms, sector, age of population etc.) or business cycles. 
Generally, labour markets can be split into “open” or liberal systems and “closed” or 
coordinated systems, much like the theoretical categories described above (although 
DiPrete et al. (1997) develop a middle ground also).  
DiPrete et al. (1997) split countries into “collectivist” and “individualist” mobility 
regimes which capture country-specific patterns of adjusting to technological changes, 
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global market fluctuations, and short-term demands for labour. The US is presented as 
the “individualist” example, where macro adjustments are felt at the micro-level and 
worker resources are a strong predictor of mobility. The Netherlands is presented as the 
“collectivist” example, where workers are largely isolated from macro-changes and 
person-specific resources are poor predictors of mobility. Between the two extremes sit 
Germany and Sweden who both share features of each “regime”. Sweden sits closest to 
the US, due to its strong commitment to full employment, and Germany sits closest to 
the Netherlands, because of its strong level of protection for the core labour market. 
DiPrete et al. (1997) show welfare state typologies (like those presented by Esping-
Andersen (2013)) explain only a portion of the variance in mobility country-differences. 
For example, Sweden and the US are diametrically opposed in welfare state literature 
(Esping-Andersen, 2013), but both have high rates of job mobility, with an emphasis on 
person-specific resources (like education). Both Germany and the Netherlands, by 
contrast, have low rates of both inter-firm and intra-firm mobility, while education has a 
weak or inconsistent impact on firm mobility or employment exit.  
The OECD (2010) also considers large cross-country variation in mobility rates, which 
cannot be explained by economic measures alone. It claims country mobility rates differ 
beyond economic measures alone, citing employment protection legislation, 
unemployment benefit legislation, and product market regulation as significant 
predictors on country level mobility rates. Countries with “stringent” Employment 
Protection Legislation have lower rates of job mobility (Germany and France). Those 
with higher unemployment benefit also have higher rates of job mobility (The Nordic 
States). Countries with higher product market regulations appear to have lower rates of 
mobility, although the effect is moderate (Mediterranean states). Lastly, countries with a 
statutory minimum wage do not see a statistically significant difference in job mobility 
rates, compared to countries without the policy. The report concludes by recommending 
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reforms to Employment Protection Legislation, relaxing these while boosting 
unemployment benefit would increase job mobility within less mobile markets. The 
report suggests more mobility is badly needed in the EU market. 
Although the examples above consider institutional design, the do not consider the 
individualisation of bargaining. Mühlau (2007) explores the rates of inter and intra-firm 
mobility in Japan and the Netherlands, finding a mobile market in the Netherlands and a 
closed internal labour market in Japan, especially for men. While the Japanese labour 
market favours internal mobility, with little movement between firms (for men, women 
see significant mobility between firms), the Dutch labour market has higher rates of 
movement between firms but less internal mobility. Part of the difference is due to the 
reasons mentioned in the OECD report, Employment Protection Legislation etcetera, 
but part is firm organisation; Dutch firms have flat organisation structures, as a result 
fewer opportunities for “upward” career ladder mobility. DiPrete et al. (1997) make a 
similar argument for both Germany and the Netherlands. Another reason, is Japan’s 
commitment to internal labour markets, where skill internalisation and lifelong career 
commitment is a keystone to Japanese production. For workers, movement between 
firms means leaving behind tenure and firm specific skills (also outlined by (Althauser, 
1989)) which means giving up their most important bargaining resource, tenure. 
Therefore, internal structures are seen as the best mechanisms for rewarding workers, 
since internal labour markets, and efficiency wages reward workers best. The 
Netherlands on the other hand relies on wider structures to “make up” a respondent’s 
career. 
An example of Britain’s mobility regime is offered by Eyraud et al. (1990) who 
compare the firm tenures of British and French workers in manufacturing. They suggest 
inter-firm mobility in the UK is higher than France, where workers commit to internal 
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careers with the same employer (a finding similar to DiPrete et al. (1997) who notice 
low rates of inter-firm and intra-firm mobility in Germany). Eyraud et al. (1990) 
conclude that the UK operates an occupational labour market, where workers are 
encouraged to spread careers between firms thanks to occupational licensing; and 
France operates an internal labour market, where employers are keen to internalise 
careers as much as possible, while drawing on the external labour market for entry-level 
jobs. For this reason, employer tenure is shorter among British workers than among 
French workers. Further British workers typically have a higher number of “former 
employers” which they rely on than French workers. Since the article’s release Marsden 
(2007) has update the view, suggesting the UK is a mobile market of “entry 
tournaments”, where workers move precariously before finding an internal career 
structure that they commit to. The implication is that inter-firm mobility is frequent and 
without reward, before workers find a career ladder which leads to intra-firm change 
and efficiency wages. 
Overall authors find institutional reasons for rates of job mobility, which go beyond the 
business cycle and the wider economy. However, countries also differ in the mobility-
outcomes relationship. Two papers discuss the topic, The OECD (2010) using a sample 
of countries and Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) using panel data from Germany and the UK. 
Here too, authors find comparative differences in how labour markets shape the 
consequences of mobility.  
The OECD report notes that countries differ in “wage premiums” tied to job transitions, 
but “wage penalties” for IVM also exist, even when changes are direct to a new 
employer. Countries with lower Employment Protection Legislation typically have a 
stronger relationship between VM and outcomes (wages). If employment protection is 
loosened, the negative effects tied to job loss are “unlikely to worsen”, but likely to see 
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increased IVM, according to authors. Estimating the effect of VM on wages, Ireland is 
said to have the strongest effect, with a 12% increase in wages following a change, and 
the Netherlands are expected to have the weakest effect, a 2% increase in wages, 
followed by Denmark (2%). A noticeable difference is the effect in Mediterranean 
countries, where VM contains high positive effects for Greece (5%), Spain (7%), and 
Italy (7%), countries with large rewards but little mobility. Germany and the UK feature 
for models estimating the effect on basic mobility (either voluntary or involuntary).The 
UK (5%) has a stronger effect than Germany (2%), despite being more mobile. Here, 
country differences in the rewards tied to quitting emerge. The most obvious finding is 
that countries with the highest rates of mobility do not have the highest rewards tied to 
mobility. In fact the most immobile countries appear to have the largest premiums tied 
to change.  
Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) too consider the effects of VM on outcomes in Germany and 
the UK. They present the UK as a mobile “highly volatile, unregulated and meritocratic 
labour market”. Here firms are reliant on a dynamic and flexible pool of labour with 
quick hiring and firing. A fear of poaching prevents employers from investing in firm 
specific skills and so workers are forced to seek general skills as a means of adapting to 
mobility. They present the German labour market as highly coordinated, with a 
collectively organised system of wage bargaining. Sector-level wage bargaining ensures 
predictable wages for workers at almost every level. Poaching is less common because 
of this low variance in wages. The system lets workers invest in firm specific skills 
which yield “gains” from intra-firm mobility but losses from inter-firm mobility. 
Throughout the theoretical framework, the authors cite Hall and Soskice (2001). 
Results show that the low paid in both countries are the only group of workers that 
benefit from mobility. High paid workers in the UK actually see losses following an 
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inter-firm change, suggesting they make trades following a change to a new employer. 
These most likely include compromising pay for bonuses, better working conditions, or 
shorter hours. Regarding country differences in mobility’s effects on outcomes, 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) find that both inter- and intra-firm mobility provides wages 
gains for British low-paid workers, but only inter-firm mobility provide wage gains for 
German low-paid workers. In short, no efficiency wages are found in Germany, but 
these exist in the UK, a completely counter-intuitive finding. The argument outlined in 
the paper suggests that employers must provide efficiency wages in the UK to prevent 
poaching and maintain skills within the firm. However, coordinated labour markets are 
said to achieve exactly this through the use of efficiency wages, while liberal market 
economies are driven precisely by low costs and short term planning. Further, the wage 
gains of inter-firm mobility are higher in Germany than the UK. This too is a counter-
intuitive finding since “opportunities” for wage growth are supposedly more common in 
the UK than Germany.  
Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) propose institutional differences between countries are at play. 
British workers will often invest in firm-specific skills by covering the cost of training 
themselves; employers will then offer higher wages as a means of avoiding poaching. 
Thus the effect is not so much the product of efficiency wages, as much as a repayment 
for the costs of additional skills, according to the article. Since wages in Germany are 
set at a higher level efficiency wage theory does not apply, as employers choose to train 
workers in firm-specific skills without worrying about poaching.  
Thus institutional factors shape the premium tied to inter and intra-firm mobility in both 
countries. I propose the reason behind the different effects may also be the product of 
how VM is defined in both countries (mentioned previously). The authors chose to 
define mobility objectively meaning that changes which are “voluntary” are typically 
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defined as “direct” elsewhere. Transitions moving into unemployment are deemed 
involuntary, even when respondents choose to resign themselves. Thus intra-firm 
mobility in both countries contains a mix of promotions, demotions, and lateral moves, 
which could explain the lack of relationship between intra-firm mobility and wage-
growth in Germany. However, the key findings, especially the lack of efficiency wages 
in Germany, are noted. With this is mind I propose the last set of hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 4a: Voluntary mobility will have a positive effect on outcomes in the UK. 
Hypothesis 4b: Involuntary mobility will have a negative effect on outcomes in the UK. 
Hypothesis 5a: Voluntary mobility will have a positive effect on outcomes in Germany 
only if it is intra-firm. 
Hypothesis 5b: Involuntary mobility will have no effect on outcomes in Germany. 
Thus, I expect the mobility-outcomes relationship to differ by country. A summary of 
the three aims is listed below.  
2.4. Summary 
This section outlined the hypotheses used throughout this work, which can be split by 
its aims and objectives. The theoretical literature on job mobility focuses on the patterns 
and causes of mobility. Mobility’s effect on outcomes is an afterthought, made simple 
by assuming a change in worker utility drives mobility.  
This assumption presents two complexities. First the relationship between mobility and 
outcomes is more complex than a change in utility (this is evident from the empirical 
literature), workers often make trades in outcomes following a change; like a 
compromise in job security, for an increase in job satisfaction, or an increase in working 
hours for an increase in gross pay. Second, the relationship between subjective and 
objective outcomes is more complex than the assumption above allows (this is also clear 
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from the empirical literature). This appears most clearly in Gesthuizen and Dagevos 
(2008) who note a mismatch in the effect on mobility on objective and subjective pay. 
The complexities above are enhanced by three configurations of the mobility-outcomes 
relationship (summarised by the three aims). First, there are different types of VM with 
different effects on outcomes depending on the change. Inter-firm movement appears to 
have a strong effect on subjective outcomes, while intra-firm movement works best for 
objective outcomes, although the empirical literature rarely highlights the distinction. 
Second, worker characteristics shape the results of the mobility-outcomes relationship, 
at the point of movement. Much has been said about the life chance of promotion for 
men and women, but little has been explored in terms of the effect promotion has on the 
outcomes of both (the same can be said for education groups). Third, countries shape 
the mobility-outcomes relationships by either individualising forms of bargaining, 
forcing respondents to individually bargain for pay and conditions, or collectivising 
bargaining, setting wages and conditions at the occupational or industry level, ensuring 
less variance between firms. Having outlined the hypotheses, the next chapter present 
the data and methodology used to answer the research question. 
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3. Methodology 
This chapter presents the data and methods used to answer the research question. I 
consider respondents from the British Household Panel Survey and the German Socio-
Economic Panel as representative samples of British and German workers. I also 
summarise the decisions for producing the estimates. The chapter has four main parts. 
First, I present the methodology or the overall approach to answering the research 
questions. Second, I present the samples and introduce both longitudinal micro-level 
panels (the BHPS and SOEP). I show the data structure, discuss balance and attrition 
and present some basic checks. Third, I outline the available variables. Since job 
mobility is a key measure in this work, I consider its strengths and limitations in detail. I 
show how the variable is coded and list basic checks which address concerns in the 
literature. I also consider the outcomes used, and their comparability between panels, 
the same is done to the independent variables, although their comparability is less 
concerning due to the Cross National Equivalence File3. The final section deals with the 
analytical strategy on the project. Here I justify the use of linear fixed-effects regression 
models, discuss the limitations of the method and outline the weighting strategy for the 
estimates. 
3.1. The Basic Approach 
Firstly, it is important to define what is meant by job mobility, a central measure in the 
thesis. I consider four types of job mobility throughout this work. Each of these is held 
against a reference category, the year where an individual remains in the same job, with 
the same employer (non-movement); 
1. Same job, same employer (Non-movers) 
                                                 
3 The Cross National Equivalent File contains equivalently defined variables for the 
British Household Panel Study (BHPS), and the German Socio-Economic Panel, among 
others. It is designed to provide suitable measures for cross-country comparisons.  
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2. Inter-firm voluntary (Movers) 
3. Inter-firm involuntary (Movers) 
4. Intra-firm voluntary (Movers) 
5. Intra-firm involuntary (Movers) 
In the most basic sense, I define job mobility as a change in job-spell in a respondent’s 
work history for a given year. Both the British Household Panel Survey and the German 
Socioeconomic Panel contain a simple mobility measure, asking “have you experienced 
a job change in the last twelve months?” Respondents who answer “yes” in a given year 
are categorised as “movers”, respondents who answer “no” are categorised as “non-
movers”. This group makes up the “same job, same employer” reference category. This 
is the most basic definition of job mobility. Among the set of movers, it is possible to 
define inter-firm and intra-firm mobility (changes that take place with the same 
employer or a new employer). Lastly, I define voluntary and involuntary changes 
subjectively, as suggested by Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001), Gesthuizen (2009) and 
Gesthuizen and Dagevos (2008). I define promotions and quits as voluntary changes, 
since worker initiative drives the change. Before a quit, respondents pursue new 
opportunities in the external market. Before a promotion, they pursue new positions by 
speaking to higher management or seeking new opportunities within the firm. In 
contrast, involuntary changes are those where workers cannot influence the change. A 
worker’s job change is seen as an alternative to her plans of staying in the same job with 
the same employer.  I define demotions, redundancies, dismissals and plant closures as 
involuntary moves. It is reasonable to assume that workers who experience demotions 
do so involuntarily, even if the definition itself is subjective (Keith and McWilliams, 
1995, Kronberg, 2013). Table 3.1 lists the definition of 4 key mobility events. The UK 
data captures each of these. The German data contains limitations, which I discuss later. 
For now, the table below captures mobility events as defined in this project.  
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Table 3.1: Job mobility defined by 2 key variables listed, voluntary or involuntary and inter- or intra-firm 
change 
Same job same employer 
(reference category) 
Non-movers 
Movers Voluntary  Involuntary 
Inter-firm Quit, mutual agreement Redundancy, dismissal, plant 
closure, end of a temporary 
contract. 
Intra-firm Promotion, mutual agreement Demotion, lateral move 
 
In order to estimate the relationship between mobility and outcomes, like time and pay, 
I turn to two longitudinal micro-panels. The German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP-
Long file), 2012 release (Wagner et al., 2007), and the British Household Panel Survey 
(Taylor et al., 1993). Both are longitudinal datasets which follow respondents over time, 
tracking their economic and social progress through annual interviews. I use a “person-
year” design to track person-specific responses from 2000-2008. I focus on respondents 
from all regions of each panel. In the GSOEP sample, I include respondents from both 
East and West Germany. In the BHPS sample, I include respondents from Britain, 
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Both are made of employed respondents, who 
have no missing job mobility information for the years 2000-2008. I expand on this 
design later. Crucially, this design is made up of a core workforce, who remains in 
employment for a minimum of eight years, with interruptions lasting no longer than a 
year. Thus mobility is strictly job-to-job mobility. Respondents with intermittent spells 
of unemployment or inactivity are dropped from the sample. 
Each panel uses three sets of variables. These are the person-specific job mobility 
variables, a set of outcome variables, and a set of controls. I have already discussed the 
mobility variables; I discuss the other two sets. Each panel considers outcomes similar 
to those used by previous researchers. These are grouped by subjective and objective 
variables which try to capture three main measures; time, pay, and conditions. 
Subjective outcomes focus on satisfaction scores (with security, pay, hours, and work 
itself). Objective outcomes focus on more specific measures (gross monthly pay, 
weekly hours worked, and subjective health). Although health is a subjective variable, I 
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use it as a proxy measure for working conditions of the job itself, an approach used 
earlier by Gash et al. (2007).  
Both country panels contain controls or predictors, similar to those used by other 
researchers estimating the mobility-outcomes relationship. I use these variables in two 
ways. First, to control for variance in pay and conditions that is not attributed to 
mobility, such as age, number of children in the home, and industry. These are time 
variant variables that may impact outcomes. Second, both panels contain gender and 
education variables, which are important as I expect them to work with the mechanisms 
tied to job mobility, to better explain differences in pay and satisfaction. In short, men 
and women are expected to experience mobility differently; just as higher educated 
workers are expected to experience mobility differently than those with a secondary 
level qualification.  
Once the sample and variables are defined, I estimate the effects of mobility using linear 
fixed-effects regression. This method is useful as it deals with individual unobserved 
heterogeneity, an important concept in job mobility research. Since job mobility is not a 
random event, it’s likely that person-specific, unmeasured characteristics (like 
motivation, determination etcetera) will play a part in determining who changes jobs. 
This violates a major assumption in random-effects modelling, leaving fixed-effects 
estimation techniques. Fixed-effects estimation controls for unobserved heterogeneity 
by transforming a typical Ordinary Least Squares regression model to a “within-
transformation” linear model (Longhi and Nandi, 2014): 
(    −   ∗) =   (    −    ∗) +  (    −    ∗) 
Where; 
 Where,   ∗,   ∗,   ∗ are the person-specific means of    ,    , and    . 
     is the dependent variable value for individual i at time t. 
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     represents a time variant independent variable (like a job quit) 
   is the estimated effect for the independent variable (like a job quit) 
      is the error term specific to i= the person and t= the time of the prediction 
 A person-specific error term is cancelled out since the individual acts as his or 
her own control. 
This transformation produces person-specific estimates of job mobility, which are 
unbiased by person-specific errors (Longhi and Nandi, 2014). Wooldridge (2015) (page 
485) refers to this process as “time demeaning”, claiming “...any explanatory variable 
that is constant over time for all i gets swept away by the fixed effects transformation”. 
In this approach, all time invariant measures, both observed and unobserved, are 
dropped from the model. This method is particularly suited to Sørensen (1977) who 
argues that worker resources are fixed from the moment workers enter the labour 
market. Thus the change in outcomes resulting from mobility is the effect of 
respondents “closing the gap” between resources and attainment. A similar argument 
appears in Akerlof and Yellen (1986). 
All of the outcome variables are linear, hence I use linear models with fixed-effects as 
proposed by Allison (2009), Longhi and Nandi (2014), and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
(2008). I run the models using Stata’s  xtreg,fe function. The wider assumptions 
and limitations of this method are outlined in the estimation section below. This method 
is used by Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) and others to estimate the relationship 
between mobility and outcomes. 
The above is the basic approach to answering the research question. Within models, I 
compare different mobility types in terms of subjective and objective outcomes (the first 
aim). Once the overall effects are discussed I consider worker-specific differences, 
checking for gender and education differences (the second aim). Here I test whether 
groups of workers differ in how mobility affects outcomes. Since fixed-effects 
transformations cannot estimate an effect for gender or education (both of these 
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variables are time constant), I run separate models for men and women, comparing the 
effects of mobility by orders of magnitude. I do the same for groups of workers with 
secondary level and third level education. Lastly, I discuss the institutional context, by 
comparing the orders of magnitude in the German models to those in the UK models, a 
method similar to the one used by Gash et al. (2007), Pavlopoulos et al. (2014), and 
Biegert (2014) (the third aim). One obvious obstacle exists, proving both panels are 
comparable. I lay out the case for the research design below. 
3.1.1. Comparability 
It’s true that BHPS and SOEP panels are not directly comparable; pooling the datasets 
into a single file is not possible due to differences in size and design. However, the data 
contains similar job history variables, similar dependent variables, and similar controls. 
Further, both panels capture the same underlying phenomenon of mobility. However, 
the measures in each panel are not identical. Since certain measures are comparable, but 
the data is designed differently, I run parallel case studies; a strategy used by previous 
researchers to consider country differences. Each chapter focuses on a single country 
panel and lays out the relationship between mobility and outcomes. In the final chapter, 
I compare models in parallel for Germany and the UK. This method is similar to 
previous researchers, Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) compare mobility’s effect on wages in 
Germany and the US, using the same design. Gash et al. (2007) too compare parallel 
models for Spain (using data from the European community household panel) and 
Germany (using the German Socio Economic Panel). Here authors use “near similar” 
measures of health (the outcome) and transition into fixed term and permanent work 
(treatment variable). In both cases, authors focus on the orders of magnitude and the 
significance of estimates, rather than on tests measuring the difference between panels. 
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Before committing to a parallel case study design, I show both panels capture the same 
underlying rate of job mobility. I test this using data from a source where both countries 
feature, the European Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)4, which 
considers both Germany and the UK. I use it to compare the rate of mobility in both 
countries alongside the rates of mobility in each panel, these are listed below. 
Table 3.2: Basic Job Mobility in Germany and the UK (1990-2013). Cross-sectional data using cross-sectional 
weights 
 Basic Job Mobility Basic Job Mobility 
 EU-SILC DE 
(1) 
EU-SILC UK 
(2) 
SOEP 
(3) 
BHPS (UndSoc) 
(4) 
1991    18.1% 
1992    18.1% 
1993    20.0% 
1994   8.5% 21.2% 
1995   9.5% 24% 
1996   9.6% 21.7% 
1997   9.0% 24.6% 
1998   8.8% 25.3% 
1999   8.7% 23.3% 
2000   9.9% 25.3% 
2001   9.7% 24.% 
2002   8.4% 22.7% 
2003   7.6% 22.6% 
2004   6.7% 21.1% 
2005 6%  23%  6.3% 21.6% 
2006  24%  6.0% 13.2% 
2007 7%  17%  7.6% 16.5% 
2008 8%   8.0% 14.1% 
2009 7%  13%  8.5%  
2010 9%  13%  7.4%  
2011 9%  12% 6.3% 6.1% 
2012 10%  7%  6.7% 6.0% 
2013 9%  8%   6.6% 
 
The EU-SILC data asks respondents if they changed jobs in the last 12 months (pl160: 
change of job since last year?). PL160 only considers those in employment, meaning it 
captures only direct movements into new jobs (mobility where respondents move from 
one job to another within the 12 month period of being sampled). This design fits with 
the definition of mobility used in the thesis, as I ignore respondents with long periods of 
unemployment and inactivity. PL160 does not distinguish between inter-firm and intra-
firm changes, and specifically considers “a change of job means a change of employer, 
                                                 
4 The EU-SILC is the European Survey of Incomes and Living Conditions. I sample 
years 2005-2013, where Germany and the UK both feature. The data is weighted. I do 
not use the data for the main analysis, it is only featured here as a reference for 
individual panels. 
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not moving from one set of duties to another with the same employer. Nevertheless, a 
change of contract with the same employer is considered as a change of job”. A quit 
and a promotion (or a dismissal and a demotion) are viewed as the same by PL160. The 
EU-SILC data is not ideal to answer the research questions presented above. However, 
it offers a basic measure to compare job mobility in the SOEP and BHPS, to a third, 
standardised sample.   
I supplement the gap in the BHPS data by drawing job mobility data from the 
Understanding Society panel5. I only use this data to “complete the picture” for the UK, 
in an effort to prove both panels are comparable. Table 3.2 shows both panels capture 
the same underlying distribution of “job mobility”, as they match the EU-SILC measure 
of mobility. In Table 3.2 above, the first column and second column list the rate of 
mobility for Germany and the UK respectively, as found in the EU-SILC data. Germany 
has a smaller rate of job mobility than the UK in each year except 2012 and 2013, where 
rates converge. Generally the mobility rate in Germany is stable, between 7% and 9%. 
In the UK, the rate of mobility is higher, but declines over time from 24% (in 2006) to 
7% (in 2012). Looking at the SOEP and BHPS rates, which are listed in columns 3 and 
4 respectively, the pattern is the same. Germany has a smaller mobility rate when 
compared with the UK in each year. The German series remains stable, between 6% and 
9%. The UK has more job mobility, where the series gradually declines over time, from 
2006 to the post crisis years. I now turn to a detailed discussion of the samples, how the 
frames are constructed, and their limitations. Again, the discussion above lists the basic 
approach. I now consider the design and limitations of this approach.  
                                                 
5 Understanding Society is a longitudinal study of British society, which has absorbed 
the British Household Panel Survey. 
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3.2. Data and Sample 
The SOEP is a longitudinal study of German households. The panel collects data 
annually from 1984. It also collects annual data from East German households since 
1990. It measures household composition, employment status, occupations, earnings, 
health status, and several satisfaction measures. Researchers have used this panel 
extensively. Gash et al. (2007) use SOEP respondents from 1994-2004 when estimating 
the negative consequences of fixed-term work. Kattenbach et al. (2014) use the German 
SOEP to predict the likelihood of inter-firm and intra-firm mobility over time and 
throughout the life course. Latzke et al. (2016) and Schmelzer (2010) use respondents 
from the SOEP to estimate the effects of voluntary change on pay and satisfaction. 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) use the SOEP alongside the BHPS to answer the question 
“who benefits from a job change?” Generally the data is well established and considered 
representative of the workforce. The researchers above use a person-year design, 
ignoring households. I use the same data-matrix.   
The German sample used in this project is defined as follows; observations from 
respondents who are missing no more than one observation from 2000-2008; 
observations where the respondent is in employment at the time of the interview; 
observations where the respondent is not in self employment, unemployment, or 
inactivity; observations who have no missing values for questions related to job 
mobility. I do not limit the sample to West Germany alone, instead I consider 
respondents from East and West Germany. I consider the period 2000-2008 as this was 
one of the most populated periods in the panel, with a high number of observations. 
Although the SOEP contains data for years up to and including 2014, the BHPS is 
absorbed in 2008 by the Understanding Society panel. In an effort to make estimates in 
both the BHPS and SOEP as comparable as possible, I limit the period studied for 
Germany to 2008. I consider a semi-balanced panel design for both datasets, where 
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respondents who miss a single wave are included in the sample. I discuss this further is 
a separate section below.  
The final sample takes the shape of a person-year design, which ignores households. 
The German data comes from two files, the original individual file (PL), and the cross 
national equivalence file (CNEF), both of which come from the SOEP-Long dataset. 
The majority of the data comes from the “original individual file- PL”, where the unit of 
analysis are individuals who are “keyed on PID (Person ID) and SYEAR (Survey 
Year)”. A number of controls come from the Cross National Equivalence File (CNEF) 
in the SOEP-Long panel. The CNEF file contains “individual-level and household-level 
data to ensure a harmonized cross-country comparison. It is keyed on PID (Person ID) 
and SYEAR (Survey Year)”. Both of these datasets are merged one to one using the 
personal identification variable and the survey year. Control variables from the CNEF 
are preferred, since these are designed specifically for between-country comparisons. 
The British Household Panel Survey has corresponding Cross National Equivalence 
File, containing standardised control variables similar to those in the German CNEF. 
The full list of CNEF variables and PL variables is discussed in the variables section, 
below. I show an example of the SOEP data-frame in Table 3.3. Here, all observations 
for one respondent (person number 370802) are listed over the 8 year period, 2000-
2008. I also list the respondent’s mobility events over the previous year and their gross 
monthly wage.  
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Table 3.3: Data frame example for SOEP respondent #370802. One respondent’s answers over 9 waves. 
pid Syear M_event grossmonthlywage 
370802 2000 Same job, same employer 1023 
370802 2001 Changed employer- involuntary 486 
370802 2002 Same job, same employer 325 
370802 2003 Same job, same employer 295 
370802 2004 Changed job, kept employer 1500 
370802 2006 Same job, same employer 1500 
370802 2007 Same job, same employer 1500 
370802 2008 Same job, same employer 1500 
 
I now turn to the British Household Panel Survey. The BHPS is also a longitudinal 
panel. It is made up of UK respondents. Data was collected at the household level 
between 1991 and 2008. The sample is also representative of the UK’s workforce, and 
contains socio-economic variables, as well as detailed job history files, household 
composition, employment, and a number of satisfaction variables. Booth et al. (1999) 
use the panel to discuss job mobility and job tenure lengths of British workers.  Battu et 
al. (2008) look at the relationship between housing tenure and unemployment using the 
sample. Also, Booth and Francesconi (2000) use the BHPS to analyse gender 
differences in job mobility and tenure. Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) measures the impact 
inter and intra-firm mobility in Germany and the UK, with the BHPS serving as the 
latter’s sample. Again, the panel is commonly used to represent the British workforce, 
making it ideal for this study.   
I define the British sample used in this work as follows; observations from respondents 
who are missing no more than 1 wave between the survey years 2000 and 2008; 
observations where the respondent is employed at each of the interviews of data 
collection; observations where the respondent is not in self employment, unemployment 
or inactivity; observations where the respondent has no missing job spell information 
for the survey year; observations where the respondent has no missing values for 
questions related to job mobility. The sample contains respondents from England, 
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Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The final data shape takes the form of a person-
year file which ignores households and focuses instead on individual responses. The 
sample draws mainly from the year-specific individual-response files “INDRESP”, 
where observations are grouped by a person-specific identifier (PID) that remains 
constant over survey years (WAVES). This design is similar to the SOEP. The sample 
also draws from the individual job history files “JOBHIST”, which contain person-
specific job-spell information for the given year. This dataset is used to construct the 
mobility variables proposed below. I discuss this further in the “variables” section of 
this chapter. Lastly, a number of controls come from the Cross National Equivalence 
File, listed within the BHPS. As mentioned in the SOEP section, the CNEF is a 
standardised file of variables created especially for panel comparisons. All 3 sets of files 
are merged using the person-specific unique panel ID (PID) and the survey year 
(WAVE). In order to illustrate the person-year design, I show a snapshot of the data 
structure for one respondent in Table 3.4, which contains the 8 observations for 
respondent number 10087486. I also include the respondent’s job mobility information 
(M_event) and gross monthly pay (paygu), as in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Data frame example for BHPS respondent #10087486. One respondent’s answers over 9 waves. 
pid year M_event paygu   
10087486 2000 Changed employer- voluntary 1756.16 
10087486 2001 Same job, same employed 2001.54 
10087486 2002 Changed employer- voluntary 2301.77 
10087486 2003 Same job, same employed 2759.21 
10087486 2004 Changed employer- voluntary 2882.25 
10087486 2005 Same job, same employed 3202.46 
10087486 2006 Changed employer- voluntary 3502.69 
10087486 2007 Same job, same employed 3302.54 
10087486 2008 Changed employer- voluntary 3692.20 
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The resulting UK sample is made up of 3,782 respondents and 32,560 person-year 
observations; the German sample is made up of 4,444 individuals, and 38,687 person-
year observations. Both samples are summarised in Table 3.5.  
Table 3.5: Sample size: Number of person-year combinations and number of respondents in each panel 
 BHPS SOEP 
Number of person-year observations  32,000+ 36,000+ 
Number of respondents 3,700+ 
(2000-2008) 
4,000+ 
(2000-2008) 
 
3.2.1. Balance and Attrition 
Both the BHPS and SOEP sample use a semi-balanced panel design. This isolates the 
core of the economy, only those who avoid unemployment or inactivity are considered. 
I allow respondents to miss a single observation during the period under study, as this 
increases the number of observations in the mobility categories. On one hand, 
considering a fully balanced panel greatly limits the number of “mobility” observations. 
On the other, an unbalanced panel contains a mix of respondents who fall into and out 
of unemployment or inactivity, and are not representative of the “core” workforce. Stata 
is able to handle semi-balanced or unbalanced fixed-effects models (Longhi and Nandi, 
2014), but cannot produce accurate estimates for variables with few observations. The 
median number of observations per respondent in both panels is 9 waves. The minimum 
is 8 waves per respondent.  
Attrition occurs naturally within panel data. Respondents and households drop out of 
surveys by refusing to answer subsequent questionnaires, dying, or moving to a new 
address without passing on the information to researchers. Respondents who experience 
job mobility may be particularly prone to attrition, since they may move to other parts 
of the country to take jobs, falling away from the panel. The BHPS documentation 
advises using longitudinal weights to correct for attrition and the changing sample size. 
However, these weights only apply to respondents who are a part of the original 1990 
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sample and greatly limit the number of observations. The SOEP also contains 
significant attrition. The guidebook for the SOEP data claims longitudinal weights 
correct for this difference, without limiting the sample size (Wagner et al., 2007). I 
discuss weighting later in the chapter.  
This is a significant limitation, since respondents who experience mobility could leave 
the country as a result of a job change, or simply move to a new part of the country 
without telling the researchers,. Attrition may have two separate effects on the estimates 
proposed in the fixed-effects models. On one hand, attrition may cause models to under-
estimate the effects of job mobility. Job-movers, who move to new positions in new 
countries, or new parts of the country, may see a large increase in pay that is not 
available to those who remain employed locally. On the other hand, attrition may cause 
models to over-estimate the effects of job mobility. Job-movers, who take positions in 
new countries or new parts of the country, may see only marginal gains from job 
mobility as they find few opportunities in their immediate labour market, while 
competing with “exceptional” workers who earn large premiums from job mobility. 
Some of the issues presented above can be addressed using panel weights, or corrected 
standard errors. However, it should be kept in mind that most of the respondents move 
at a local level and are representative of a local labour market. I now consider the 
variables available in each panel. 
3.3. Variables 
In an effort to make models as comparable as possible, I make a number of coding 
decisions. First, panels differ in the type of mobility considered. Specifically intra-firm 
mobility in the UK is nuanced, but not in Germany. I lay out the categories in each 
panel and the limitations of comparability in each panel. I also run checks on the time 
period covered by the mobility variable, the validity of intra-firm moves (a problematic 
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measure in Germany according to Kattenbach et al. (2014)), and the validity of the 
reference category for both panels. I confirm that the available measures are valid, 
despite suggestions from previous authors. Second, subjective outcomes are recorded on 
different scales. After presenting these, I discuss strategies of making the measures 
comparable. Ultimately I change the scale measuring subjective satisfaction into z-
scores in both panels. Last, I outline the control variables that do not come from the 
CNEF and how these can be summarised into somewhat comparable categories.  
3.3.1.  Job Mobility 
This section develops the coding of the mobility variable, which was sketched out in the 
section above. Given its centrality as a concept, I discuss it in detail. I list the variables 
used to define mobility in datasets, their distribution, and the limitations each measure 
has in both panels. As before, the main categories used in this work are: 
1. Same job, same employer (non-movers, the reference category) 
2. Inter-firm voluntary  
3. Inter-firm involuntary 
4. Intra-firm voluntary 
5. Intra-firm involuntary 
While the measure is not directly comparable for UK and German data, it captures 
important dynamics of mobility in both institutional contexts. On one hand, Latzke et al. 
(2016) and Kattenbach et al. (2014) highlight that intra-organisational changes in the 
German panel may be under-reported, and cannot be split into voluntary and 
involuntary changes. For this reason, they drop these observations. On the other, 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) consider intra-firm mobility in their work without splitting 
these into promotion or demotion categories. I too include these observations into the 
panel in an effort to capture some effect for intra-firm mobility, even if underreported, 
73 
 
as these are a crucial element of attainment theory and efficiency wage theory. I run 
some basic checks on intra-firm change and the reference category below. I define job 
mobility as job spell changes that occur between and within firms, and changes which 
are voluntary or involuntary.  The main variables used to create the mobility categories 
are listed in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6: Variables used to define Job Mobility. (BHPS & SOEP)  
Column 1 Column 2 
BHPS 
Column 3 
Coded result 
Column 4 
SOEP 
Column 5 
Coded Result 
Employed 
respondents 
only 
Jbstat:  
 Self employed 
 Employed 
 Unemployed 
 Retired 
 Maternity leave 
 Family care 
 Student 
 Sick 
 Government 
training 
Employed Dummy 
 Employed 
 All other 
categories 
(Unemployed
, inactive, 
self-
employed, 
training) 
Empstat: 
 Full time 
employment 
 Regular part 
time 
 Vocational 
training 
 Marginally 
employed 
 Near retirement 
 Military  
 Civil service 
 Workshop for 
disabled 
 No employed 
 Full time short 
work 
 Part time short 
work 
Employed dummy: 
 Full time 
employed, 
regular part-
time 
 All other 
categories 
(Unemploye
d or 
inactive, 
including 
short work) 
Change of 
job 
Jspno: employment spell 
number(0 no change. 1-9 
change) 
Spell change dummy  
 0-no change 
 1- spell 
change 
Changed jobs in the last 12 
months? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes, after 
checking dates 
Spell change dummy: 
 No change 
 Spell 
change 
Inter/intra 
firm change 
Jhstat: 
 Different job, 
same employer 
 Working for a 
different 
employer/ 
working for 
myself 
 Unemployed 
 Retired 
 On maternity 
leave 
 Looking after 
family 
 In full time 
education 
 Sick leave 
 Government 
training 
 Something else 
Inter/intra firm change: 
 Same job 
same 
employer, 
 Inter firm 
change 
 Intra firm 
change 
 
 
Which categories are 
used? 
 Inter firm 
change: 
(Working for 
a different 
employer) 
 Intra firm 
change- 
(Different 
job, same 
employer) 
 Remaining 
categories are 
dropped 
Destination: 
 First job 
 Job after a break 
 Job with a new 
employer 
 Company taken 
over 
 Changed jobs, 
same firm 
 New job, self 
employed 
Inter/intra firm change: 
 Same job, 
same 
employer 
 Inter firm 
change 
 Intra firm 
change 
 
Which categories are 
used? 
 Inter-firm 
change: (Job 
with a new 
employer) 
 Intra-firm 
change: 
(Changed 
job, same 
firm) 
 Remaining 
categories 
are dropped 
Voluntary/in
voluntary 
change 
Jhstpy: 
 Promoted 
 Left for better 
job 
 Made redundant 
 Dismissed 
 Temp contract 
ended 
 Retirement 
 Children/homec
are 
 Care of other 
 Moved area 
 Started college 
 other 
Voluntary/involuntary: 
 same job, 
same firm 
 voluntary 
 involuntary 
 other 
 
Which categories are 
used? 
 Voluntary: 
(promoted, 
left for better 
job,) 
 Involuntary: 
(redundant, 
dismissed, 
temp contract 
ended) 
 Other: 
(retirement, 
childcare, 
care of other, 
Termination: 
 company closed 
 resigned 
 dismissal 
 mutual 
agreement 
 contract expired 
 retired 
 leave of absence 
 business closed 
 training 
 other 
Voluntary/involuntary: 
 same job 
same firm 
 voluntary 
 involuntary  
 other 
 
Which categories are 
used? 
 Voluntary: 
(resigned, 
mutual 
agreement) 
 Involuntary: 
(company 
closed, 
dismissal, 
contract 
expired) 
 Other: 
(other, 
training, 
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moved area, 
other) 
retirement) 
 
Column 1 in Table 3.6 lists the concept being measured; columns 2 and 4 show the 
concept as it appears in the original data files of the BHPS and the SOEP. Columns 3 
and 5 show how the original variables are operationalised in the study.  
Starting from the first row, workers must be “employed” for the year in observation. 
Using the categories in the BHPS and SOEP I isolate employed respondents in both 
panels. In the second row, each panel asks respondents if they changed job recently (in 
the last 12 months). I use this variable as a dummy for a basic job change. In the next 
row, both countries distinguish changes to a new employer and changes with an existing 
employer. These variables are used to determine inter-firm and intra-firm mobility. Last, 
both countries distinguish between voluntary and involuntary changes, by listing the 
reason for the previous change. Only the BHPS contains data on promotions and 
demotions, or voluntary and involuntary intra-firm changes. The SOEP does not 
elaborate on intra-firm changes. I list the mobility variables, and their frequencies 
below. The sample in Table 3.7 considers the years 2000-2008 and contains the semi-
balanced panel described throughout. 
Table 3.7: Job mobility frequencies, semi-balanced panel. (German & the UK, 2000-2008) 
 BHPS variable BHPS frequencies SOEP variable SOEP frequencies 
     
Reference category, 
employed without a 
recent change  
Same job, same 
employer 
27,091 
(83.20%) 
Same job, same 
employer 
33,318 
(95.96%) 
     
Inter-firm mobility Voluntary change, new 
employer 
1,872 
(5.75%) 
Voluntary change, new 
employer 
826 
(2.38%) 
 Involuntary change, 
new employer 
468 
(1.44%) 
Involuntary change, 
new employer 
334 
(0.96%) 
 Other, new employer 873 
(2.68%) 
Other, new employer 7  
(0.02%) 
     
Intra-firm mobility Voluntary change, 
same employer 
1,630 
(5.01%) 
Intra-firm change  235  
(0.68%) 
 Involuntary change, 
same employer 
96 
(0.29%) 
  
 Other change, same 
employer 
530 
(1.63%) 
  
     
 Total 32,560 
(100%) 
Total 34,720 
(100%) 
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Looking at Table 3.7, both panels have the same reference category, where workers 
remain in the same job with the same employer. The UK panel is more mobile than the 
German panel, 83% of the observations in the BHPS panel are made up of years where 
respondents do not change jobs at all. In the German case, 96% of observations capture 
employed workers with no move. Overall, the “job-hopping” narrative appears to be 
overstated, at least for the core workforce.  
Moves between firms are more common in the UK than Germany, 5.7% of observations 
in BHPS capture voluntary moves to a new employer. In Germany, 2.4% of 
observations catch voluntary inter-firm moves.  In the UK 1.4% of observations catch 
workers who move involuntarily to a new employer. These changes are 1% of 
observations in Germany. Lastly, in the UK 3% of cases change employers for other 
reasons but only 0.02% of workers make the claim in Germany. It is likely that moves 
for “other” reasons fall out of the panel-design eventually.  
Considering intra-firm mobility, in the BHPS 5% of observations make up promotions 
within the firm and only 0.3% of observations are involuntary changes with the same 
employer (demotions and downsizing). 1.6% of the sample reports an intra-firm change 
for “other reasons”. These changes are even less common in the German sample, only 
0.7% of observations capture internal changes. This category holds all changes 
including promotions, demotions, and downsizing of workers. I list three basic checks 
which ensure that mobility and the reference category in both countries is valid.  
3.3.1.1.  Checks and Issues 
In this section I consider three issues. First, does mobility capture the same time period 
between waves in both panels? The lower rate of mobility in Germany could be the 
result of survey rounds covering fewer months. I find both mobility variables cover a 12 
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month period. Second, intra-firm changes in Germany have been questioned; authors 
suggest the measure is not capturing intra-firm movement with the same employer. I 
find that the average firm tenure of an intra-firm move is 6 years, although the 
distribution reveals many respondents move in their first year at a given firm. This 
measure should be interpreted with caution but appears to catch intra-firm mobility. 
Third, linked to the previous point, issues with intra-firm mobility have affected the 
reference category. Authors question if those reporting “no change”, move through a 
career ladder within the firm gradually based on tenure without listing promotions. This 
would be a significant issue. However I find that the reference category has a high level 
of occupational fidelity6, and captures a distinct group of non-movers.  
The first issue considers the length of time between waves, ensuring respondents who 
answer the survey consider the same time period when measuring “mobility”. The most 
basic measure of job mobility asks respondents if they experienced a change in spell 
between interviews. Here, I ask whether this measure covers the same time period 
between waves. Respondents are asked about moves which took place in the “previous 
year” during a given interview. Therefore mobility events outlined for a given year (t) 
take place in the previous year (t-1). There are subtle differences to the time referenced 
in both panels. In the German dataset, respondents are asked about job changes “after 
December 31st” of the previous year. Thus, in the 2008 questionnaire, respondents are 
asked “Did you change your job or start a new one after December 31, 2006?” The 
reference period covered is all of 2007, and the period in 2008 taken to collect the data. 
In the BHPS, respondents are asked if they experienced a change since the “1st of 
September”. Thus, in 2008 respondents are asked the following question “I'd like to ask 
                                                 
6 By occupational fidelity, I mean the first difference in occupation following a mobility 
event. The measure checks for how often respondents remain in the same occupation. A 
“high” rate of occupational fidelity, means a high percentage of observations remaining 
in the same occupation following a recent change. 
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you a few questions now about what you might have been doing since September 1st 
2007 in the way of paid work, unemployment, or things like time spent retired or 
looking after your family”. Is the length of period between data rounds the same in both 
panels? 
In Table 3.8, I list the average number of months between interviews for respondents. In 
each panel, I consider the interview month and year. I then calculate the first difference 
of the variable, giving me the average duration, in months, between interviews. 
Germany’s “low rate of mobility” could be the product of a shorter period between 
interviews, 8 months, for example, when the UK covers 12. I find that both panels 
gather data annually, with an average of 12 months between interviews for each panel. 
The standard deviation suggests that both countries differ roughly by 3.2 month in each 
direction (1.6*2). The minimum and maximum values suggest that a number of outliers 
also exist, where respondents are re-sampled after a short, or a long period of time. 
Most of the observations occur between 9 months and 15 months, in both panels. The 
differences between panels are similar, meaning both are comparable. 
Table 3.8: Average duration between interview waves in months. BHPS & SOEP 
 BHPS SOEP 
Average number of months between 
waves 
11.89 months (st dev 1.61 months) 11.86 months (st dev 1.66 months) 
Minimum and maximum 4 months (0.02%), 20 months(0.05%)  1 month (0.03), 23 months (0.01) 
  
Considering the second issue, I explore the validity of intra-firm mobility in Germany. 
As outlined, it’s not possible to discern between voluntary and involuntary changes that 
take place within the firm in Germany. Questions about voluntary and IVM only apply 
to inter-firm mobility. However, it is possible to isolate internal changes, which contain 
promotions, demotions and lateral changes that occur in the same firm. This is clear 
from Table 3.6, where no promotion or demotion category appear in the variable 
“termination”. As a result of this issue, Latzke et al. (2016) and Kattenbach et al. (2014) 
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suggest focusing on external mobility alone, claiming the category for intra-firm 
mobility may be flawed and not capturing intra-firm changes at all. Both also allude to 
issues with the reference category, which may contain promotions, since workers move 
through ladders without acknowledging a change, I discuss this later. Latzke et al. 
(2016) claim“...the operationalisation excludes intra-organizational job changes due to 
concerns about accurate measurement within the GSOEP” (p142). However, 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) use the same data to consider inter and intra-firm VM, 
although they define VM as any direct change without periods of unemployment, 
bypassing the need for a “promotion” category as described by Kattenbach et al. (2014).  
I use a basic check in the SOEP data to test the length of firm-tenure of those who list 
an intra-firm change. A variable in the SOEP asks respondents the year they started 
working with their employer (plb0036). I subtract the survey year from the year the 
respondent started at their current job. This measure is a rough estimate of firm tenure. I 
separate this measure by mobility types using the German data. 
Table 3.9: Average number of years with an employer, by mobility. SOEP panel alone. Intra-firm movers hold 
and average of 6 years of firm tenure. 
 SOEP 
Average number of years with current employer 
Same job, same firm 12.76 
Intra-firm change (changed job, same firm) 6.82 
Inter-firm change (changed job, changed firms) 0.71 
 
Table 3.9 suggests that, on average, those who experience intra-firm mobility hold 6.8 
years of firm tenure. However, looking at the distribution of tenure years for those with 
intra-firm changes show that almost 50% of responses record 1 year with their 
employer. The remaining 50% list their tenure between 2 and 43 years long. It may be 
that workers either receive or fail to receive a promotion in their first year, or a 
movement from a trial period occurs within their first year. Internal movement category 
for the SOEP may need to be interpreted with caution.  
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Finally, I consider the issue with the reference category “same job, same employer”, 
which must remain the category of non-movement or non-change throughout the 
analysis. Commenting on the issue with German intra-firm mobility data Kattenbach et 
al. (2014) questions if internal movements and promotions are slipping into the 
reference category “respondents may interpret an internal job change as a clear move 
into a different position with a different job title, even if a promotion is not implied” (p 
56). Thus authors allude to respondents taking promotions without acknowledging these 
as promotions. I run a basic check on whether workers in this category remain in the 
same occupation instead of slowly moving upwards through a career ladder. This is 
particularly important in Germany, where workers do not have a category for 
“promotions” or “demotions” with their employer. If workers are receiving promotions 
but not listing them, this compromises the reference category. 
I show that the reference category contains an unchanged group of non-movers using 
Table 3.10, where I list a measure of occupational fidelity (the rate of observations 
without an occupational change between waves) for each type of firm mobility, 
including the reference category, for both panels.  
Table 3.10: Occupational fidelity by mobility type. (BHPS & SOEP 2000-2008). Reference category (same job, 
same employer) has the highest rate of occupational fidelity. 
 % of observations without 
occupational change BHPS (1 digit 
ISCO 1st  difference) 
% of observations without 
occupational change SOEP (1 digit 
ISCO 1st  difference) 
Same job, same employer  85% 93% 
Changed job, kept employer 63% 71% 
Changed job, changed employer 58% 67% 
 
The BHPS has no issues with intra-firm mobility. The panel distinguishes between 
voluntary and involuntary changes between and within firms. The issue lies with 
Germany, whether movements within the firm are fully captured by the category 
“changed job kept employer”, or is that category only capturing demotions, or types of 
other reassignment, letting “promotions” slip into the reference category. This is not the 
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case, as 93% of all observations in the reference category remain in the same ISCO 
category to the previous year.   
To summarise, both job mobility rates are calculated between 12 months, both contain 
valid measures of intra-firm mobility. Both contain uncompromising groups of non-
movers as the reference category. Although issues with the mobility measure exist, 
these have been discussed above. The variable still contains comparative power in both 
panels. I now consider the outcome variables used throughout the thesis. 
3.3.2.  Outcomes 
I use three objective and four subjective outcomes throughout this work, which are 
saved in the individual response files, PL in SOEP-Long and INDRESP in the BHPS. I 
consider one dependent variable from the CNEF for both panels, subjective health, 
which is designed specifically for comparing German and British workers. The measure 
for weekly working hours is taken from the CNEF for German data; and the individual 
response file in the British data.  
Subjective or “soft” outcomes are satisfaction scores for pay, security, work, and hours. 
The objective measures or “hard” outcomes are (near) direct measures, gross monthly 
pay, weekly working hours, and health. I list these in the first three columns of Table 
3.11. Although the CNEF also contains a measure of household income, I use the 
subject-specific, gross monthly income measure (PAYGU for the BHPS, and PLC0013 
for the SOEP) from each panel’s individual response files. Since the project does not 
sample workers at the household level, focusing on household income may skew the 
relationship. Since Germany and the UK differ in tax rates, I consider gross monthly 
income, instead of net monthly income.  A summary of each variable is listed below in 
Table 3.11. Since the SOEP does not contain a measure for satisfaction with pay, I 
consider satisfaction with household income, the nearest possible subjective measure of 
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earnings. Each subjective measure is an interval scale. Although a categorical 
satisfaction measure was originally considered, for the German data, it was dropped 
from analysis due to lack of (within-respondent) variance. 
Table 3.11: Subjective and Objective outcomes used throughout the thesis (standardised and non-
standardised). 
 BHPS SOEP Standardised BHPS 
variables 
Standardised SOEP 
variables 
Subjective:     
Satisfaction 
with pay 
Jbsat2 (job 
satisfaction: pay) 
Range 1-7 
Plh0175 (satisfaction 
with HH income) 
Range 0-10 
Z_paysat (job satisfaction: 
pay) 
Range -2.49- 1.35 
Mean 0 
Z_paysat (satisfaction with 
HH income) 
Range -3.14-1.65 
Mean 0 
Satisfaction 
with security 
Jbsat4 (job 
satisfaction: 
security) 
Range 1-7 
- Z_securitysat (job 
satisfaction: security) 
Range -2.44-1.24 
Mean 0 
- 
Satisfaction 
with work itself 
Jbsat6 (job 
satisfaction: work 
itself) 
Range: 1-7 
Plh0173 (satisfaction 
with work) 
Range 0-10 
Z_worksat (job satisfaction: 
work itself) 
Range -3.37-1.15 
Mean 0 
Z_worksat (satisfaction 
with work) 
Range -3.56-1.46 
Mean 0 
Satisfaction 
with hours 
Jbsat7 (job 
satisfaction: hours) 
Range 1-7 
Plh:0178 (satisfaction 
with leisure time) 
Range 0-10 
Z_timesat (job satisfaction: 
hours) 
Range -2.96-1.21 
Mean 0 
Z_timesat (satisfaction 
with leisure time) 
Range -2.86- 1.58 
Mean 0 
Objective:     
Income Paygu: gross 
monthly income 
plc0013: gross monthly 
income 
Comparable, log transformed Comparable, log 
transformed 
Weekly 
working hours 
Jbhrs: number of 
hours normally 
worked per week 
e11101: Annual work 
hours of individual 
Comparable  Weeklyhours: e11101 
divided by 52. 
Health m11126: health 
status 
Range 1-5 
m11126: health status 
range 1-5   
Comparable Comparable 
 
Columns 2 and 3 list the variables as they feature in the panels. Columns 3 and 4 
present the variables after transformation. The outcomes listed above are similar to 
those used by previous authors discussing mobility. Focusing on “soft” and “hard” 
outcomes has been suggested by several authors (Fasang et al., 2012). Measures of 
satisfaction catch obvious objectives; people want to be happy with working conditions. 
“Soft” outcomes are also “increasingly accepted as valid measures of subjective utility 
that are distinct from objective rewards” and should therefore be studied separately (p 
371 (Fasang et al., 2012)). Most of all, the reason for using both outcomes stems from 
the complexity found by previous authors; there is a clear mismatch in the mobility 
relationship to subjective and objective outcomes. Gesthuizen and Dagevos (2008) 
provide the clearest example of this, while estimating VM’s effect on both subjective 
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and objective outcomes. In their analysis of the Netherlands, they find that voluntary 
inter-firm and intra-firm mobility impact subjective and objective outcomes differently. 
This is discussed in the literature review. In their analysis Gesthuizen and Dagevos 
(2008) consider if job quits stem from job mismatch, while promotions are the result of 
career progress.  
3.3.2.1. Checks and Issues 
Considering Table 3.11, the objective outcomes are comparable. The health variable 
comes from the cross national equivalence files, for both panels. The income variable is 
similar in that it’s capturing gross monthly pay. Hours are also comparable, although the 
German outcome lists the annual hours worked, while British outcome lists the weekly 
hours worked. Subjective measures are less comparable. Similar concepts contain 
different measures. The measure of satisfaction with pay ranges from 1-7 and is a 
continuous variable in the BHPS. In the SOEP, satisfaction with pay is phrased as a 
satisfaction with “Household income” and ranges from 0-10. This is a similar variable, 
but contains a different range. Job security ranges from 1-7 in the BHPS, but is a 
categorical variable in the SOEP therefore I only consider the measure for British data. 
Satisfaction with work or “the job” features in both panels, in the BHPS it ranges from 1 
to 7; in the SOEP it ranges from 0 to 10.  Lastly, satisfaction with hours is a continuous 
variable that ranges from 1 to 7 in the BHPS, for the SOEP I use satisfaction with 
“leisure time” which range from 0 to 10. This is the closest measuring of subjectively 
capturing the underlying measure of “satisfaction with hours”.  
I turn subjective continuous outcomes into z-scores. Z-scores are standardised measures 
with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This method transforms continuous 
measures in both panels onto a similar scale, distance from the mean in standard 
deviations (Field, 2009). I list the results in column 4 and column 5 of Table 3.11. 
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3.3.3.  Controls 
Measuring the impact of mobility alone would not give a “true” effect of job changes on 
outcomes. I consider a number of control variables, similar to those used by previous 
researchers looking at the differences between “movers” and “non-movers” (Kattenbach 
et al., 2014, Latzke et al., 2016, Gesthuizen, 2009, Gesthuizen and Dagevos, 2008, 
Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 2001). Most of the variables appear in the CNEF for each 
panel, only three do not feature in the file; education, contract type, and firm size. I 
summarise the controls in the table below. I also include two macro variables, as 
control, the country level of unemployment for the interview year (unemployment) and 
the country economic growth for a given year (growth) both are taken from the Eurostat 
database7. The first column lists the variable type, the second column shows the variable 
used in the BHPS; the last column lists the SOEP variable. 
Table 3.12: Control variables used throughout the thesis (BHPS and SOEP).  
Variable: BHPS SOEP 
   
Gender d11102LL- male/female d11102ll; cnef- gender of respondent 
Education Qfedhi- highest educational qualification 
 
PGCASMIN- qualification position 
Age d11101- age (cross national equivalence) D11101; equivalence file- age of individual 
 
Children d11107- equivalence file D11107; CNEF- number of kids 
 
Contract Permanent- type of contract Permanent- type of contract 
Firm size Jbsize- number of employed  PGBETR**- size of company 
PGALLBET**- size of company 
Industry Equivalence file;  e11106, 1 digit industry 
Equivalence file; e11107, 2 digit industry. 
e11106; cnef- 1 digit industry codes 
e11107; cnef- 2 digit industry code 
Occupation e11105 two digit occupation CNEF 
 
E11105; CNEF- occupation of individual 
Unemployment Own calculations- level of unemployment during 
survey year 
Own calculations- level of unemployment during 
survey year 
Economic growth  Own calculations- level of GDP growth during 
survey year 
Own calculations- level of GDP growth during 
survey year 
 
Since I use linear fixed-effects regression to estimate the models, only time variant 
measures may be included into a specific model. Each model controls for age and 
contract type, which are standard controls. I also include worker industry and 
                                                 
7 Eurostat is the institution responsible for the storage and harmonisation of European 
statistics.  
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occupation, although several authors choose to use industry alone (Gesthuizen, 2009, 
Gesthuizen and Dagevos, 2008, Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 2001). Gesthuizen (2009) 
and others control for the number of children living in the house and claim that firm size 
is important is explaining differences of working conditions in both panels. Lastly, I 
consider country level unemployment and growth in GDP within a given year. The 
macro variables fit into the UK models but are dropped from German models due to 
issues of collinearity with the year specific dummies. Neither unemployment nor 
growth varies strongly by survey year in Germany; wider differences emerge in the UK. 
3.3.3.1. Checks and Issues 
Only two variables in Table 3.12 are not directly comparable. These are education, and 
firm size. I list each of these in Table 3.13. The education variable in the BHPS makes 
simple distinctions between qualifications. The SOEP has a more nuanced divide. I 
transform education in both panels into a categorical variable containing three 
categories: basic, secondary and vocational, and third level education.  The result is 
listed in Table 3.13. 
Firm size is another measure that is not directly comparable in its listed form. However, 
the categories can be shaped to accommodate differences between the two panels. 
While the BHPS lists a nuanced set of values for firm size, the SOEP has a more 
restrictive list of options. I limit these to three categories that are not wholly compatible. 
However, their impact on pay and satisfaction is expected to be minor. Both reference 
categories consider large firms. 
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Table 3.13: Non comparable controls, recoded into common values (BHPS & SOEP). 
 BHPS SOEP BHPS recoded SOEP recoded 
Education QFACHI 
 Higher 
degree 
 1st degree 
 HND, 
HNC, 
teaching 
 A levels 
 levels 
 CSE 
 None of 
these 
CASMIN 
 In school 
 Inadequately 
completed 
 General 
elementary 
 Basic vocational 
qualification 
 Intermediate 
general education 
 Intermediate 
vocational 
 General maturity 
cert 
 Vocational 
maturity cert 
 Lower tertiary 
 Higher tertiary 
Educ: 
 Basic (CSE, no 
education) 
 Secondary or 
vocational (o 
level, a level, 
HND, NHC, 
teaching) 
 Third level (1st 
degree, higher 
degree) 
Educ: 
 Basic 
(Inadeuately 
completed, 
general 
elementary, 
basic 
vocational) 
 Secondary 
(intermediate 
general/vocatio
nal, general 
cert, vocational 
cert) 
 Tertiary (lower 
tertiary, higher 
tertiary) 
Firm size Jbsize 
 1-2 
 3-9 
 10-24 
 25-49 
 50-99 
 100-199 
 200-499 
 500-999 
 1000+ 
 Dk less than 
25 
 Dk 25+ 
PGBETR 
 Less than 20 
 20-200 
 200-2000 
 2000+ 
 Self employed 
without 
employees 
 
Jbsize1: 
 1-99 
 100-499 
 500+ 
Jbsize1: 
 1-200 
 201-2000 
 2000+ 
 
This section adds to the previous discussion of sample size and data by considering the 
mobility variable, the outcomes, and the controls used. Lastly, I lay out the estimation 
process used in this work. As already mentioned, I use fixed-effects estimation 
techniques to answer the research question. Below is a discussion of the method, its 
strengths, its limitations, and its assumptions.  
3.4. Analytical Strategy 
Several authors simply use ordinary least squares regression to consider the relationship 
between mobility and outcomes, outlined in the literature review. This does not consider 
unobserved individual heterogeneity, an important aspect in the theory listed, and the 
empirical results shown. Job mobility is not a random event. Estimating a relationship 
between job mobility and outcomes without accounting for person-specific 
characteristics that may influence those who quit or pursue promotions (as well as those 
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who could lose their job or face demotion) would bias the estimates. The first group is 
likely determined, influential, or confident. The latter group may be less likely to hold 
these qualities. None of these measures can be included in the model, since they are 
unmeasured. A natural question is whether the positive relationship between a quit and 
the earnings the product of the quit or the product of the time-invariant variables (like 
motivation) that make respondents more likely to quit. This issue is known as 
unobserved heterogeneity. It has implications for the research question, which I 
summarise below. Starting with a basic model, the data above could be estimated in a 
simple ordinary least squares regression, or pooled estimation (Longhi and Nandi, 
2014). The equation would follow: 
Log wageit= β0 + βx(Job mobility eventit) + βz(Matrix of Controlsit) + βq(Year 
Dummiesit) + error termit 
 Considering each term, the subscript i identifies individuals, and the subscript t 
identifies periods of time or waves. The β coefficients are the estimated effects of each 
control variable. Wages tend to be skewed, and so require a log transformation. β0 is the 
intercept or the estimated quantity of log wages when all other values are 0. The job 
mobility factor variable contains 4 possible job mobility events, each of which has its 
own estimated β. The matrix of controls contains the other measures with their own β 
estimates (q). In the model above I would have to assume that the error term in the 
equation is a random variable with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. I also assume that 
there are no between worker differences, in that, the equation above would give all 
respondents the same intercept. The error term above would therefore be particularly 
large (Allison, 2009).  
The main appeal of panel data is that repeated observations allow the error term to be 
split into a “person-specific time-invariant” error term (αi) and a time variant error term 
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(εit). The person-specific time-invariant error term is a crucial concept and allows me to 
rewrite the equation above in a way that isolates unchanging unknown person-specific 
measures (like IQ, motivation, genetic make-up, upbringing etcetera).  The equation 
would follow: 
Log wageit= β0 + βx(Job mobility eventit) + βz(Matrix of Controlsit) + βq(Year 
Dummiesit) + αi + εit 
Here, the “error term” is now two separate unknown values αi which does not change 
over t (time invariant) and εit which changes over time and individual (Wooldridge, 
2015). I assume that εit is normally distributed in the equation above with a mean of 0 
and a constant variance. I assume that αi does not change over time, in that it captures 
individual time-invariant factors that can’t be caught by the measured variables in the 
model. At this point I must make a significant assumption about the relationship 
between the individual specific error term and job mobility. This is the choice between 
fixed and random-effects models.   
3.4.1. Random VS Fixed-effects models 
Is αi uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables and is it normally distributed with 
a mean of zero and constant variance? In fixed-effects models, unobserved differences 
between respondents are “cancelled out” of the models, as individuals act as their own 
control (Allison, 2009). In random-effects models unobserved differences are regarded 
as random and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Thus the difference between 
the two equations comes down to the structure of association between the observed 
variables (like job mobility) and the unobserved variables (like motivation, genetic 
makeup, intelligence, or drive). Theoretically, it is highly likely that person-specific 
characteristics play a part in someone’s ability to quit or be promoted (as well as those 
most likely to see demotion or dismissal). However, I test this using the Hausman, 
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which compares the estimates produced by fixed and random effects regression. The 
Hausman compares an inefficient estimate, in this case a set of fixed effects mobility 
dummies, against a potentially biased but more efficient estimate, in this case a set of 
random effects mobility dummies (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008). A significant 
test, suggests there is a difference in the estimates, and that the inefficient but unbiased 
set should be used, since this set is “correctly specified” (page 157 (Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal, 2008)). 
Instead of running the model for each outcome, in each panel, I limit the output to two 
outcomes per panel, general satisfaction with work, and log gross monthly pay. In 
Germany, neither satisfaction with work (Hausman = 17.96, p=0.0013), nor gross 
weekly pay (Hausman = 57.96, p=0.000) pass the benchmark for a random effects 
model. In both cases the specification for the model is off, and the person specific errors 
correlate with job mobility types. Considering the UK, neither satisfaction with work 
(Hausman = 24.00, p=0.0005), nor gross monthly wages (Hausman = -492.14, p= does 
not meet asymptotic properties) pass the test for random effects models. Here too, the 
person specific errors correlate with the mobility types. As a result, fixed effects 
estimates should be considered. Luckily this is the standard approach in the literature 
(Gesthuizen, 2009, Gesthuizen and Dagevos, 2008, Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 2001), 
and there is a strong theoretical reason for pursuing fixed effects (Kalleberg and 
Sorensen, 1979, Sørensen and Kalleberg, 1981).  
Fixed-effects estimation guarantees unbiased estimates (Allison, 2009, Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal, 2008, Longhi and Nandi, 2014, Wooldridge, 2015). Since motivated 
individuals are far more likely to quit or receive a promotion, this assumption cannot 
hold for random-effects models. Estimating these models using random-effects would 
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inflate the estimates for job quits on outcomes, as the person-specific error would fall 
into the estimates for job mobility.  
There are two data requirements for fixed-effects models. The first is a dependent 
variable, wages or satisfaction, which is measured for each individual at least two 
occasions. These must be comparable and hold the same meaning or metric. The second 
is a set of predictor variables which change in value across multiple occasions for a 
substantial portion of the sample. Both panels above contain clusters of individuals 
(  = 1, … ,  ), each of whom is measured at several points in time (at least 8) (  =
1, … ,  ). Job mobility (Job Mobilityit) varies within individuals over time, as do the 
independent variables (Matrix of controlsit). The method is used by Kalleberg and 
Mastekaasa (2001) in their analysis of job mobility’s impact on firm commitment and 
reward. The country specific chapters (5 & 6) estimate the return on mobility for the 
labour force as a whole (the first aim), and separately by gender (male and female) and 
education groups (those with a basic, secondary or post secondary, and third level 
education) (the second aim). I consider linear fixed-effects models below, and lay out 
their limitations. Although these are less efficient than random-effects models they 
contain no cluster-level bias.  
3.4.2. Linear Fixed-effects 
Linear fixed-effects models are used throughout this thesis, since the proposed 
dependent variables are measured on interval (satisfaction) or ratio (wages) scales. 
These outcomes are dependent on a set of predictors that are time variant for the reasons 
mentioned above. The equation for fixed-effects regression relies on a within-
transformation where the time-invariant error term (discussed above) is dropped from 
the model. It follows that: 
(    −   ∗) =   (    −    ∗) + (    −    ∗) 
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Where; 
 Where,   ∗,   ∗,   ∗ are the person-specific means of    ,    , and    . 
     is a dependent variable value for individual i at time t. 
     represents a time variant independent variable (like a job quit) 
   is the estimated effect for that variable 
      is the error term specific to i= the person and t= the time of the prediction 
   , the person-specific error term is cancelled out of the model, as each person 
acts as “their own control” (Allison, 2009, Longhi and Nandi, 2014) 
Since fixed-effects estimation produces within respondent estimates, and unobserved 
person-specific characteristics (like IQ or motivation) don’t change over time, changes 
in the dependent variable capture influences that are the result of time variant measures. 
The model above can be estimated using Stata’s [xtreg] command with the option [fe]. 
While this method can estimate the effect of job changes, it cannot estimate the effect of 
gender or education themselves, two variables relevant to the second aim of the thesis. 
Overall, I am not interested in gender and education regarding their impact on the 
dependent variables, but rather how gender and education work through mobility in 
shaping outcomes. 
Allison (2009) suggests that the relationship, between time variant (job change) and 
time invariant (gender) variables, may be included in fixed-effects models using 
interaction terms. These coefficients capture the extent to which a time variant estimate 
(job change) is over or under estimated for a particular group (male or female). This 
method is relevant to the research question. However, I do not include interaction terms 
for fixed variables with time varying variables. Instead, I run separate models for males 
and females, since individual models produce the same results but do not rely on 
interpreting interaction terms, which are complex. Further, this method produces 
separate intercepts for each group, which show insight into baseline differences. At this 
point, a number of limitations must be noted.   
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3.4.3. Limitations 
The first aim of the thesis is to estimate the relationship between mobility and reward. 
Fixed-effects modelling techniques are able to achieve this, especially when non-
random events like job mobility are considered. However, fixed-effects estimation is an 
inefficient method of estimation. Estimation relies on variance within clusters alone, 
discarding between cluster differences, which are “contaminated” by unobserved 
subject-specific characteristics (Longhi and Nandi, 2014, Allison, 2009). By focusing 
on fixed-effects estimates, I trade variation between workers for unbiased estimates of 
the effects of mobility. In this way, fixed-effects will sacrifice efficiency in an effort to 
reduce bias (Allison, 2009). Thus, fixed-effects estimates produce larger standard errors, 
than random-effects models. Therefore fixed-effects estimates have wider confidence 
intervals, and ultimately larger p-values. For this reason, I treat estimates with p-values 
of less than 0.1 as significant, raising the threshold from 0.05.  
The second goal of the models is to estimate the difference between workers, focusing 
on how mobility is impacted by gender or education in rewarding workers. Do men and 
women benefit from mobility equally? Do third level and secondary educated workers 
benefit from mobility equally? There is a significant limitation in meeting this goal. 
Fixed-effects models will not produce estimates of the effects of variables that don’t 
change over time. There are ways of producing estimates for time invariant variables, 
but these estimates do not control f or “unobservables”, and so are inaccurate. This 
limitation does not fully apply to the second goal, since I test for gender or education 
differences in the relationship between mobility and outcomes, not the gender or 
education differences in outcomes, as mentioned.  
Lastly, a point that is relevant to both goals, predictor variables that change little within 
clusters, can produce imprecise estimates in fixed-effects models (Allison, 2009). This 
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is particularly important for the mobility variables proposed here. In some cases models 
rely on no more than 100 observations of job change. However, most of the mobility 
“events” contain hundreds of observations. This is only likely to affect involuntary 
changes in Germany, as seen from Table 3.7. Although limitations exist, fixed-effects 
estimation is capable of dealing with the proposed goals. 
3.4.4. Weighting 
Each panel contains longitudinal weights, which correct for attrition. However, the 
UK’s longitudinal weights greatly reduce the sample size, as they only consider 
respondents who are a part of the original 1991 BHPS sample. This problem does not 
exist in Germany, where weights do not reduce sample size. Ultimately, I use 
longitudinal panel weights in Germany and clustered standard error in the UK, this 
approach is taken by previous researchers who are limited by BHPS weights. 
In chapter 4 I look at the cross sectional distribution of job mobility over time. These 
tables are purely descriptive, but use cross-sectional weights for both panels. These 
weights are provided in the data files and summarised in Table 3.14 and Table 3.15. 
Cross sectional weights are important because they adjust for unequal probability of 
selection, non-response, and the inclusion of large samples from Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. As an example, I list the impact of weights on monthly wages using 
cross sectional and longitudinal weights using the tables below.    
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Table 3.14: Summary of weights for the BHPS. Mean pay weighted. Mean pay, cross sectional weight. Mean 
pay, panel weights. (1991-2008) 
year Mean gross monthly 
pay, unweighted 
BHPS 
N Mean gross 
monthly 
pay, cross 
sectional 
weights 
BHPS 
N Mean gross 
monthly pay, 
longitudinal 
weights 
BHPS 
N 
              
1991 £922.72 5,164 £933.79 5,043   
1992 £976.16 4,843 £990.60 4,670 £979.85 4,310 
1993 £992.91 4,665 £994.79 4,440 £986.91 3,918 
1994 £1,029.72 4,743 £1,049.85 4,487 £1,026.97 3,764 
1995 £1,079.93 4,680 £1,094.98 4,403 £1,070.34 3,610 
1996 £1,121.43 4,885 £1,138.93 4,544 £1,111.77 3,523 
1997 £1,140.82 5,727 £1,200.57 4,668 £1,157.10 3,525 
1998 £1,192.52 5,696 £1,248.25 4,662 £1,197.82 3,535 
1999 £1,218.53 7,942 £1,293.39 4,598 £1,257.84 3,449 
2000 £1,290.51 7,924 £1,352.79 4,521 £1,323.80 3,330 
2001 £1,335.32 9,423 £1,430.96 4,469 £1,409.87 3,194 
2002 £1,420.06 8,367 £1,469.29 4,364 £1,451.69 3,081 
2003 £1,453.68 8,172 £1,518.71 4,273 £1,494.95 2,979 
2004 £1,507.82 7,990 £1,581.36 4,148 £1,556.83 2,880 
2005 £1,556.68 7,798 £1,632.63 4,100 £1,593.15 2,768 
2006 £1,622.65 7,603 £1,700.00 4,040 £1,660.88 2,663 
2007 £1,678.98 7,425 £1,767.62 3,917 £1,721.15 2,585 
2008 £1,745.93 7,068 £1,827.87 4,427 £1,806.00 2,440 
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Table 3.14 shows the impact of the cross sectional and longitudinal weights for the UK. 
The un-weighted average wages rise slowly. Average wages rely on a varying number 
of observations, from 5,000+ to 9,000+. This is because the BHPS is topped up by 
larger samples from Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. These samples are included 
to provide a generalisable number of cases for each country. However, wages are lower 
in these countries, particularly in Northern Ireland when compared to London. 
Therefore, average monthly wages appear to rise faster in the weighted version (column 
4), which takes explanatory power away from other countries (like Wales and Scotland). 
This also impacts the number of participants in the study, limiting the number to 
roughly 4,000+ observations. However, this estimate is closer to the “true” value.  
The last columns show the impact of longitudinal weights on the same variable. The 
difference between weighted averages is minor. However, the longitudinal weights 
reduce the number of observations. These quickly decline while using panel weights, 
but correct for drop out bias and other forms of attrition. The reason the number of 
participants declines gradually, is because the weights apply only to those who took part 
in the study since 1991.   
The SOEP also contains a cross sectional and a longitudinal weight. I list their effects 
on the same outcome used in Table 3.14, average monthly pay. Each weight is 
“individual” or person-specific (households and enumerated weights are ignored).  
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Table 3.15: Summary of weights for the SOEP. Mean pay weighted. Mean pay, cross sectional weight. Mean 
pay, panel weights. (1991-2008) 
year Mean gross monthly 
pay, unweighted 
N Mean gross monthly pay, 
cross sectional weights 
N Mean gross monthly 
wages, longitudinal weights 
N 
       
1991 €1,347.08 6,007 €1,461.17 2.65E+07 €1,337.26 6,381.42 
1992 €1,545.95 5,578 €1,643.67 2.59E+07 €1,534.66 5,962.19 
1993 €1,719.27 5,524 €1,834.09 2.60E+07 €1,716.67 5,893.85 
1994 €1,818.12 6,217 €1,929.12 2.88E+07 €1,815.18 6,257.08 
1995 €1,880.62 6,251 €1,988.49 2.78E+07 €1,888.06 6,067.63 
1996 €1,928.59 6,286 €2,048.11 2.84E+07 €1,922.72 6,481.82 
1997 €1,977.23 5,911 €2,111.04 2.74E+07 €1,974.13 6,025.95 
1998 €1,966.78 6,399 €2,048.89 2.73E+07 €1,998.27 5,826.76 
1999 €2,037.79 6,267 €2,131.19 2.78E+07 €2,027.55 6,607.96 
2000 €2,039.19 10,800 €2,061.17 2.86E+07 €2,118.32 6,413.57 
2001 €2,101.96 9,762 €2,109.95 2.86E+07 €2,086.82 10,938.37 
2002 €2,560.99 10,780 €2,137.52 2.80E+07 €2,184.27 9,984.70 
2003 €2,524.72 9,948 €2,191.16 2.78E+07 €2,523.27 10,776.57 
2004 €2,565.86 9,557 €2,226.84 2.73E+07 €2,561.43 10,136.32 
2005 €2,548.10 9,102 €2,241.49 2.74E+07 €2,548.20 9,781.40 
2006 €2,527.58 9,519 €2,284.05 2.75E+07 €2,588.64 9,302.06 
2007 €2,575.96 8,986 €2,314.94 2.78E+07 €2,571.96 9,859.12 
2008 €2,586.58 8,560 €2,344.59 2.87E+07 €2,572.15 9,485.14 
 
The cross national equivalence file for the SOEP contains a simplified cross sectional 
weight for individuals (w11105). This weight is used in cross sectional models looking 
at differences between waves. It adjusts for selection bias, and over-representation from 
smaller German regions. The first column lists the average household income per 
research wave, without the weight. There is a large shift in income from 2001 to 2002. 
Adding the cross sectional weight corrects this, where respondents’ income rises 
gradually over time. The large shift in 2002 is corrected and a general pattern of steadily 
increasing pay emerges in the weighted results, each wave is a valid representation of 
average pay, which is not influenced by new samples brought into the data. Two large 
samples, the East German sample and a “Refreshment sample” are included in 1990 and 
2000. The impact of these, has been smoothed out using the cross sectional weights. 
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The weight has a large impact on the number of observations, which is not mentioned in 
the literature, however, the estimates are more representative.  
Longitudinal weights are also provided in the file. These weights consider the fact that 
individuals are re-measured at each stage and require “inverse staying probabilities” or a 
weight to consider the likelihood of attrition from the sample. These are needed for 
longitudinal analyses of the SOEP. I illustrate the impact weights in the last two 
columns. Their impact is minor and steady growth in pay remains, although it is 
reduced slightly. 
3.4.4.1. Weighting Issues 
Here I consider the decisions other researchers have made regarding BHPS panel 
weights. Cross sectional weights are not appropriate for fixed-effects models, because 
observations are clustered by individuals. Longitudinal weights would be appropriate, 
but they disregard respondents who come into the study after wave one. A number of 
researchers have discussed weights and weighting in the BHPS;  
Snelgrove (2009) use control variables which “would have been used for sample 
weights”. These are region and migrant status. They argue that un-weighted data with 
these controls provides similar estimates without compromising sample size. Since their 
models use an unbalanced design, the weights provided in the dataset are not 
appropriate.  In Chandola (2003) longitudinal weights are used in a balanced panel 
estimating subjective health. However since weights limit the number of individuals 
available to researchers by almost half, with 6000+ individuals in the un-weighted 
model and 3400+ in the weighted model. The authors run both models separately and 
present the findings simultaneously. Due to limitations of space, I cannot list two 
versions of each model. Differences between estimates in Chandola et al. (2003) are 
minor. In a separate study of class differences in health, Ki et al. (2013) use weights in 
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the descriptive statistics but drop weights for the main analysis; differences between the 
weighted and non-weighted samples are also minor.  
One consensus is that weighted and non-weighted models should be compared and 
contrasted, if minor differences exist then research seem to favour non-weighted output 
because of the larger sample size that it provides. I opt to control for the survey year and 
add clustered standard errors for British models, which correct for repeated observations 
as used by Gesthuizen (2009). Having compared the models in the BHPS to weighted 
and non-weighted versions, I conclude that these are roughly similar. I present non-
weighted models throughout the British chapter. 
3.5. Summary 
This section presented the methodology used to answer the research questions. I list the 
approach, discuss the sample, discuss the variables and consider analytical strategy.  
Obvious limitations exist in the proposal outlined here, but I address each in turn. Five 
key decisions should be summarised at this point. First, regarding the sample, I opt to 
use a semi-balanced panel allowing workers to miss a single observation. This is an 
effort to increase the number of mobility observations, which are rare events. A strongly 
balanced panel limits the number of observations in the mobility categories. An 
unbalanced panel increases the chances of long term unemployed workers moving into 
the panel periodically. Second, job mobility categories do not cross over perfectly in 
both panels. However, I consider German intra-firm movements as a valid mobility type 
after some basic checks. The respondents who experience the move have on average 
several years of tenure with the firm. Further the reference category same job same 
employer, has a high rate of occupational fidelity (Table 3.10), meaning intra-firm 
promotions are not “slipping into” the reference category. Third, regarding outcomes, I 
transform linear subjective outcomes into z-scores. In this way, each measures becomes 
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more comparable, as satisfaction scores run on a similar range of 1 to 2 standard 
deviations from the mean (in z-scores this is 0). Regarding controls, I take the majority 
of the control variables from the Cross National Equivalence Files contained in each 
panel. Firm size and education qualification are not directly comparable. I collapse these 
variables into simpler measures. Fourth, I estimate the impact of job mobility using 
fixed-effects linear regression instead of ordinary least squares regression. This method 
removes the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. Since job mobility is a non-random 
event, person-specific characteristics are likely correlated with the job mobility 
variables. Lastly, I use longitudinal weights in the SOEP data, and clustered standard 
errors in the BHPS data. The longitudinal weights in the BHPS limit the sample size 
greatly and consider only the original sample from 1991.  
Before turning to the main analysis, I summarise the rate of mobility, the shape of 
outcomes, and the main institutional differences in Germany and the UK. This analysis 
sets up the main empirical chapters with a background discussion of mobility, 
outcomes, and institutions.   
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4. Mobility, Outcomes, and Institutions 
The literature review (p 12) outlined a number of gaps in the job mobility discussion, 
both stem from the complexity of treating job mobility as driven by utility. Taking this 
line assumes that countries with lower mobility rates are countries with fewer 
opportunities. This chapter offers a preliminary look at mobility types, outcomes, and 
institutions. It also presents the first argument; the UK’s high rate of mobility, 
especially VM, is a consequence of varied outcomes and rewards. Germany’s low rate 
of mobility is instead the consequence of a predictable labour market in terms of 
outcomes. British workers may be using mobility to improve outcomes in an 
unpredictable (or at least, a varied) market, or to correct for job mismatch. German 
workers may be moving less because conditions are standardised and the “premium” 
(OECD, 2010) tied to change is lower. This is not to say that the rewards tied to 
mobility are better in the UK than Germany, the argument is that outcomes are less 
predictable in the UK. 
Authors often cite Employment Protection Legislation (henceforth EPL) as the key to 
understanding country differences in mobility rates (OECD, 2010). However, the main 
source of country differences is the rate of VM in Germany and the UK, where 
respondents choose to leave themselves, or to take a promotion offered by an employer. 
Both countries have surprisingly similar rates of IVM, but different measures of EPL. It 
may be that structured wage bargains and coordinated working conditions shape 
mobility as much as, if not more than, EPL.  
The chapter is structured as follows; it first considers mobility types, listing the 
frequency, type, and commonality of job changes using cross-sectional and longitudinal 
data. Second, it discusses the outcomes used in this work, thinking of the longitudinal 
sample alone. Outcomes are considered for both panels, measuring their variance 
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between and within respondents. Last, it explores the macro-indicators that shape 
British and German labour markets. Authors exploring country differences in job 
mobility often cite “institutional differences”. Less often they separate the factors 
shaping mobility, and the factors shaping outcomes. Here, Germany’s role as the 
coordinated market, and the UK’s role as the liberal market are illustrated for clarity. 
The chapter presents four findings that support the argument and present the key 
puzzles for subsequent chapters. First, mobility types differ. In both countries, most 
movement is the product of workers moving “voluntarily” between employers, a 
smaller portion move voluntarily within employers. Second, there are few differences 
between workers in chances of mobility. Men and women are equally likely to 
experience basic mobility (defined simply as moving jobs), and are equally likely to 
experience VM and IVM (in both countries). There is an education effect, but this 
applies to the UK alone, not Germany. Third, there is an institutional context to 
mobility, the UK is more mobile than Germany, but this difference is the product of 
voluntary mobility alone. Fourth, outcomes in the UK are less predictable than 
outcomes in Germany. Pay and working conditions vary less between-worker in 
Germany than in the UK. More importantly, outcomes vary less throughout an average 
German worker’s time in the labour market, when compared to an average British 
worker’s time in the labour market. The section below begins the discussion, 
summarising the frequency of mobility in both panels.  
4.1. Mobility Types  
This section uses cross-sectional and longitudinal data to illustrate job mobility in both 
panels. The sections consider cross-sectional data, listing the observations which 
capture mobility, and panel data, exploring respondents who move and how often they 
move.  
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4.1.1.  Cross-sectional data  
The EU-SILC8 (Survey of Income and Living Conditions), the BHPS, and the SOEP all 
contain measures of mobility, which are further split into voluntary and involuntary 
types. This section compares mobility in the EU-SILC with mobility in the country 
specific chapters. The survey is only used in a minor portion of this chapter to illustrate 
the rate of change in Germany and the UK. Both panels capture the same patterns of 
mobility as that caught by the EU-SILC, and both countries have distinct patterns. 
The EU-SILC asks respondents if they experienced a job change in the last 12 months 
(PL160), for a given year. Only those in employment answer the question, meaning the 
sample considered is similar to that of each panel. The data for Germany and the UK 
runs from 2005-2013. However, both datasets are incomplete and contain missing years. 
2006 data is missing for Germany, and 2008 data is missing for the UK. The basic rate 
of mobility is listed below for Germany and the UK (EU-SILC), along with the same 
rate for the individual panels (The BHPS and the SOEP).  
  
                                                 
8 The EU-SILC is the European Survey of Incomes and Living Conditions, a European 
wide survey covering, earnings, labour market situation, and demographics. 
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Table 4.1: Basic Job Mobility in Germany and the UK (1990-2013). Cross-sectional data using cross-sectional 
weights. 
 Basic Job Mobility Basic Job Mobility 
 EU-SILC DE 
(1) 
EU-SILC UK 
(2) 
SOEP 
(3) 
BHPS (UndSoc) 
(4) 
1991    18.1% 
1992    18.1% 
1993    20.0% 
1994   8.5% 21.2% 
1995   9.5% 24% 
1996   9.6% 21.7% 
1997   9.0% 24.6% 
1998   8.8% 25.3% 
1999   8.7% 23.3% 
2000   9.9% 25.3% 
2001   9.7% 24.% 
2002   8.4% 22.7% 
2003   7.6% 22.6% 
2004   6.7% 21.1% 
2005 6%  23%  6.3% 21.6% 
2006  24%  6.0% 13.2% 
2007 7%  17%  7.6% 16.5% 
2008 8%   8.0% 14.1% 
2009 7%  13%  8.5%  
2010 9%  13%  7.4%  
2011 9%  12% 6.3% 6.1% 
2012 10%  7%  6.7% 6.0% 
2013 9%  8%   6.6% 
 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4.1 list the rate of mobility in the EU-SILC. Germany’s rate 
(column 1) remains stable, showing a consistent series with little variance. Mobility is 
predictable and affects between 6% and 10% of the population. In the UK (column 2) 
the rate is less predictable, peaking in 2006, before falling from 2009. Overall, the UK 
rate fluctuates, but the German one remains stable. For Germany, even the European 
debt crisis9 does not seem to affect mobility. Market uncertainty may affect the UK’s 
pattern of mobility, since the country experienced a longer economic recession than 
Germany. The rates in the EU-SILC (columns 1 and 2) reflect those in country specific 
individual panels (column 3 and 4). 
The German SOEP10 data runs 1994-2012 (column 3), mobility remains stable 
throughout. It peaks in 2000 at 9.9%, but declines slightly in 2011 to 6%; a similar 
                                                 
9 The European debt crisis is defined as the period from 2008 where several European 
states struggled to repay and refinance government debt due to complications in global 
financial markets. 
10 The data is cross-sectional and considers all employed respondents who experienced a 
change of job since they were last interviewed. The rate is weighted using cross-
sectional weights. 
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pattern emerges for the UK. The BHPS11 runs from 1991-2008 (column 4), the missing 
years are filled using the BHPS cohort of the Understanding Society panel, which 
absorbed the BHPS in 2009. The British rate is less stable, peaking at 25% in 1998 
before declining to 6% in 2011. A change occurs after the European debt crisis of 2008, 
suggesting mobility relies on market confidence. The BHPS rate (column 4) matches 
the EU-SILC data for the UK (column 2); even the decline in mobility after the mid 
2000’s emerges in both datasets. This suggests both panels are capturing a similar 
underlying trend. 
Table 4.1 lists only the basic rate of job mobility, yet the concept is more nuanced. 
Table 4.2 unpacks the rate further, splitting mobility into voluntary and involuntary 
types.  Since the German panel (SOEP) cannot distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary mobility within the firm (as explained in Chapter 3: Methodology), the rate 
is likely underestimated. The SOEP thus captures only “voluntary” changes between 
employers. However, the EU-SILC contains a representative sample of voluntary and 
involuntary change for both countries.  
  
                                                 
11 The data is cross-sectional and considers all employed respondents who experienced a 
change of job since they were last interviewed. The rate is weighted using cross-
sectional weights. The purpose of the Understanding Society sample is to “complete the 
picture” of mobility trends in the UK, I do not use the data in any subsequent analysis. 
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Table 4.2: Voluntary and Involuntary Mobility rates- split by EU-SILC, BHPS, and SOEP (1990-2013).  
 Voluntary change  Involuntary change Voluntary (quits and 
promotions) 
Involuntary (demotions and 
redundancies) 
 EU-SILC 
DE 
(1) 
EU-SILC 
UK 
(2) 
EU-SILC  
DE 
(3) 
EU-SILC  
UK 
(4) 
SOEP 
(5) 
BHPS (UndSoc) 
(6) 
SOEP 
(7) 
BHPS (UndSoc) 
(8) 
1990         
1991      10.5%  2.8% 
1992      11.8%  2.1% 
1993      13.6%   2.7% 
1994     3.6% 14.8% 3.3% 2.6% 
1995     4.1% 16.3% 3.5% 2.9% 
1996     4.1% 14.8% 3.7% 2.6% 
1997     3.5% 17.1% 3.5% 2.8% 
1998     3.6% 17.0% 3.4% 3.4% 
1999     6.7% 14.3% 2.8% 2.9% 
2000     7.6% 15.7% 2.1% 3.0% 
2001     5.8% 15.0% 3.7% 2.5% 
2002     4.8% 14.3% 3.4% 2.6% 
2003     4.1% 14.3% 3.4% 2.5% 
2004     3.0% 13.2% 3.6% 2.2% 
2005 2.0%  3.2%  2.6% 13.8% 3.6% 2.3% 
2006     2.5% 8.3% 3.4% 1.7% 
2007 2.5%  2.9%  3.7% 9.7% 3.9% 1.9% 
2008 3.1%  3%  4.4% 8.9% 3.6% 1.6% 
2009 2.9% 4.4% 2.7% 3.4% 4.6%  3.8%  
2010 2.6% 4.2% 2.8% 3.3% 3.5%  3.7%  
2011 3.3% 4.2% 3.0% 3.0% 3.3% 3.1% 2.8% 1.1% 
2012 3.9% 3.0% 2.9% 1.5% 4.0% 3.3% 2.6% 1.1% 
2013 3.4% 3.9% 2.7% 1.5%  3.9%  1.1% 
  
In the UK, VM (column 2) is more common than IVM (column 4), although differences 
within the EU-SILC are small. 4% of employed respondents change jobs voluntarily in 
a given year, and between 1.5% and 3% of respondents change jobs involuntary. 
Looking at Germany, VM (column 1) and IVM (column 3) are equally common. 3% of 
respondents move for voluntary reasons, and 3% of respondents move for involuntary 
reasons according to the EU-SILC.  
The country-specific panels show a similar pattern, although VM is more pronounced in 
the SOEP panel. In the UK VM (column 6) is more common than IVM (column 7). The 
former is declining over time and converging with the German rate (column 5). In 
Germany VM (column 5) is more common than IVM (column 8), although the 
difference is minor. Persistent differences exist between countries. Voluntary changes 
outnumber involuntary changes at a rate of approximately 7:1 in the UK’s individual 
panel. In Germany’s panel, the ratio of VM to IVM is almost 1:1.  
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Comparing mobility types in both countries, VM is the mode with IVM being less 
common. There are similarities in the rate of German IVM (column 7) and British IVM 
(column 8), but the difference between countries lies in their rates of voluntary mobility. 
As a final point, Table 4.3 investigates mobility between and within firms in both 
countries. The EU-SILC is no longer used, as it does not distinguish between inter and 
intra-firm change. 
Table 4.3: Mobility rate: inter-firm and intra-firm (BHPS & SOEP 1990-2012). 
 Inter-firm (new employer) Intra-firm (existing employer) 
 SOEP 
(1) 
BHPS   
(2) 
SOEP 
(3) 
BHPS  
(4) 
1990     
1991  10.5%  8.6% 
1992  8.3%  10.2% 
1993  9.5%  10.6% 
1994 5.5% 12.0% 0.7% 9.4% 
1995 6.3% 12.5% 0.8% 11.7% 
1996 6.1% 12.5% 0.8% 9.6% 
1997 5.3% 14.7% 0.8% 10.3% 
1998 5.3% 14.8% 0.8% 10.7% 
1999 7.4% 14.0% 0.7% 9.6% 
2000 7.6% 14.9% 0.8% 10.4% 
2001 7.5% 14.0% 0.7% 10.1% 
2002 6.1% 13.1% 0.8% 9.8% 
2003 4.9% 12.7% 0.6% 9.8% 
2004 4.09% 12.28% 0.80% 9.0% 
2005 3.9% 12.4% 1.6% 9.3% 
2006 3.6% 12.2% 1.5% 1.0% 
2007 5.2% 15.5% 1.7% 0.7% 
2008 5.5% 13.4% 1.9% 0.7% 
2009 6.0%  1.9%  
2010 6.1%  1.7%  
2011 5.1%  1.5%  
2012 5.4%  1.5%  
2013     
 
Voluntary mobility may be more common, but it is worth asking where the change takes 
place. Starting with Germany, the rate of inter-firm mobility (column 1) is far greater 
than the rate on intra-firm change (column 3). Most of the movement in the German 
labour market occurs between firms (4%-7%); workers are less likely to move with the 
same employer. This rate remains low until increasing in 2005 to 2%.  
In the UK, inter-firm mobility (column 2) is larger than intra-firm change (column 4). 
Inter-firm mobility stands at roughly 12% each year. Intra-firm mobility remains steady 
before dropping suddenly in 2006 to a low rate of 1%. This sharp fall is not noted in the 
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BHPS literature. It does not appear to be a data issue, as the EU-SILC also catches a 
gradual decline in voluntary movement seen in the previous table. This is likely 
reflecting a real decline in intra-firm changes. 
Considering the three charts above, the mobility regimes described by DiPrete et al. 
(1997) and explored by the OECD (2010) begin to emerge. VM is more common than 
IVM in both countries, and movement between employers is also more common than 
movement within a firm. Most importantly, a country difference exists not in the rate of 
mobility, but in the rate of voluntary mobility alone. This is a key point, relevant to the 
argument of the thesis. As noted by DiPrete et al. (1997), individualised markets (like 
the UK), contain larger hierarchies within the firm, leading to more intra-firm 
movement. They are also more turbulent, leading to more inter-firm mobility. By 
contrast, collectivist markets (like Germany); contain flatter organisations with fewer 
middle level managers and supervisors. Hence, these regimes contain less intra-firm 
mobility. They also contain less turbulence, and as a result, less inter-firm mobility. 
One issue with the tables above is that they track observations, not workers. This raises 
a number of questions. The UK “is more mobile”, does this mean more respondents are 
moving? Or does a core group move frequently? In Germany, do fewer respondents 
move? Or does the same core group simply move less often? The next section uses the 
panel data discussed above to consider these questions. I consider the commonality of 
mobility within workers.   
4.1.2.  Panel data  
The tables above consider mobility as a cross-sectional sample, but this cannot capture 
repeated moves by the same respondents. Subsequent chapters use semi-balanced 
panels, which follow respondents over time. Both panels cover the same period, 2000-
2008. Table 4.4 lists the rate of basic mobility in each panel, unpacking the rate between 
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and within respondents. The table shows which respondents are moving, and how often 
the average respondent moves. 
Table 4.4 lists both panels, Column 1 lists the number of respondents (not observations) 
who experienced job mobility at least once over the 9 year period. Column 2 lists the 
percentage of respondents with at least a single job move. The last column summarises 
the frequency of mobility, for an average respondent. This column captures how many 
periods contained a job change for an average respondent over 9 years. The output is 
divided this way because it shows the number of respondents (rather than just 
observations) who move at least once during the 9 year period, and importantly, shows 
the average number of changes for an average respondent. 
Table 4.4: Basic rate of mobility in each panel, listed between respondents, within respondents, and 
observations overall. (BHPS & SOEP 2000-2008). 
German Socio-Economic Panel Survey Between 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Within 
(3) 
 Freq.   Percent Percent 
    
No Change 4444 100 95.94 
Basic Job Change 1006 22.64 17.95 
    
Total  N=4444  
    
Great British Household Survey Between  Within 
 Freq.   Percent Percent 
    
No Change 3781 99.97 83.17 
Basic Job Change 2503 66.18 25.47 
    
Total  N=3782  
     
Columns 1 & 2 consider mobility differences between workers. In Germany, 23% of 
respondents changed jobs at least once. In the UK 66% of the panel changed jobs at 
least once. Taking movers and non-movers into account, in Germany “the majority” of 
the panel contains non-movers, at least for the period under observation. In the UK, the 
majority is that of movers. Lastly, column 3 gives insight into how often moves occur 
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within an average respondent. In Germany, an average respondent will have moved in 
18% of the periods under study (9 waves). This means throughout the 9 waves a 
respondent will move 1.6 times. In the UK, an average respondent will have moved in 
25% of the periods under study i.e. 2.25 times over 9 waves. Thus, in the UK more 
people move more often than in Germany. Germany contains fewer movers moving less 
often.  
A weakness in comparing basic rates of mobility is that they provide an incomplete 
picture of movement. While the mobility rates in Table 4.4 are greater in the UK than 
Germany, they offer little regarding the nuance behind mobility. As discussed 
previously, country differences are mostly differences in the rate of VM, with little 
difference in rate of IVM. A similar pattern emerges in the semi-balanced panel, 
captured in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5: Voluntary and involuntary mobility in each panel; split between respondents, within respondents, 
and overall (BHPS & SOEP 2000-2008). 
German Socio-Economic Panel Between 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Within 
(3) 
 Freq.   Percent Percent 
    
Same job 4444 100 95.93 
Changed employer, voluntary 638 14.36 16.44 
Changed employer, involuntary 311 7.00 13.92 
Changed employer, other 6 0.14 15.97 
Changed job, kept employer. 221 4.97 14.27 
    
Total N=4444   
    
    
British Household Panel Survey Between  Within 
 Freq.   Percent Percent 
    
Same job 3781 99.97 83.17 
Changed employer, voluntary 1238 32.73 17.68 
Changed employer, involuntary 418 11.05 13.11 
Changed employer, other 726 19.2 14.05 
Changed job kept employer, voluntary 1120 29.61 16.89 
Changed job kept employer, involuntary 84 2.22 13.29 
Changed job kept employer, other 436 11.53 14.11 
    
Total N=3782   
 
I develop the analysis presented in Table 4.4 by unpacking mobility beyond “basic 
change” to include voluntary and involuntary change, between and within firms. This is 
presented in Table 4.5 and contains a lot of detail.   
In Germany, 14% of all respondents moved to a new employer for voluntary reasons on 
at least one occasion (column 2). Only 5% of all respondents changed jobs within the 
firm, this is most likely a voluntary internal change since the majority of mobility events 
are voluntary. In comparison, 32% of all UK respondents changed firms for voluntary 
reasons at least once, a far higher rate. A further 30% of respondents changed jobs 
voluntarily with the same firm at least once. Thus a greater portion of respondents 
experience voluntary change in the UK when compared to Germany. The difference 
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between countries is narrower in measures of IVM. In Germany, 7% of respondents 
changed employers involuntarily at least once. The UK rate is 11%. I ignore the other 
mobility types, as they are less relevant at the moment.   
Column 5 summarises the frequency of each mobility event for the average person. 
Workers in Germany typically see one voluntary change during the period under 
observation. Within respondents, voluntary inter-firm change and intra-firm change are 
most likely. In the UK voluntary changes within, and between firms are most common 
within respondents (most likely to occur multiple times to a respondent in the years 
covered.) Table 4.5 confirms a previous finding. VM is more common in the UK than 
Germany. Respondents in the UK are more likely to experience VM than those in 
Germany. Lastly, British respondents are more likely to see multiple voluntary changes 
than German respondents, although the difference is minor. In sum, more British 
workers move voluntarily more often, than German ones. Differences in involuntarily 
mobility are slight. More importantly, British workers do not move involuntarily any 
more often than German workers.  
This section confirms that the major difference between the two countries is the product 
of different rates of VM. Thus the mechanisms behind involuntary changes are similar 
in Germany than they are in the UK. Employment Protection Legislation dictates the 
rates of hiring by employers, but more often protects workers from unfair dismissal. The 
charts above show that rates of dismissal are comparable. Worker “choice”, to move or 
remain, is far more prevalent in country differences. In order to illustrate the importance 
of “serial changers” further, I calculate the number of respondents with two or more 
mobility “events” during the nine-year panel. I list this rate in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6: Portion of respondents with none, one, or two or more changes (BHPS & SOEP 2000-2008). 
Serial mobility BHPS Freq. BHPS % SOEP Freq SOEP % 
     
0 1,279 33.8 3,438 77.4 
1 991 26.2 628 14.1 
2+ 1,512 40.0 378 8.5 
     
Respondents N=3,782  N=4,444  
Observations n=32,560 100 n=38,687 100 
 
In the UK 33% of all respondents do not experience movement even once. This rate is 
77% for Germany, where the majority do not change jobs during the 9 year period. 26% 
of UK respondents change jobs once between 2000 and 2008, while only 14% of 
German respondents do. Lastly, 40% of British respondents change jobs on 2 or more 
occasions, while only 8% of German respondents experience 2 or more changes. The 
mode in the UK is the group of respondents who move at least twice. The mode in 
Germany is made up of people who do not move at all. Not only does the UK (a liberal 
market economy) have higher rates of mobility than Germany (a coordinated or 
collectivist country), but the number of respondents who experience mobility is also 
higher, and the likelihood that respondents will move more than once is higher.  
4.1.3.  Differences between workers  
Mobility differs by institutional structure, but surprisingly contains few differences 
between workers. This section considers the difference between genders and 
educational groups. As mentioned throughout the methodology, the design of the 
sample means that only the core workforce is considered. Since women are 
disproportionately likely to balance both professional and caring roles, the sample likely 
underestimates their mobility, since it captures only those women who remain a part of 
the core workforce. Since lower educated workers will find it hard to compete in the 
market, they are also likely to be underrepresented in the sample. For brevity, I do not 
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explore if these patterns change over time, but rather list the gender and education 
differences in both countries. The UK is the more “competitive” labour market, 
Germany is the more “egalitarian” labour market, although certain inequalities exist 
(particularly tied to gender and the male breadwinner model) (Esping-Andersen, 2013). 
If VM is a tool for improving working conditions in an unpredictable labour market, the 
most advantaged groups will use this tool more (as laid out in attainment theory 
Sørensen (1977)). This is explored in Table 4.7. I consider data from EU-SILC as well 
as the country panels. 
Table 4.7: Basic Rates of Mobility by Gender and by Education (EU-SILC, SOEP, and BHPS) 
 EU-SILC DE EU-SILC UK SOEP BHPS 
Male mobility rate 7% 14% 9% 21% 
Female mobility 
rate 
8% 15% 10% 21% 
     
Basic  8% 11% 9% 17% 
Secondary 8% 15% 10% 23% 
Third level 7% 15% 10% 27% 
 
The gender rates of mobility are listed in the first two rows. The education rates are 
listed in the last three rows. Neither country contains a gender difference in the basic 
rate of mobility; men and women are equally likely to change jobs. As mentioned, the 
UK has a higher rate of job changes in both the EU-SILC and the national panels. 
Regarding education groups, Germany shows no educational differences, both in the 
EU-SILC and the SOEP panel. However, the UK rate varies by education; respondents 
with a basic education are least likely to change jobs compared to those with a 
secondary or third level education. This effect emerges in the EU-SILC and BHPS, 
suggesting British workers with a third level or secondary level education are more 
mobile than those with a basic level qualification. Germany’s labour market, with a 
smaller emphasis on individual resources, contains similar chances of moving for each 
education group (Mills et al., 2006b). Again, Table 4.7 considers mobility without 
nuance. The section below considers the rate of VM and IVM in each country by gender 
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and education (Table 4.8). I separate the rate by gender first, and by education second.  
Gender differences are minor in each dataset, with men and women equally likely to 
change jobs for voluntary and involuntary reasons. Women are neither more nor less 
prone to voluntary or involuntary changes than men. However, a difference in education 
emerges again.  
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Table 4.8: Voluntary and involuntary mobility by Gender, and Education (EU-SILC, SOEP, and BHPS) 
 EU-SILC DE 
(Voluntary) 
(1) 
EU-SILC DE 
(Involuntary) 
(2) 
EU-SILC UK (Voluntary) 
(3) 
EU-SILC UK (Involuntary) 
(4) 
SOEP  
(Voluntary) 
(5) 
SOEP 
(Involuntary) 
(6) 
BHPS  
(voluntary) 
(7) 
BHPS (involuntary) 
(8) 
Male mobility rate 3.2% 2.9% 4% 2.7% 4.1% 3.5% 13.85% 2.71% 
Female mobility rate 3.2% 2.8% 3.7% 1.9% 4.7% 3.3% 13.22% 2.33% 
         
Basic Ed 3.30% 3.12% 1.68% 1.87% 3.47% 3.3% 9% 2.3% 
Secondary Ed 3.19% 3.32% 3.77% 2.41% 4.78% 3.6% 14.8% 2.7% 
Tertiary Ed 3.22% 2.31% 4.7% 2.35% 4.88% 3.0% 18.6% 2.9% 
 
Table 4.8 suggests education does not affect mobility in Germany. Looking at the EU-SILC data, each category of education is equally likely to move 
for voluntary reasons (column 1). Roughly 3% of all observation captures a voluntary move. There is a small education effect regarding involuntary 
moves (column 2), those with a third level education are the least likely to change jobs involuntarily, but this difference is likely insignificant. The 
remaining categories (basic and secondary) remain similar at 3% of all observations. Looking at the German SOEP panel, the results are similar. There 
is a minor difference in the column for voluntary moves (column 5). Respondents with a third level education are the most likely to change for 
voluntary reasons, but this is minor and likely insignificant.
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There is an educational difference in chances of voluntary change in the UK. Looking at 
the EU-SILC sample, third level educated workers are the most likely to experience a 
voluntary change (column 3), followed by workers with a secondary level education, 
and lastly those with a basic level education. Regarding involuntary changes (column 
4), respondents with a third level education are also most likely to experience the event, 
possibly because they are most mobile. However, the differences between education 
groups for IVM are small and likely insignificant.  
In the country specific panel (BHPS), voluntary changes (column 7) are most common 
among those with a third level education, followed by secondary educated workers, and 
lastly by primary educated or workers with a basic education. The rate of mobility 
change among third level educated workers is twice that of those with a basic education. 
Regarding involuntary changes (column 8), no education effect emerges, and each 
education group has a roughly equal chance of seeing an involuntary change. This 
suggests that education is an important variable in the UK, but not in Germany. The 
education difference exists in a highly mobile labour market, but does not in a steady, 
coordinated one.  
This chapter argues that mobility is a strategy for bargaining in the UK; third level 
educated workers may be better able to navigate the market compared to other groups. 
In Germany, mobility may bring fewer rewards, and therefore bargaining is unnecessary 
because working conditions are standardised. In order to show this, I now compare pay 
and working conditions in the UK and Germany, paying particular attention to the way 
in which outcomes differ between and within workers. 
4.2. Outcomes  
The UK is a mobile labour market where respondents move voluntarily. Germany is a 
less mobile labour market where workers move voluntarily less often. Mobility rates 
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may be shaped by their relationship to outcomes, if this is the case, outcomes should 
differ somewhat by mobile and immobile labour market (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 
2004, Hall and Soskice, 2001). The coordinated nature of the German market sets 
standards for working conditions and pay at an industry level (Streeck, 2009a, Streeck, 
2009b, Hall and Soskice, 2001). In the UK working conditions and pay are bargained 
between firms and individuals (Hall and Soskice, 2001, Pavlopoulos et al., 2014). This 
section outlines what this means for outcomes.  
Table 4.9 lists the outcomes used in later chapters. The data was introduced in the 
methodology, but is discussed in more detail here. The observations are clustered by 
individuals in the panel. As a result they vary both between and within respondents. The 
table lists the average, standard deviation (between and within), minimum, and 
maximum values of each outcome for each panel. The Standard Deviation column is of 
most importance since it measures the variance of an outcome, between respondents and 
throughout a respondent’s time in the panel. The smaller the measure, the more 
predictable an outcome is between and within respondents.  
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Table 4.9: Panel summary of outcomes (BHPS & SOEP 2000-2008); listing average and deviation between and 
within respondents.  
German Socio-Economic Panel  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
gross monthly pay overall 2,772.46 1,584.57 0.00 50,000.00 N =   34720 
 between  1,463.56 0.00 18,479.56 n =    4339 
 within  655.62 -10,477.54 39,022.46 Tbar = 8.00 
       
Log of gross monthly pay overall 7.80 0.52 5.03 10.82 N =   34686 
 between  0.50 5.68 9.67 n =    4334 
 within  0.17 5.77 10.59 Tbar = 8.00 
       
z_worksatisfaction overall -0.01 0.95 -3.56 1.46 N =   38288 
 between  0.68 -3.23 1.46 n =    4444 
 within  0.66 -4.31 3.29 Tbar = 8.61 
       
z_paysatisfaction overall 0.00 0.95 -3.14 1.65 N =   38434 
 between  0.75 -3.04 1.65 n =    4444 
 within  0.59 -3.57 3.57 Tbar = 8.64 
       
z_timesatisfaction overall 0.02 0.94 -2.86 1.58 N =   38585 
 between  0.72 -2.86 1.58 n =    4444 
 within  0.61 -3.78 3.34 Tbar = 8.68 
       
Weekly (hours) overall 41.65 10.93 0 143.17 N = 38687 
 between  9.22 8.75 88.26 n = 4444 
 within   5.88 -20.52 119.87 Tbar=8.70 
       
British Household Panel Survey  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
gross monthly pay overall 1,808.98 1,322.11 27.32 72,055.43 N =   31147 
 between  1,124.23 75.83 15,382.87 n =    3748 
 within  683.84 -11,990.55 60,755.33 Tbar =  8.3103 
       
Log of gross monthly pay overall 7.30 0.67 3.31 11.19 N =   31147 
 between  0.62 4.32 9.44 n =    3748 
 within  0.26 4.15 9.69 Tbar =  8.3103 
       
z_worksatisfaction overall 0.00 1.00 -3.66 1.26 N =   31773 
 between  0.67 -3.56 1.26 n =    3760 
 within  0.74 -4.28 3.74 Tbar = 8.45027 
       
z_paysatisfaction overall 0.00 1.00 -2.92 1.38 N =   31765 
 between  0.69 -2.92 1.38 n =    3760 
 within  0.72 -3.67 2.95 Tbar = 8.44814 
       
z_timesatisfaction overall 0.00 1.00 -3.15 1.31 N =   31781 
 between  0.70 -3.06 1.31 n =    3760 
 within  0.72 -3.88 3.88 Tbar = 8.45239 
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Jbhrs (hours) overall 35.02 9.73 0 99 N= 32396 
 between  8.24 0 87.33 n= 3781 
 within  5.25 -30.30 90.80 Tbar= 8.57 
 
Table 4.9 contains three outcomes related to pay- gross monthly pay, the natural log of 
gross monthly pay, and pay satisfaction for both panels. The gross monthly pay of 
workers in Germany and the UK is listed in two separate currencies. I instead focus on 
the log-transformed measure of pay. The German average (7.8) is higher than the UK 
average (7.3), but more importantly the standard deviation of the measure is different in 
both panels. The deviation between workers in Germany is lower (0.5) than the UK’s 
(0.62). This means that differences in pay between workers are more predictable in 
Germany than the UK. Another way of thinking about the measure above goes as 
follows; the differences between workers in Germany are smaller than the differences 
between workers in the UK. Thinking of the variance within-workers (in other words 
throughout an average respondent’s time in the panel), the German measure of deviation 
is also lower (0.17) than the UK’s (0.26). This too means that there are smaller 
differences in pay throughout an average German’s time in the panel, compared to an 
average Briton’s time in the panel. Thus, German pay is more predictable than the 
UK’s, in measures of worker-differences, and in terms of differences for the average 
worker during a panel.  
A subjective measure of pay provides further insight. The measure is a standardized z-
score of satisfaction for both panels (the logic behind standardising the score is 
explained in section 3.3.2 on p 81). The differences between workers are wider in 
Germany (0.75) than they are in the UK (0.69). This is surprising since gross monthly 
pay in Germany is more predictable than it is in the UK. Thinking of how satisfaction 
varies for an average worker throughout the panel; satisfaction varies less in Germany 
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(0.59) than the UK (0.72). Throughout a respondent’s career, their chance of seeing a 
change in satisfaction with pay is lower in Germany than in the UK. Thus, there are 
wider differences in satisfaction with pay between German workers. These differences 
also persist throughout an average worker’s time in the panel more so for German 
workers than British workers. In a way, German satisfaction with pay is more persistent 
throughout the panel, than British satisfaction with pay. 
Other outcomes contain similar patterns. Both Germany (0.68) and the UK (0.67) have 
similar differences between workers in terms of satisfaction with work. These measures 
are equal suggesting roughly equal differences between workers. Within workers, or 
throughout an average person’s career, Germany (0.66) has a smaller deviation than the 
UK (0.74), suggesting an average German worker will see less variance in satisfaction 
with work over the nine year period than a British worker.  
Satisfaction with working time is similar. Between workers, both Germany (0.72) and 
the UK (0.70) share a similar level of worker differences. However, within respondents, 
the average German worker will see less variance (0.61) over the nine years, when 
compared to the average British worker (0.71). In the UK, a worker’s satisfaction with 
time will differ more, than in Germany.  
Lastly, the table lists the actual weekly working hours for workers in both countries. 
Average weekly working hours are higher in Germany (40+) than the UK (35+). 
Between respondents, there are greater differences in Germany (9.22) than the UK 
(8.24) suggesting that working time is less predictable in Germany than the UK. For the 
average German respondent (5.88) working time is roughly as predictable as for the 
average British respondent (5.25). This suggests that working time is roughly equally 
predictable for the average worker in both countries.   
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In several measures Germany emerges as the more predictable labour market when 
compared to the UK. Pay, working conditions, and satisfaction with working time vary 
less between workers in Germany. More importantly, pay, working conditions, and 
working time vary less throughout an average German’s time in the panel, compared to 
a British respondent working through a similar period. Workers in the UK may be 
mobile in an effort to improve their working conditions. In Germany, since working 
conditions vary less between firms or industries, VM may be less necessary, or at least 
may carry fewer returns. The varied pay and working conditions of the UK run parallel 
to higher rates of VM. The predictable pay and working conditions in Germany run 
parallel to a small rate of VM. I now turn to the institutional indicators which shape 
mobility and outcomes in both countries. 
Authors often cite labour market differences in Germany and the UK, without listing the 
empirical differences in institutions (Pavlopoulos et al., 2014, Latzke et al., 2016, 
Schmelzer, 2010). After a review, Germany is labelled as coordinated, the UK is 
labelled as liberal (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The next section illustrates these 
differences using macro-indicators which shape mobility, and macro-indicators which 
shape outcomes. Both labour markets differ in the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001, Thelen, 2014), below, these differences are observed and illustrated. 
4.3. Institutional context  
The findings above illustrate specific differences between Germany and the UK in terms 
of mobility and outcomes. Germany is a labour market with little mobility, although the 
most common change is voluntary inter-firm and intra-firm mobility. Parallel to this, 
outcomes vary less in Germany than in the UK, leading to pay and conditions that are 
more predictable, especially throughout an average worker’s time in the panel. The UK 
is a labour market with higher rates of mobility, most of which is voluntary movement. 
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The UK also contains more varied outcomes, with less predictable measures of pay and 
satisfaction than Germany. This is especially for within respondent variance, throughout 
an average respondent’s time in the labour market.  
The aim of this section is to examine the institutional underpinnings of these two 
differences. Institutional factors shaping mobility are unemployment protection 
spending, subsidised work spending, Employment Protection Legislation, and barriers 
to entry and conduct for professions. Each of these measures differs for Germany and 
the UK. Further, this section considers demand-side factors which differ due to mobility 
rates but actually appear similar. These are the number of firms, the number of firm 
births, and the vacancy rates in each labour market. Because the countries differ by 
population, these are expressed as a rate per 1,000 workers. Institutional factors shaping 
outcomes are wage coordination, collective bargaining coverage, and union density. 
These too differ by country.  
Measures like Employment Protection Legislation and occupational autonomy are 
linked to rates of mobility (Blossfeld and Hofmeister, 2006, Mills et al., 2006a). Levels 
of union density and wage coordination play a part in the individualised nature of 
outcomes, like pay and conditions (Streeck, 2009b, Streeck, 1997). Both countries 
resemble their typologies; Germany is a coordinated labour market with higher union 
power, strong employment protection where wages are set collectively. The UK is its 
near opposite, with low union power, low employment protection, and a system of 
individualised bargaining, where wages are primarily set at the individual level between 
a firm and its worker (Hall and Soskice, 2001, Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2004, Thelen, 
2014). Both countries contain interesting similarities in supply-side indicators. One 
could expect rates of mobility to differ simply because there are more employers which 
workers can turn to in the UK, compared to Germany. Results show that the number of 
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firms in both countries is similar per 1,000 workers. Further the vacancy rate in both 
countries is also higher in Germany than the UK, despite a lower rate of inter-firm 
mobility. I discuss each set of indicators, starting with macro-indicators that shape 
mobility, before turning to macro-indicators that shape outcomes.  
4.3.1. Institutional Measures Shaping Mobility  
Using the theoretical framework of Mills et al. (2006b) this section considers three 
measures of labour market openness- spending on labour market benefits, spending on 
subsidised work, and the strength of EPL. It also considers a measure separate to the 
sketch, the strength of labour market entry into professions. This indicator is used as a 
measure of EPL specific to professions alone. The latter half of this section lists a 
number of demand-side indicators like vacancy rates and number of employers.  
4.3.1.1.  Unemployment Benefit  
A country’s spending on unemployment benefit will dictate the amount of time workers 
can spend looking for work.12. The series is listed in Figure 4.1. Countries that spend 
little will see large rates of labour market re-entry after unemployment. Countries with 
generous unemployment benefits see longer periods of unemployment duration (Fasang 
et al., 2007, Fasang et al., 2012, OECD, 2010). With this in mind, countries with low 
rates of unemployment benefit will see larger rates of (direct) IVM, simply because 
workers must gain employment quickly. Countries with low unemployment spending 
may also see larger rates of VM as workers try to pre-emptively leave precarious 
positions to avoid unemployment. 
                                                 
12 Comparisons of unemployment benefit come from the OECD-STAN database. Data 
location: https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/public-unemployment-spending.htm. The series 
is labelled “PUBUNEMPEXP” and is expressed as a percentage of a country’s GDP.  
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Figure 4.1: Public unemployment spending as % of GDP. Germany and the UK (1980-2015). 
Germany spends a great part of its GDP on unemployment benefits compared to the 
UK. Germany’s unemployment spending increased three times, in the early 80’s, 90’s, 
and 2000’s. The rate remains at roughly 1.5% from the mid 1990’s. Subsequent 
chapters focus on the pre-crisis period 2000-2008 during which, Germany saw an 
increase in spending, followed by a fall. Most importantly, Germany consistently 
spends more than the UK.  
In the UK, public unemployment spending falls gradually. The rate peaks in the 1980’s 
but declines throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s. By the early 2000’s, the rate of spending 
on unemployment steadies to roughly 0.33%. In the early 1980s, the UK spends more 
on unemployment than Germany. Yet, both countries switch positions by the early 
1990s. The UK avoids large spending on unemployment, instead encouraging workers 
to seek work in the market as quickly as possible. In Germany, generous spending 
supports workers until they can find similar work elsewhere. Since unemployment 
benefits are generous in Germany (Esping-Andersen, 2013) the state takes efforts to 
prevent employers from “dumping” workers into unemployment unless necessary. 
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The pattern of spending listed above is consistent with the political patterns in both 
countries. The rise of the conservatives in the UK in the 1980’s brought about a long 
period of deregulation and a roll-back of the welfare state, which was not reversed 
under new labour in the late 1990’s. By comparison, the German pattern of supporting 
the welfare state was set back marginally during the period of Hartz13 reforms in the 
early 2000’s. 
4.3.1.2.  Subsidised Work and Labour Market Investment  
Large public sectors require large investment in subsidised forms of work14. The state as 
an employer needs labour market investment into public programmes and forms of 
employment. Typically the amount spent by the state on labour market programmes is 
indicative of how much the state is willing to subsidise work to prevent redundancy and 
layoff. Large spending correlates with larger public sectors, and lower mobility, 
especially IVM. Figure 4.2 compares the UK and Germany in terms of employment 
subsidies, which try to limit unemployment.  
                                                 
13 The Hartz reforms were 4 sets of policy changes started in 2002, which were designed 
to modernize the German labour market. Changes ranged from the creation of “mini 
jobs” to the strengthening of vocational credentials. 
14 The data measuring labour market investment also comes from the OECD-STAN 
database. Data location https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=STAN08BIS. 
The series is labelled “PUBLMPEXP” and is expressed as a percentage of a country’s 
GDP.  
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Figure 4.2: Public labour market spending as % of GDP. Germany and the UK (1985-2015) 
 Germany's rate of spending on subsidised work is roughly 2% of GDP during the 
1980's. This increases during the 90’s before falling to roughly 2% during the early 
2000's. The rate's decline throughout the 1990's is gradual, but the fall seen in the early 
2000’s is likely the product of the Hartz reforms mentioned earlier.  
The UK’s rate of spending on subsidised labour also falls over time. From 1985 to 1990 
the rate falls from 2% to 1%; falling further to half of one percent in 2013. The UK rate 
is consistently lower than the German rate. Thus, in Germany, the state will inhibit IVM 
by subsidising forms of work. This support is uncommon in the UK leading to larger 
rates of mobility, especially IVM.  
4.3.1.3.  Employment Protection Legislation  
  Countries differ in the freedom employer’s have to hire and fire workers15. Countries 
with few limitations see more mobility (OECD, 2010). There are likely two reasons for 
                                                 
15 I consider differences in employment protection using a comparable measure from the 
OECD database, which quantifies protections offered to permanent and temporary staff. 
Data location 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm  
The measures consider individual and collective dismissal (EPRC_v1), and workers on 
a temporary or agency contract (EPT_v1).  
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this. First, workers will move involuntarily due to redundancies and temporary 
contracts. Second, they will move for voluntary reasons, as workers try to find secure 
employment within and between firms. The measure is often presented as a key factor 
in explaining country differences in mobility rates (Mills et al., 2006b, Mills et al., 
2008). It is illustrated in Figure 4.3 for the UK and Figure 4.4 for Germany. 
The measure “EPRC_v1” considers the strength of protection for individual and group 
dismissals in a permanent contract. The measure “EPT_v1” considers the level of 
protection for temporary workers. Both range from strong (6) to weak (1).  
 
Figure 4.3: Strength of Employment Protection Legislation. (UK 1985-2015) 
 
In the UK, employment protection is weak for all workers. Only a baseline form of 
protection is offered for permanent staff. This is consistent with the individualistic 
mobility regime prediction made by DiPrete et al. (1997), and the findings suggested by 
the OECD (2010). Temporary workers have no protection. Both rates do not evolve 
over time and remain limited from the mid 1980’s onward, pointing to a deregulated 
labour market that underpins the high rate of mobility in the UK to a degree. Most 
importantly, the rate of protection does not change over the years, yet the rate of job 
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mobility in the UK has varied significantly as shown in previous tables. The 
relationship between protection and mobility may be over stated. Further, the rate of 
protection does not change, despite significant changes in British politics, moving from 
a strong conservative majority, to a (somewhat) liberal one and back again. The rate 
remains flat, seeing only a minor increase corresponding to Tony Blair’s Labour 
government. This is reversed in 2012.   
 
Figure 4.4: Strength of Employment Protection Legislation. (Germany 1985-2015) 
In Germany, protection for individuals and groups in permanent work (eprc_v1) is 
reasonable. At the very least, it is higher than the UK’s level of protection. For 
permanent workers, Germany maintains an average rate of protection. This rate does not 
change over time. For temporary staff, strong protection exists throughout the 80’s and 
90’s. However, protection has gradually declined in order to make the market more 
“flexible”. This is also likely the result of the Hartz reforms which pushed for greater 
flexibility in the labour market, especially through the use of mini-jobs (Lehndorff et 
al., 2009). 
Comparing the two countries, the UK provides weak coverage consistently without 
change. Germany provides average protection consistently without change for 
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permanent workers. Germany protects permanent workers from individual and group 
dismissals more so than the UK. The OECD cites a negative correlation between 
mobility and Employment Protection Legislation. This is evident in the data above. The 
UK, a country with low protection for groups and individuals, has high rates of 
voluntary and involuntary mobility. Germany, a country with medium rates of 
Employment Protection Legislation, has minimal rates of job mobility between and 
within firms.  
The persistence of each series is surprising. Employment Protection Legislation is cited 
as a key factor in understanding country differences in mobility, yet mobility rates differ 
while the strength of protection remains the same. Further, the differences presented 
here remain resilient over periods of great political change. The UK model of 
employment supposedly stood at important cross roads in the 1980’s, 1990’s, and 
2000’s (Rubery et al., 2009), yet the level of employment protection has not changed. 
Similarly, Germany’s entire employment model is described as being in “upheaval” by 
Lehndorff et al. (2009), however, the level of protection remains unchanged for 
permanent core workers (although the chances of accessing permanent work may have 
changed over time).    
4.3.1.4.  Barriers to Entry and Barriers to Conduct 
Lastly, I consider how the labour laws and policies that regulate the rate of entry and 
conduct of the classic professions, shape rates of mobility. This measure is a kind of 
EPL for professions. It considers those in law, engineering, finance, and architecture. 
The policies and the institutions which shape these professions will also regulate the 
rates of mobility for workers between and within firms. Professions, which have control 
over their occupation, are able to standardise their working conditions, making rewards 
predictable (Freidson, 1994). In this way, mobility is less necessary as conditions and 
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pay are typically standardised. Further, by controlling numbers within the profession, 
the group is able to limit the number of involuntary mobility and temporary forms of 
work. The OECD hosts the data16 and considers 4 key professions; architecture, law, 
engineering, and finance. Further, the OECD-STAN database collects data on the 
regulation of professions, rating the barriers to entry, and the conduct regulations of 
lawyers, architects, engineers and accountants. To compare the employment protection 
“landscape” in Germany and the UK, I show the occupation-average regulation score 
for each country. Higher scores mean more regulation of entering a profession, or 
professional conduct. Lower scores mean less regulation of occupational entrance and 
conduct. Figure 4.5 lists the data, only the available years are listed. 
 
Figure 4.5: Entry regulation and conduct regulation of professionals (Germany and the UK 1998-2013) 
Figure 4.5 shows clear differences between both countries. In the UK, entry into a 
profession has little regulation, which declines further over time. The UK contains 
almost no conduct regulation for professions. The index is low in each year, suggesting 
                                                 
16 Data location http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PROFSVC. I consider 
Conduct regulation and regulation of entry in the tables above. I consider the overall 
barriers for accounting, architecture, law, and engineering. The data is sampled at 4 
points in time 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013. It is cross-sectional  
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the state keeps a distance from professions operating in engineering, finance, law, and 
architecture. German entry regulation is high and remains steady after 2003. Germany’s 
conduct regulation is also high, but declines gradually over time. Overall, the UK 
resembles a less regulated market for professions. Germany’s market for professions 
appears more regulated, suggesting more protections for professional workers, and 
therefore a less mobile market. These rates reflect the rates of mobility found in both 
countries.  
4.3.1.5. Vacancies and potential employers 
This section considers the importance of demand-side factors. It could be that there are 
simply more firms for the average worker to choose from in the UK, hence its higher 
rate of mobility. British workers may be able to “shop around” before committing to a 
given employer. In Germany, fewer firms for the average worker could explain the 
lower rates of change, because workers simply have less choice. Eurostat’s Business 
Demographic Statistics17 offer insight into the demand for labour by gathering statistics 
on the number of employers in both countries. The table below lists the number of 
active firms in both countries for the earliest available years. Since the active population 
in both countries also differs, the table lists the raw number of firms, and the rate of 
firms per 1,000 active workers. Earlier data is not available, but the rate of firms in both 
countries appears roughly stable.  
                                                 
17 The data can be accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Business_demography_statistics. I focus on the rate of active 
firms, dividing these by the number of active workers in the labour market expressed in 
their 1000’s. 
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Table 4.10: Number of active firms in Germany and the UK. Expressed as a number and as a rate per 1,000 
active workers (2008-2014). 
Active firms 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Germany 2,972,219 2,937,202 2,958,720 2,985,718 2,997,832 2,972,456 2,818,836 
United Kingdom 2,157,830 2,109,620 2,013,225 2,027,600 2,054,940 2,126,775 2,218,955 
Number of firms per 1,000 workers        
Germany 72.44 71.59 73.64 73.84 73.95 72.83 68.77 
United Kingdom 70.59 68.79 65.52 65.53 65.95 67.87 70.37 
 
Table 4.10 shows that there are more firms in Germany than in the UK by a significant 
margin, both in number and rate. Despite having a larger number of potential 
employers, there is still less VM in Germany than in the UK. Again, a more valid 
comparison may be to look at the rate of enterprises per 1,000 workers. Here too, 
Germany has a larger number of potential business sector employers per 1,000 workers 
than the UK (until 2014).  
Although there may be more employers, these may be a part of the old, established, and 
closed labour markets, made up of senior companies with an established core. The UK 
may have a higher rate of firm births. More firm births means younger, more dynamic 
organisations which are more likely to hire staff quickly. This rate is also available in 
the Eurostat database. The rate is listed for both countries18 below. 
  
                                                 
18 The data can be accessed here http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:Enterprise_birth_rate. I focus on the raw number of firm 
births, and the rate of firm births per 1,000 workers. 
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Table 4.11: Firm births in Germany and the UK (2004-2013). Expressed in raw number and in rate per 1,000 
active workers 
Firm births 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Germany 303,338 283,105 272,140 260,108 274,803 244,199 258,076 258,661 238,205 219,603 
United Kingdom 271,250 265,545 256,600 299,170 280,380 212,835 210,950 234,495 242,400 311,845 
           
Firm birth per 1,000 workers         
Germany 7.65 7.01 6.66 6.35 6.70 5.95 6.42 6.40 5.88 5.38 
United Kingdom 9.27 8.98 8.54 9.89 9.17 6.94 6.87 7.58 7.78 9.95 
Data source: Eurostat series “Business demography by size class (from 2004 onwards, NACE Rev. 2) [bd_9bd_sz_cl_r2]”. Rate is 
calculated by dividing the number of firm deaths by the active population aged 16-64 expressed in thousands. 
 
The data in Table 4.11 shows between 2004 and 2008 both Germany and the UK have a 
similar number of firm births, between 270,000 and 300,000. The UK overtakes 
Germany in firm births only in 2007 but both countries also differ in workforce size. In 
order to make the figures more comparable, they are converted firm births per 1,000 
active workers. The UK rate is higher, but shows a difference of roughly 2-3 firm 
openings per 1,000 workers. This is despite a drastic difference in mobility rates, which 
does not fully explain the difference. 
Both Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 challenge the assumption that differences in employee 
opportunities exist in both countries. It is true that there is a greater share of firm births 
in the UK than Germany, but the rate constitutes a difference of about 2 births per 1,000 
workers. Further the number of enterprises per 1,000 workers is still higher in Germany 
than the UK. This suggests that workers have significant options in both countries, and 
the idea that workers are prevented from moving voluntarily in Germany is not 
convincing.   
Third, the German labour market may be less mobile simply because there are fewer 
vacancies between firms, unlike in the UK where job vacancies may be more common. 
German employers may be averse to hiring new workers; hence the rate of quits is 
limited by the fact that there are few opportunities for workers to consider. In this way, 
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German workers who move voluntarily must compromise their expectations in terms of 
working conditions, whereas British workers are able to improve these, as they chose 
from more vacancies. This data is also collected by Eurostat’s database, listing the 
vacancy rates in both countries19.   
Table 4.12: Vacancy rates in Germany and the UK (2000-2008) 
GEO/TIME 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) 3.8 3.1 2.9 2.5 2.2 3.2 3.8 3.5 3.1 
United Kingdom  2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.2 
 
Both countries have comparable vacancy rates, and in several years the German rate of 
vacancies is higher than the UK rate. This suggests that vacancies for jobs tend to be 
higher in Germany than the UK throughout the 8-year period studied. Since job 
mobility between and within firms is higher in the UK, this suggests German workers 
have more vacancies to choose from but move less often than British workers. Thus the 
argument that British workers have more choice in the labour market is invalid. 
Germany contains higher vacancy rates and more employers to choose from per worker 
(roughly).  
Although several measures above illustrate two separate “mobility regimes”, mobility is 
said to be fuelled by its impact on outcomes. A key assumption is that mobility is driven 
by movement to better jobs with better outcomes. It is worth asking how countries differ 
in terms of institutions which shape outcomes.  
4.3.2. Institutional Measures Shaping Bargaining  
Beyond the high rates of mobility in the earlier tables, Table 4.9 shows the varied nature 
of outcomes in the UK, and the more predictable nature of outcomes in Germany. The 
                                                 
19 The data can be accessed here http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Job_vacancy_statistics. The vacancy rate is expressed as a 
percentage of all positions empty and occupied in a given year.  
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institutional measures above impact mobility, but many of the measures are designed to 
target involuntary mobility, like unemployment benefit levels. Although EPL may 
affect rates of voluntary movement, in that it will push workers to move voluntarily 
until they find secure work, this measure is designed with IVM in mind. However, 
institutional structures, which make rewards either more or less predictable, also affect 
rates of mobility. This is a key point, if workers are not rewarded for mobility, then 
rates of mobility should not occur according to attainment theory. Rewards stemming 
from VM are more likely in individualised markets.  
The empirical measures used to show country differences are wage bargaining, union 
rates, and employee representation (Visser, 2011, Streeck, 1997, Hall and Soskice, 
2001). This section considers each in turn. First, wage coordination measures the extent 
to which wage setting is individualised. Second, union coverage measures the inclusion 
rate of union agreements. Last, the rate of union density captures the rate of union 
members as a percentage of all wage earners.  
4.3.2.1. Wage Coordination   
The UK individualises wage bargaining, while Germany promotes group-based 
bargaining. This is illustrated best using ICTWSS (Visser, 2011) dataset which contains 
several measures of labour power for countries around the world. Wage coordination is 
also measured20. The measure is listed for both countries in Figure 4.6. The UK follows 
an "individualized" approach to wages and job protection. Germany is coordinated, 
balancing protection for permanent workers with central bargaining for wages.  
                                                 
20 Data taken from the ICTWSS dataset as arranged by Visser et al (2011). The series is 
labelled “coord”. It contains a scale ranging from “maximum and minimum wage rates 
set through centralised bargains” (5) to “fragmented forms of wage bargaining, confined 
to individual firms or plants” (1). Middle values capture nuance. 
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Figure 4.6: Visser (2011) measure, Coordination of wage setting (coord) Germany and the UK (1960-2015) 
The variable measuring the strength of wage coordination (coord) ranges from 1 to 5. 
The smallest value (1) meaning "fragmented wage bargaining, confined to individual 
firms or plants”. The highest values (5) meaning "highest or lowest wage rates based on 
centralised bargaining".  
Germany maintains marginal wage coordination. The rate "dips" on three occasions, in 
the early 60’s, late 60’s, and early 2000’s. This last decline coincided around the time of 
the Hartz reforms21. Authors argue that labour bargaining power was damaged by the 
changes (Lehndorff et al., 2009), although these appear resilient as Germany promotes 
centralised wage bargaining at the industry level.  
In the UK, wage coordination falls in the early 80’s to its lowest levels. Here, wage 
bargaining and negotiation happens at the baseline, individuals in firms. This is likely 
due to deregulation which took place throughout the period (Rubery et al., 2009). What 
is noteworthy is the fact that the UK has moderate levels of wage coordination in the 
60’s and 70’s. After the 1980's coordination falls to basic bargains between individuals 
                                                 
21 The Hartz reforms were 4 sets of policy changes started in 2002, which were designed 
to modernize the German labour market. Changes ranged from the creation of “mini 
jobs” to the strengthening of vocational credentials. 
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and their employers. Much of the nuance used to describe the New Labour 
government’s approach to employment systems by Rubery et al. (2009) does not 
emerge in the chart above.  
4.3.2.2. Collective Bargaining Coverage  
Union coverage is the rate of workers covered by collective bargain agreements, 
expressed as a percentage of all salaried workers.  This section compares union 
coverage in both countries, in an effort to show the impact of collective bargaining. 
Germany has greater coverage than the UK, although both rates are falling over time. 
The measure is an important variable in explaining the varied nature of wages and wage 
bargaining described above (Streeck, 2009b).  
Union negotiators prioritise working conditions and stability for the workers. In certain 
countries, this coverage is bargained for union members alone, in others, the bargains 
cover wider groups, like an occupation or industry (Visser, 2011). In this way, when 
union coverage is high, workers can use “voice” to improve pay or conditions. 
Conversely, when coverage is low, workers use "exit" (changing employers) to improve 
pay or conditions. Figure 4.7 shows the two series for “union coverage”.  
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Figure 4.7: Union Coverage. Germany and the UK (1960-2015). 
Although coverage declines over time, two features stand out. First, the UK contains 
less union coverage than Germany. Second, this difference is maintained for each year 
under observation. From the 1990’s, collective agreements cover roughly 30% of the all 
salaried workers. Before this, there is a slow decline in coverage. Bargain coverage in 
Germany stays at 70% of all salaried workers throughout the 1990's. The rate continues 
to fall to 60% of all salaried workers. Overall, bargains cover more workers in Germany 
than in the UK. These bargains and collective agreements reduce individualisation of 
wage-setting, making outcomes predictable between workers. Hence, the smaller 
variance of pay and working conditions in Germany may be the product of wider union 
coverage in contrast to the UK’s lower coverage rate.  
4.3.2.3. Union Density  
The rate of union density is the percentage of all salaried workers who belong to a trade 
union; it is a measure of union power. The measure also appears in the ICTWSS dataset 
(Visser, 2011). Figure 4.8 shows the figures for both countries over time. Union density 
in the UK is just above 30%, suggesting that union coverage, described in Figure 4.7, 
extends to those who are unionised. By contrast, density in Germany falls below the 
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UK’s rate, just under 20%. Yet bargains made by unions cover about 50% of all salaried 
workers. Thinking of the two figures, UK union bargains cover union members, while 
German unions extend coverage to larger portions of the labour market.  
 
Figure 4.8: Union Density. Germany and the UK (1960-2015). 
Union density in the UK peaks in the 1980’s at 50%. Shortly afterwards, the rate 
declines. The fall continues through the 1980’s and 1990’s and stabilises in the early 
2000’s. The rate in recent years stands at 30%. In Germany, union density remains 
stable from the 60’s to the 90’s.  It then falls in the early 90’s and declines further 
during the 2000’s. Union density stood at 15% in 2012. Comparing both countries, 
union density is lower in Germany than in the UK. This difference maintains over time. 
As explained above, the low union density in Germany goes hand in hand with a large 
rate of union coverage, thus workers may not feel obligated to join a trade union, 
knowing that unions bargain on their behalf within the industry. The UK’s union 
coverage is similar to its rate of union density.  
Germany, the coordinated market, shows a pattern of group bargaining. The system 
emphasises group action on wage setting, and generally limits the level of individual 
bargains to include wider agreements at the industry level. The country also shows 
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larger rates of union coverage. Although this rate is in decline, it exists despite a lower 
union density than in the UK. In other words, Germany contains fewer unionised 
workers as a percent of all waged workers, but the coverage won by union bargains 
envelopes a greater portion of workers. 
4.4. Summary    
This chapter offers a preliminary look at mobility, outcomes, and the institutions which 
shape both in Germany and the UK countries. A number of key puzzles emerge. First, 
why is it that both countries differ only in rates of voluntary mobility? Germany and the 
UK have different EPL, designed to protect workers from layoff and dismissal. 
However the rate of IVM is equal in both countries. The major difference between the 
UK and Germany stems from workers quitting jobs and taking promotions. Second, 
outcomes in the UK are highly varied, as is the rate of mobility. Is this the product of 
workers moving to improve outcomes, or moving to maintain outcomes? Mobility in the 
UK may indeed be fuelled by opportunity, in that workers are moving to better jobs 
each time. However, mobility may also be fuelled by the need to maintain conditions in 
a rapidly changing market. Workers may be moving to leave failing firms or to escape 
downsizing. This mobility is voluntary, but may stems from a need to get out ahead of 
dismissals or redundancies. Lastly, how is it that the rate of vacancies can be near equal, 
but mobility is still high for British workers, and what does this mean for outcomes? 
Four findings from this chapter should be carried into the empirical chapters ahead. 
First, VM is the mode; IVM is unpopular in both countries. Second, there is a lack of 
worker-differences in mobility rates. The exception is the educational difference in rates 
of VM in the UK, where bargains are individualised. Workers with third-level 
qualifications are more mobile. Workers with a basic education are the least mobile. No 
differences between workers exist in rates of involuntary change. Third, there is an 
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institutional context to mobility. German mobility is low, and British mobility is high. 
The difference between countries lies mostly in the rate of VM (or more specifically, 
voluntary change between firms). Both countries have comparable rates of IVM. Thus 
there is a larger rate of quits and promotions in the UK, where fewer exist in Germany. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, outcomes in Germany are more predictable than 
they are in the UK. This is especially true when variance is considered for the average 
worker over the 9-year period (within-subject variation). Pay and working conditions 
vary less between and within workers in Germany. The UK’s high rate of VM 
corresponds to an individualised institutional context, with low rates of employment 
protection and low union coverage, affecting union member alone. Germany’s lower 
rate of VM corresponds to a collective institutional context, with higher rates of 
protection, industry level bargaining, and higher union coverage which extends beyond 
union members.  
The next chapter presents the British case. It uses the longitudinal British Household 
Panel Survey to estimate mobility’s effect on outcomes. Since outcomes vary more 
between and within British workers, and VM is especially high, it may be that mobility 
is fuelled by workers moving to “better” jobs.  The chapter tackles the first two goals of 
the thesis. It estimates the effects of VM and IVM on outcomes (first aim), and 
considers gender and education differences (second aim) in the mobility-outcomes 
relationship. 
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5. United Kingdom  
This chapter develops the argument for the UK, laid out above. Chapter 4 shows how 
the country’s high rate of mobility may be the product of individualised bargaining and 
varied (unequal) outcomes. The present chapter develops this further, tackling the first 
two research aims. A key argument runs through this chapter. The UK’s high rate of 
mobility stems from individualised bargaining where workers must move to improve 
their conditions. However, the premiums attached to mobility itself are almost 
exclusively subjective. Workers see changes only to subjective outcomes following a 
voluntary change, suggesting mobility may be driven by mismatch and dissatisfaction 
rather than attainment as it appears in the literature (Sørensen, 1977). Material rewards 
are few, only intra-firm mobility brings objective premiums independent of worker 
characteristics.  
The chapter considers two configurations mentioned in chapter two. First, it considers 
the nuance of mobility types and outcomes. Second, it estimates the nuance between 
workers and the mobility-outcomes relationship. In each of these configurations, the 
two complexities found in the literature emerge. First, not all outcomes are affected by 
mobility itself. Second, there is a difference between mobility’s effect on subjective and 
objective measures of the same outcome.  
Sociologists see mobility as a process where workers gain attainment or utility in a 
structure of inequality. Economists instead see attainment and utility as rewards tied to 
experience, human capital, and time spent in the labour market, where mobility itself is 
irrelevant. The results in this chapter find wider nuance in terms of mobility type, and 
the characteristics of the mover. Instead of the above, mobility is a process of 
bargaining; where workers compromise certain outcomes for improvements in others. A 
number of findings support this view. 
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First, in the UK VM rewards subjective outcomes, while having little effect on objective 
ones. Much of the rewards tied to mobility are purely subjective, where people’s 
evaluation of their work, pay, security and hours are increased, but the objective 
measures of the same concepts remain unaffected by mobility. Second, the location of 
the change is important, where inter-firm mobility improves subjective outcomes, but 
intra-firm mobility increases wages beyond what can be explained by worker 
characteristics. Third, different groups use mobility strategically; while men see almost 
no effect from mobility, women see large subjective premiums tied to mobility that do 
not materialise into objective outcomes. In the same vein, secondary level educated 
workers see large subjective gains from mobility, but third level educated workers are 
the only group who gain objective pay from VM. The UK’s lean production regime (O 
Riain, 2011), its individualised form of bargaining (Hall and Soskice, 2001), and its 
limited capacity to match skills to jobs (Rubery et al., 2009) mean mobility less often 
signals career progression, and more often signals basic bargains over subjective 
conditions in a varied market. Thus the theory of attainment (or efficiency wages) may 
apply somewhat to promotions, but not to inter-firm changes like quits. The sections 
below revisit the hypotheses, present the data, list the results, and discuss the British 
case overall (starting with mobility types and moving to worker differences). 
5.1. Hypotheses and Aims: 
The aims and hypotheses of this chapter are discussed in depth in the literature review 
(chapter 2). Each set of hypotheses is tied to a research aim; they are listed below for 
reference.   
1) To estimate the relationship between job mobility and outcomes. 
a) Hypothesis 1a: Voluntary mobility will have a positive effect on outcomes 
(Attainment theory).  
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b) Hypothesis 1b: Voluntary mobility will differ based on movement between and 
within firms. Intra-firm mobility will have a positive effect on objective outcomes 
(Efficiency Wage theory/Internal Labour Market theory)  
c) Hypothesis 1c: Voluntary inter-firm mobility will have a positive effect on 
subjective outcomes (Job mismatch).   
d) Hypothesis 2a: Involuntary mobility will have a negative effect on outcomes 
(Attainment theory/Values-Rewards theory). 
e) Hypothesis 2c: Inter-firm involuntary mobility will have a negative effect on 
subjective outcomes (Job mismatch). 
2) To test between-worker differences in this relationship: 
a) Hypothesis 3a: Gender differences will exist between workers. Men will benefit 
from voluntary mobility more than women. 
b) Hypothesis 3b: Men will be hindered by involuntary mobility less than women. 
c) Hypothesis 3c: Education differences will exist between workers. Those with a 
third level education will benefit from voluntary mobility more than those 
without.  
d) Hypothesis 3d: Those with a third level education will be hindered by 
involuntary mobility less than those without. 
Overall, the argument above is supported by 4 key findings. First, VM improves 
subjective outcomes, but has minor effects on objective outcomes. This is especially 
true for pay. Voluntary mobility contains a strong and positive effect (independent of 
worker characteristics) when pay is measured subjectively, but a weak and minor effect 
when pay is measured objectively. This minor effect even disappears after controlling 
for weekly working hours. Second, IVM has no impact on subjective outcomes, a 
finding which casts doubt on attainment theory, but has a significant negative impact on 
objective outcomes, as suggested by attainment theory suggested by values-rewards 
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theory. Third, there is nuance to VM; counter to attainment theory leaving an employer 
has a stronger effect on subjective outcomes, than taking a promotion with the same 
employer. However, taking a promotion with the same employer has a better effect on 
objective pay, than leaving an employer for a more satisfying job elsewhere. This is 
supported by significance tests (F-tests) at post-estimation. Last, differences between 
workers emerge but run counter to hypotheses as suggested by attainment theory. 
Women’s pay increases from a voluntary change. However, the effect stems from 
women increasing their hours using mobility, not increasing their rate of pay. 
Differences in education groups show that workers with a secondary level education see 
a subjective premium tied to VM. However, only those with a third level education see 
a pay premium tied to VM, earning more from the change independent of worker 
characteristics as laid out by Sørensen (1977). Thus the theory may apply to a specific 
group of workers, possibly insiders who hold a “service relationship” in the UK 
(Goldthorpe, 2000).  
5.2. Data and Variables: 
The full analytical strategy and the limitations of the data are presented in chapter 3 (p 
58). Descriptive statistics for each outcome can be found in chapter 4 (Table 4.9 on p 
118). Table 5.1 lists the variables considered throughout the chapter. The sample draws 
from nine rounds from the BHPS data (2000-2008); respondents must appear in a 
minimum of eight rounds to be considered. 
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Table 5.1 Summary statistics of variables used for the UK. (BHPS 2000-2008) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Ref: Same job, same employer      
Changed employer-voluntary 32,560 0.057 0.233 0 1 
Changed employer-involuntary 32,560 0.014 0.119 0 1 
Changed employer-other 32,560 0.027 0.162 0 1 
Changed job, kept employer-Voluntary 32,560 0.050 0.218 0 1 
Changed job kept employer- involuntary 32,560 0.003 0.054 0 1 
Changed job kept employer-other 32,560 0.016 0.127 0 1 
      
z_pay satisfaction 31,765 0.000 1.000 -2.9162 1.384748 
z_security satisfaction 31,719 0.000 1.000 -3.37958 1.091396 
z_work satisfaction 31,773 0.000 1.000 -3.66383 1.257712 
z_time satisfaction 31,781 0.000 1.000 -3.15082 1.310318 
      
Weekly number of hours worked 32,396 35.025 9.730 0.000 99.000 
Gross monthly pay 31,147 1808.980 1322.109 27.324 72055.430 
Log gross monthly pay 31,147 7.298 0.665 3.308 11.185 
      
(Ref: male)      
female 32,046 0.484 0.500 0 1 
      
education (Ref:third level)      
second level 31,021 0.599 0.490 0 1 
basic level 31,021 0.209 0.407 0 1 
      
agecat: ref (16-30)      
(31-45) 32,556 0.475 0.499 0 1 
(46-65) 32,556 0.376 0.484 0 1 
(66-80) 32,556 0.007 0.085 0 1 
      
children (Ref: No children)      
1 child 32,560 0.186 0.389 0 1 
2 children 32,560 0.178 0.382 0 1 
3+ children 32,560 0.048 0.213 0 1 
      
contract: (ref: temporary)      
Permanent 31,205 0.984 0.127 0 1 
      
jbsize1: ref(1-99)      
100-499 32,066 0.240 0.427 0 1 
500-1000+ 32,066 0.185 0.388 0 1 
      
industry      
Agriculture 29,946 0.008 0.090 0 1 
Energy   29,946 0.017 0.128 0 1 
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Mining   29,946 0.002 0.047 0 1 
Manufacturing 29,946 0.169 0.374 0 1 
Construction 29,946 0.048 0.214 0 1 
Trade   29,946 0.134 0.340 0 1 
Transport 29,946 0.062 0.242 0 1 
Bank/Insurance 29,946 0.059 0.236 0 1 
Services  29,946 0.460 0.498 0 1 
      
isco10      
Professionals 29,728 0.139 0.346 0 1 
Technicians 29,728 0.145 0.352 0 1 
Clerical staff 29,728 0.165 0.371 0 1 
Service workers 29,728 0.137 0.344 0 1 
skilled agricultural 29,728 0.006 0.079 0 1 
Craft 29,728 0.102 0.302 0 1 
Plant and machinery 29,728 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Elementary 29,728 0.067 0.250 0 1 
      
Wave (ref: 10)      
11 32,560 0.113 0.317 0 1 
12 32,560 0.113 0.317 0 1 
13 32,560 0.113 0.317 0 1 
14 32,560 0.114 0.317 0 1 
15 32,560 0.114 0.318 0 1 
16 32,560 0.115 0.319 0 1 
17 32,560 0.114 0.318 0 1 
18 32,560 0.109 0.311 0 1 
      
Growth 32,560 2.575 1.284 -4.31 4.3 
unemployment 32,560 5.088 0.296 4.7 6.7 
 
The baseline number of observations stands at 31,000+. The observations decline for 
measures of occupation and industry. Four subjective outcomes are used throughout the 
chapter. These are satisfaction scores considering work, pay, hours, and security. They 
are converted z-scores in an effort to make them comparable with the German 
outcomes, which are considered later. The models also consider three objective 
outcomes, gross monthly pay, health, and weekly working hours. Although health is a 
subjective variable, here it is used as a proxy for working conditions. A similar strategy 
is used by Gash et al. (2007). VM is determined subjectively, and considers workers 
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who quit their previous job, or who gain a promotion. IVM is also subjectively defined, 
and considers workers who lose positions to demotion, redundancy, dismissal, or plant 
closure among other reasons. The strategy is summarised in Table 3.6 on p 74 and 
follows that of Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001). Respondents who move for “family” 
or “other” reasons are listed in the “other” category.  
All models are estimated using linear fixed-effects and are split into two sets, subjective 
outcomes and objective outcomes. These are discussed separately. Since linear fixed-
effects models cannot consider between-respondent variance, the models are unbiased 
but inefficient (Allison, 2009, Longhi and Nandi, 2014). As a result estimates with p-
values less than 0.1 are considered statistically significant.  
5.3. Types of Mobility and Outcomes: 
This section considers the first aim, and hence the first configuration of mobility and 
outcomes; mobility types. It presents the effects of VM and IVM on outcomes between 
and within firms. It does not consider differences between workers, which are listed 
later.  
5.3.1.  Fixed-effects Estimates and Subjective Outcomes 
The subjective outcomes used here are satisfaction with work, pay, security, and time. 
The mobility estimates are listed in Table 5.2. Models consider 26,000+ observations 
from 3,600+ individuals. The R-squared values, or the portion of the variance explained 
by the independent variables, differ from 2% (satisfaction with work) to 14% 
(satisfaction with time), suggesting that controls (including mobility) do not explain 
satisfaction with working conditions particularly well, although the relationship 
between mobility and outcomes is significant and theoretically relevant. 
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Table 5.2: Results, UK 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effect of moving on subjective outcomes. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Satisfaction with work, 
linear z-scores 
Satisfaction with pay, 
linear z-scores 
Satisfaction with security, 
linear z-scores 
Satisfaction with time, 
linear z-scores 
2.Inter-firm 
voluntary 
0.36*** 0.24*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
3. Inter-firm 
involuntary 
0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
5.Intra-firm 
voluntary 
0.18*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.04* 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
6.intra-firm 
involuntary 
-0.09 0.02 -0.07 -0.00 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Constant 0.38 -0.19 -0.17 0.01 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.26) (0.24) 
     
Observations 26,036 26,016 25,984 26,032 
R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.14 
Number of pid 3,698 3,698 3,698 3,698 
Wave 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 
Weights Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models above control for age, contract type, firm size, whether the respondent has children, the size of the firm, the industry, the 
occupation, and the survey wave.  I also control for general job satisfaction in each model (except for the model estimating 
satisfaction with work), and two macro variables; the unemployment rate and the rate of economic growth. I list these estimates in 
the appendix Table 1.1, which contains the full model. 
 
A clear distinction can be made between VM and IVM throughout each model. VM 
produces positive estimates, while IVM has no significant effect in each model. Thus, 
the key distinction in the models above is whether the change is voluntary or 
involuntary. At first glance it appears that VM itself has a positive effect on all 
outcomes, independent of worker characteristics as laid out in attainment theory. In 
each model mobility to a new position contains significant reward beyond what can be 
explained by worker characteristics.  
Starting with satisfaction with work (model 1) both VM estimates have a positive effect 
on satisfaction. Those who quit or take promotions move to vacancies with higher 
satisfaction with work. However, the effect of VM between firms is stronger than the 
effect within firms (F (1, 3723) = 25.54, p >F = 0.000). This finding runs against 
attainment theory, which does not make the distinction between mobility between and 
within a given employer’s firm. IVM has no effect, suggesting respondents move to 
jobs which do not affect their satisfaction with work. Changing employers after a 
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dismissal or a firm closure has no significant effect on subsequent work; neither does a 
demotion or a lateral change with the same employer. 
A similar relationship emerges in models predicting satisfaction with pay (model 2). 
VM has a positive and significant effect on the outcome, regardless of whether the 
change occurs between or within firms. Thus respondents who quit for a new employer 
improve their satisfaction with pay, as do those who take promotions with a given 
employer. Further, VM between firms has a bigger effect on the outcome than VM 
within a firm, suggesting quits have a stronger effect on satisfaction with pay than 
promotions (F(1, 3723) = 18.21, p > F = 0.000). Here too, mobility to a new role has a 
positive effect beyond worker characteristics. As before IVM has no effect on 
subsequent satisfaction with pay, hence workers may be able to recreate their subjective 
feelings about pay with a new employer or a given employer.  
Satisfaction with job security is affected in a similar way by mobility (model 3). VM 
has a positive effect, suggesting quits and promotions reward subjective satisfaction 
with security. There is no difference between inter and intra-firm mobility in terms of 
this premium (F (1, 3723) = 0, p >F = 0.972). Thus, mobility in itself will improve the 
satisfaction workers have with security beyond their ability or other fixed resources. 
This finding is curious as job security is typically tied to firm tenure, yet respondents 
who quit, report a similar bonus in security compared to those who take a promotion. It 
could be that insecure workers are pushed to quit, while workers who expect a 
promotion see only a smaller change. It is also possible that a larger portion of the effect 
of promotion is explained by worker characteristics themselves, and not the promotion. 
IVM has no significant effect on workers, suggesting they are able to recreate their job 
security after the change.  
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Lastly, satisfaction with time (model 4) is positively affected by VM, and unaffected by 
IVM. Respondents who quit report higher satisfaction with time, suggesting they move 
to more flexible jobs. However, respondents who take a promotion see a positive but far 
smaller change than those who quit (F (1, 3723) = 10.32, p > F= 0.001). IVM has no 
effect on the outcome, suggesting workers are unaffected by the change itself.   
Each model provides support for the hypotheses tied to VM, but not IVM. This is 
curious because it suggests that VM moves workers to jobs with better conditions than 
their resources, but IVM moves them to jobs where their conditions match their 
resources. I accept hypothesis 1a, results show VM improves each outcome considered 
above, as laid out by attainment theory. Mobility itself contains premiums beyond the 
characteristics of workers. Further, I accept hypothesis 1c, inter-firm VM improves 
outcome better than intra-firm VM (satisfaction with security is an exception where 
both inter-firm and intra-firm VM improves the outcome equally). Thus the premium 
tied to changing firms is higher than the premium tied to taking promotions. I reject 
hypothesis 2a. From the output, it’s clear that IVM has no effect on subjective 
outcomes, suggesting workers are unaffected by involuntary changes. Tied to this, I 
reject hypothesis 2c; there is no nuance tied to IVM. It is important to note that the 
sample contains workers who move directly to a new job after the change, and thus is 
representative of the core workforce alone. It is possible that workers reveal they are 
under qualified during their time in a given firm, and so job loss corrects for their 
resources or lack of experience. However, this is not the argument proposed by 
attainment theory, and internal labour markets. 
As mentioned, attainment theory (Sørensen, 1977) is a process where workers move 
between positions in a structure. It sees VM as a strategy for improving wages and 
status, but predicts that subjective outcomes should see “gains” from VM (discussed in 
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section 2.1.1 on p 14). This is confirmed in the results above. Mobility itself yields 
improved outcomes, beyond what is explained by worker characteristics alone. In this 
way, workers are moving from one vacancy to a better vacancy, improving outcomes. 
However, an issue emerges when IVM is considered. If VM leads to positions with 
higher rewards in a fixed structure, why then does IVM not lead workers “down” this 
structure? Instead IVM, in itself, does not move workers to positions with lower 
rewards.  
Overall the predictions made by attainment theory appear in the output. The first 
complication mentioned in the introduction and literature review does not emerge in 
subjective models, suggesting mobility is driven by utility. Respondents are able to gain 
in terms of several outcomes. Further the suggestions made by efficiency wage theory 
(and at times internal labour market theory), that better working conditions await those 
who take promotions internally, does not emerge. Instead, quits appear to work best, 
possibly because working conditions vary more between firms than they do within 
them.   
Overall results suggest there are few downsides to mobile markets. Workers are able to 
improve their conditions through VM, and see few consequences to IVM. The results 
are similar to previous authors. Gesthuizen and Dagevos (2008) find similar effects in 
The Netherlands, where some subjective outcomes are improved through VM. They too 
find that inter-firm mobility improves subjective outcomes best when compared to intra-
firm change.  Fasang et al. (2012) also report a positive link between VM and subjective 
outcomes, noting subtle differences between inter and intra-firm changes. Lastly, 
Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) report a positive relationship between VM and several 
subjective outcomes, finding no significant relationship between IVM and the same 
outcomes (counter to the values-rewards theory they propose). When considering the 
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effect, Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) suggest Norway’s generous welfare benefits 
are responsible for the lack of effect. This does not appear to be the case in this 
chapter’s results which suggest workers in a liberal market economy are equally 
unaffected by IVM.  
For the moment, the UK resembles a mobile market where workers gain from VM 
without a penalty tied to IVM. Values-rewards theory and attainment theory are both 
useful for UK data, provided outcomes are subjective. The next section substitutes the 
same outcomes for objective measures, in an effort to understand the effects in greater 
detail. The theories listed throughout expect no difference between subjective and 
objective outcomes and their relationship to VM and IVM. In the next section I pay 
particular attention to pay and time, two outcomes which are important in the subjective 
models above, and appear objectively below.   
5.3.2.  Fixed-effects Estimates and Objective Outcomes: 
This section considers gross monthly wages, subjective health, and the weekly hours 
normally worked by respondents. The models draw on 26,000+ observations from 
3,600+ individuals. Satisfaction with health contains fewer observations (22,800+) due 
to missing values. The R-squared value, or the portion of the variance explained by the 
controls ranges from 2% (satisfaction with health and number of hours worked) to 25% 
(gross monthly wages). The variables used in the model explain the variance in gross 
pay well, but do not explain satisfaction with health or number of hours worked well. 
The relationship between mobility and outcomes remains theoretically important and 
statistically significant, but much of the variance is unexplained. Table 5.3 lists the 
estimates. 
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Table 5.3: Results, UK 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effect of moving on objective outcomes. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log Gross monthly pay Subjective health Number of hours worked weekly 
    
2.Inter-firm voluntary 0.01* 0.15*** 0.47*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.18) 
3. Inter-firm involuntary -0.07*** 0.12** -0.68 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.42) 
5.Intra-firm voluntary 0.01* 0.05 -0.14 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.19) 
6.intra-firm involuntary -0.09* 0.05 -0.48 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.95) 
Constant 7.47*** 5.54*** 34.93*** 
 (0.08) (0.33) (1.94) 
    
Observations 26,057 22,806 26,020 
R-squared 0.25 0.02 0.02 
Number of pid 3,698 3,672 3,698 
Wave 10-18 10-18 10-18 
Weights Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models control for age, contract, firm size, whether the respondent has children, the size of the firm, the industry, and survey 
wave.  I also control for two macro variables- the unemployment rate, and the rate of economic growth. I list these estimates in the 
appendix, Table 1.2. 
 
The simple breakdown between VM and IVM now appears more complex, with 
important differences between inter- and intra-firm mobility. Further while IVM 
appeared inconsequential in subjective models it carries significant penalties in models 
estimating pay. Generally, the output for objective models does not resemble the output 
for subjective models, suggesting mobility does not always come with objective 
premiums. 
Starting with pay (model 1) VM has a minor effect, with new positions holding a 1% 
premium in pay. The effect is similar for both inter-firm and intra-firm mobility. Thus, 
moving to a new position increases pay by 1%, holding worker characteristics constant. 
This is surprising, since the subjective models contain large significant premiums tied to 
mobility. I return to this point later. IVM carries significant negative effects on gross 
pay. Those who move between firms for involuntary reasons see a 7% fall in pay, while 
those who experience a demotion see a 9% fall in pay. The difference between the two 
mobility types is insignificant (F (1, 3723) =0, p > F = 0.993). This too is surprising, 
because subjective models suggested no link between IVM and subjective pay. 
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Involuntary mobility leads workers to positions with lower pay, beyond the 
characteristics of the workers who move.  
Satisfaction with health (model 2) reveals interesting dimensions to working conditions 
following mobility. Here, the main distinction is one between inter-firm and intra-firm 
mobility. Respondents who leave for a new employer (either through VM or IVM) see 
positive changes to working conditions or at least to health outcomes at work. Those 
who remain with the same employer following a change, see no difference in subjective 
health. It is possible that workers see a reduction or a change in their responsibilities at 
work following an inter-firm change, while no such reduction follows an intra-firm 
change. Poor conditions or poor health may be a push factor, encouraging inter-firm 
mobility. Moving to a new employer yields improved health outcomes, beyond the 
characteristics of the movers themselves.  
Lastly, mobility has almost no effect on the weekly hours worked by respondents 
(model 3). VM increases weekly hours, but only for those who quit their job and change 
employers. Respondents who take promotions see no increase in weekly hours despite 
previously seeing an increase in satisfaction with time. Further, respondents who see an 
involuntary change are able to recreate their working hours with a new or an existing 
employer. Noticeably, VM leads to increased hours (model 3) and increased pay (model 
1). Thus it could be that workers increase their pay, by using mobility to find longer 
hours. Re-estimating the model for pay (model 1) while controlling for weekly hours 
eliminates the positive effect for inter-firm VM, but not intra-firm VM. However, even 
the positive effect of promotions although significant, is minor. Respondents who take a 
promotion see a 1% increase in pay, compared to years where they remain in the same 
job with the same employer. Respondents who quit see a 1% increase in pay, but this is 
the product of searching for longer hours for a similar rate. 
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The estimates for objective models do not reflect the estimates for subjective models. 
Firstly, I reject hypothesis 1a, VM alone does not have a positive effect on outcomes. In 
fact, there are differences between inter-firm and intra-firm mobility, which go beyond 
those described in the subjective models. Inter-firm mobility in itself does not increase 
the wages of workers. Instead it may be a strategy for increasing pay through increased 
hours, while intra-firm VM increases pay without increasing hours. Respondents who 
quit their job for a new employer appear to be negotiating conditions and time, for a 
similar rate of pay. Respondents who take promotions experience the attainment 
described by Sørensen (1977) and the higher pay described by Akerlof’s (1986) 
efficiency wage theory. By moving within the firm, workers earn a bonus beyond what 
can be explained by their characteristics alone. For this reason, I cautiously accept 
hypothesis 1b. Intra-firm VM rewards objective outcomes better than inter-firm VM. 
However, the effect is weak and minor. I also accept hypothesis 2a. IVM has a strong 
negative effect on pay, without a corresponding effect on hours, suggesting workers fall 
into less valued jobs. The effect of IVM does not differ by location, inter and intra-firm 
IVM has a similar effect on respondents (this is confirmed at post-estimation using an 
F-test). Hence, I reject hypothesis 2b. 
As mentioned, attainment theory claims VM should not occur without a change in 
outcomes or “gains” in “income and status”. This effect is dependent on the firm and 
does not emerge in the wider market. Between firms, workers who move, increase their 
weekly working hours. Within firms, workers see only a 1% increase for each change, 
suggesting they need to experience several changes before substantial returns are seen. 
Thus the assumption that voluntary mobility (itself) leads workers to better jobs is not 
supported by objective outcomes. The complexities discussed in chapter 1 and 2, 
emerge throughout the results. First, there is a difference in terms of how mobility 
affects outcomes. While pay and health improve after VM, these changes come with an 
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increase in weekly working hours, suggesting a compromise. Second, while subjective 
outcomes see strong positive effects after VM, objective outcomes see minor weak 
effects after VM. Pay is a perfect example. When models predict the effect of mobility 
on subjective pay, the estimates report a significant link between satisfaction and 
mobility. When models estimate objective pay, the effect disappears. Yet Sørensen 
(1975) places this mobility as a key mechanism to improving all or several outcomes, 
beyond the characteristics of those making the changes.  
The utilitarian view of attainment theory is missing conflict and bargaining between the 
employer and the worker. Results suggest the satisfaction that comes after VM is not the 
product of increased pay or reduced hours, but rather a renegotiation of responsibilities. 
The increase in satisfaction with pay that follows a quit may be a renegotiation of 
responsibility, which better align with the respondent’s level of pay. The same is true 
for IVM. Involuntary changes between firms leave workers feeling no different about 
pay, but actual pay declines significantly following the change, as they move to less 
valued positions, independent of their characteristics alone.  
Attainment theory considered by Sørensen (1975, 1977, 1978) fails to predict three 
specific findings, although some are noted by efficiency wage theory (Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1986) and internal labour market theory (Althauser, 1989, Althauser and 
Kalleberg, 1981). First, it makes no distinction between inter and intra-firm mobility, 
yet there is a clear divide. Inter-firm changes improve subjective outcomes best, while 
intra-firm changes improve actual pay (this is predicted by efficiency wage theory, but 
the theory expects a similar relationship between conditions and intra-firm mobility, 
which doesn’t emerge). Second, tied to the first point, there is a clear difference 
between mobility’s effect on subjective and objective outcomes. Although attainment 
theory focuses mostly on status and pay, it expects “psychological” rewards to work in 
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the same way. The bonuses tied to moving are largely subjective, there may be an 
argument that satisfaction scores better capture the concept of utility (Fasang et al., 
2012). However, attainment as a concept deals with clear objective categories, high pay 
and high status. Third, the relationship between IVM and subjective outcomes does not 
emerge, a relationship proposed by both attainment theory (Sørensen, 1977) and values-
rewards theory (Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 2001). The negative relationship between 
involuntary change and pay, as proposed by Sørensen (1975), does emerge, suggesting 
that workers who lose their job move downward to lower valued vacancies, independent 
of their characteristics as workers.  
The theory that comes closest to predicting the results above is efficiency wage theory, 
where workers earn above market rates of pay by pursuing promotion within the firm. 
However efficiency wage theory would also expect a high rate of working conditions to 
be maintained in an effort to hold on to core workers. This emerges somewhat in the 
results above, but the effect is weaker than that of quits. Instead, I propose a type of job 
mismatch is at play in the UK, where mobility is the product of searching for better 
conditions, or an internal structure to commit to. This mismatch closer aligns to the 
bargains outlined by Sallaz (2017) than those argued by Sørensen (1975). Worker 
wages are strongly defined by market forces in the UK, as a result, they make bargains 
based on responsibilities and conditions to better fit wages.   
5.3.3.  Mobility Types and the UK Model: 
The output above tells two conflicting stories about mobility and outcomes in the UK. 
When models estimate subjective or soft outcomes, the estimates paint a picture of 
individualised and “boundaryless markets”. Respondents who move voluntarily 
improve their conditions, with intra-firm movements offering minor improvements, and 
inter-firm movements boosting working conditions and feelings about work. Here, both 
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inter- and intra-firm changes reward workers who take risks by pursuing new jobs or 
promotions. IVM has no effect, as workers are able to recreate their worth elsewhere. 
Job loss is just a part of the “modern career”, and demotions are part of being “flexible” 
for an employer.  
When estimating objective outcomes however, a different UK emerges. VM only 
slightly increases wages, despite producing high “satisfaction with pay” in previous 
models. Controlling for hours further reveals that the relationship between mobility and 
pay is complicated. The positive effects of quitting (inter-firm VM) disappears, 
suggesting the effect is the product of worker bargains for longer hours at a similar rate 
of pay. The positive effect of promotion remains, carrying a premium which cannot be 
explained by worker characteristics alone. IVM too, looks different from the perspective 
of objective outcomes. Previous models which predict no changes in subjective feelings 
about pay are replaced by strong negative effects for gross monthly pay.   
Considering both sets of models together, VM may be used to improve conditions and 
feelings about work rather than reach attainment as described by Sørensen (1975). 
Mobility may instead be a strategy for improving working conditions and feelings about 
work, by leaving poor conditions behind. This argument is supported by the differences 
between inter-firm and intra-firm mobility. Inter-firm VM improves outcomes for 
workers more than intra-firm VM, but only when outcomes are subjective. Thus 
mobility is likely driven by subjective dissatisfaction with one’s employer rather than 
the opening of a vacancy that rewards workers better than their resources. VM within 
the firm contains objective premiums, although the effect is weak. It could be that 
workers use mobility between firms to place themselves into structures with rewards 
tied to internal change (a central concept for Brown et al. (2008)). However, even these 
rewards are minor, according to the output above. And more importantly, the argument 
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does not suggest that mobile markets are the best mechanisms for workers. Having 
outlined the effect mobility has on outcomes, the section below considers the second 
aim of the thesis, asking if workers experience the mobility-outcomes equally. 
5.4. Differences between Workers: 
The second aim of the thesis, asks whether workers differ in the mobility-outcomes 
relationship. Since mobility and outcomes are socially organised, they provide 
advantages and disadvantages to groups of workers, which cannot be explained by 
differences in skill acquisition alone. These predictions are summarised by the limited-
opportunity model (Hachen, 1990). The above sections assume all workers are affected 
by change equally. This important assumption is useful in capturing distinct differences 
between mobility types and outcomes. However, it is unrealistic, given the literature 
describing differences between workers and their relationship to the market. These often 
go beyond human capital, labour supply, or job characteristics alone (Cooke, 2014, Blau 
and Kahn, 2003, Goldthorpe, 2000, Goldthorpe, 2002) . For this reason, this section 
tests if worker differences in the mobility-outcomes relationship exist, first considering 
gender (Cooke, 2014, Mills et al., 2008, Acker, 2006), followed by education (Mills et 
al., 2008, Goldthorpe, 2000, Goldthorpe, 2002, Rosenfeld, 1992). The relevant 
hypotheses are listed on p 143. 
The discussion below considers the models in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 separated by 
gender, before splitting the models by education in a separate section. Due to limitations 
of space, the nuance of mobility types are not considered, this configuration has already 
been covered. Instead the discussion focuses on worker-differences by VM and IVM 
alone. Differences in inter and intra-firm mobility emerge, but these are considered 
together when discussing group hypotheses.  
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Although worker differences are minor, gender groups differ when the outcome is 
related to time, and education groups differ when the outcome is pay. Most importantly, 
results show the complexities of the mobility-outcomes relationship apply to the 
different groups. Here, it does not appear that men gain from mobility at the expense of 
women, while third level educated workers gain at the expense of other groups. Instead, 
women rely on mobility to improve outcomes, while men are unaffected, suggesting 
they rely on other mechanisms to advance outcomes. In particular, women rely on the 
firm when outcomes are subjective, but on the wider market when outcomes are 
objective. Further, secondary level educated workers rely on mobility to improve 
subjective outcomes, but third level educated workers rely on mobility to improve 
objective outcomes. Results suggest nuance in terms of who “benefits” from mobility 
depending on the outcome used. The section below opens the discussion of gender 
differences. 
5.4.1. Gender Differences in Subjective Outcomes: 
This section splits the models in Table 5.2 by gender. Overall, few gender differences 
emerge in the models estimating subjective outcomes. Since these consider only 
respondents who move directly to a new job, they focus on a specific group of women, 
who over the 9-year period do not take career breaks, and remain employed for each 
survey, at the time of the survey. The sample is the economic core, which may not take 
maternity leave, or drop out of the labour market to look after young children. As a 
result, the core does not represent the average British woman’s experience in the labour 
market, since women are more likely to take career breaks and balance the 
responsibility of family life along with employer demands (Atkinson, 2015, Acker, 
2006, Cooke, 2016, Cooke, 2014).  
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Citing overt discrimination Becker (2010) predicts that casualised or non-bureaucratic 
labour markets, like those in liberal market economies, will produce few differences 
between genders, compared to closed labour markets. Since efficient markets mean a 
greater choice for workers, there is more mobility between firms and less reliance on a 
single employer. Because of this, employers find discrimination costly, and will reward 
both genders for efficiency alone. Workers can “correct” their worth with a new firm, if 
they feel their productivity is undervalued. Opponents of Becker (2010), and overt 
discrimination, claim he over-emphasises human capital, which ignores structural 
discriminations based on gender (Mills et al., 2008, Cooke, 2014, Acker, 2006). 
Kalleberg and Marsden (2005) instead propose that casualised labour markets produce 
more gender inequality than coordinated markets since they amplify existing systems of 
inequality, like occupational and industry filters for genders. A key issue with Becker’s 
proposal, and overt discrimination more widely, is that it sees employer decision 
making as an issue of “taste”, ignoring wider structures which dictate differences in life-
chances and job types (see Acker (2006)), these also stem from overt discrimination, but 
go beyond issues of taste.  
The results presented below suggest the relationship between genders is more 
complicated than overt discrimination proposes. In fact, the inequality regimes laid out 
by Acker (2006) best explain gender differences. Women rely on mobility to improve 
outcomes, while men appear reliant on other mechanisms. “Young women aspiranters 
had different tasks than young men. Men’s tasks were varied and brought them into 
contact with different aspects of the business. Men were groomed for managerial jobs.” 
(Acker 2006: p447) As a result, while men improve outcomes from occupations, 
experience, and training, women are reliant on the premiums that come with mobility to 
improve outcomes. 
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The models for men draw on 13,000+ observations from 1,895 respondents. The models 
for women contain fewer respondents, and fewer observations. The R-squared estimates 
explain between 2% variance (satisfaction with work) and 15% variance (satisfaction 
with time) in outcomes. Genders do not differ in terms of model fit. The constant term 
in each model provides some insight into the basic difference between genders, 
although these differences are not statistically significant. In each model women are 
more satisfied than men with each measure. In satisfaction with work, women (0.80) 
score higher than men (0.01). In terms of satisfaction with pay, women (0.37) score 
higher than men (-0.75). In satisfaction with security too, women (0.19) are more 
satisfied than men (-0.44). Lastly satisfaction with working time too suggests women 
(0.24) are more satisfied than men (-0.23).  The first set of models estimates satisfaction 
with work and pay, listed in Table 5.4. Table 5.5 lists the estimates predicting 
satisfaction with security and satisfaction with time. For clarity, estimate which warrant 
attention are underlined.    
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Table 5.4: Results, UK 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of mobility on satisfaction with work and 
satisfaction with pay. Models estimated separately for each gender. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Male: z-score work sat Female: z-score work sat Male: z-score pay sat Female: z-score pay sat 
     
2.Inter-firm, voluntary 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
3.Inter-firm, involuntary 0.04 0.09 0.12* -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) 
5.Intra-firm voluntary 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.08** 0.12*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
6.Intra-firm, involuntary 0.13 -0.31* -0.05 0.08 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) 
Constant 0.01 0.80** -0.75** 0.37 
 (0.35) (0.37) (0.35) (0.39) 
     
Observations 13,234 12,802 13,224 12,792 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.07 
Number of pid 1,895 1,803 1,895 1,803 
Waves 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 
Weight Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models above control for age, contract type, firm size, whether the respondent has children, the size of the firm, the industry, the 
occupation, and the survey wave.  I also control for general job satisfaction in each model (except for the model estimating 
satisfaction with work), and two macro variables; the unemployment rate and the rate of economic growth. I do not list the estimates 
in the appendix sue to limitations of space. 
 
 
Table 5.5: Results, UK 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of moving on satisfaction with security and 
satisfaction with time. Models estimated separately for each gender. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Male: z-score secure 
sat 
Female: z-score secure 
sat 
Male: z-score time 
sat 
Female: z-score time 
sat 
     
2.Inter-firm, voluntary 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
3.Inter-firm, 
involuntary 
0.00 0.09 -0.00 0.13 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
5.Intra-firm voluntary 0.13*** 0.08** 0.01 0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
6.Intra-firm, 
involuntary 
-0.02 -0.11 -0.10 0.09 
 (0.20) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) 
Constant -0.44 0.19 -0.23 0.24 
 (0.37) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) 
     
Observations 13,210 12,774 13,232 12,800 
R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.15 
Number of pid 1,895 1,803 1,895 1,803 
Waves 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 
Weights Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models above control for age, contract type, firm size, whether the respondent has children, the size of the firm, the industry, the 
occupation, and the survey wave.  I also control for general job satisfaction in each model (except for the model estimating 
satisfaction with work), and two macro variables; the unemployment rate and the rate of economic growth. I do not list the estimates 
in the appendix sue to limitations of space. 
 
As before, the clearest dimension in the tables is one between VM and IVM, with VM 
improving outcomes and IVM having no effect on outcomes. This appears to be the 
case for men and women in each model. However three key differences emerge between 
genders. First, women see a fall in satisfaction with work after a demotion (intra-firm 
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IVM), while men do not. Second, men see increased satisfaction with pay after a 
redundancy (inter-firm IVM), while women do not. Last, women see increased 
satisfaction with time after a promotion (intra-firm VM), while men do not. Women 
appear more dependent on the firm, gaining more from promotion but seeing penalties 
for demotion, men appear to be less affected by intra-firm movement and reliant on 
other mechanisms to improve outcomes.   
Models 1 and 2 consider “satisfaction with work overall” for men and women. Men 
benefit from VM and are unaffected by IVM. Those who quit or take a promotion are 
able to improve their satisfaction with work, while those who lose their jobs or take 
demotions are able to recreate their subjective satisfaction. The results for women are 
the same, bar one estimate. Women are negatively affected by demotion, which is 
predicted by attainment theory and values-rewards theory. However, it suggests there is 
a gender element to the effect. Women move to subjectively worse positions after 
demotion, despite their fixed resources.    
Models 3 and 4 in Table 5.4 consider “satisfaction with pay” for men and women 
separately. Again, men see improved satisfaction following VM and are unaffected by 
intra-firm IVM. However men see a positive change in satisfaction with pay after inter-
firm IVM, while women do not. Overall, both men and women who quit or take 
promotions, improve their feelings about pay. Men who lose their jobs but move to a 
new employer also improve their feelings about pay, while women do not. 
Regarding satisfaction with security (models 1 and 2, Table 5.5), no gender differences 
exist. VM increases satisfaction with security for men and women, IVM has no effect 
on satisfaction with security. Men and women who quit their job or take a promotion 
see equal premiums in satisfaction after the change, and see no penalties after IVM. 
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Lastly, satisfaction with time (models 3 and 4, Table 5.5) is positively affected by VM 
and unaffected by IVM for both genders. Only one difference exists, women who take a 
promotion with their employer (intra-firm VM) see increased satisfaction with time, 
while men are unaffected. Otherwise, respondents who quit their job and move to a new 
employer benefit from the change, regardless of gender.    
Women appear more reliant on intra-firm mobility than men. Negative effects emerge 
for IVM (satisfaction with work) and positive effects emerge for VM (satisfaction with 
time) when considering women. However, these differences are minor, and could 
suggest that women are more reliant on mobility than men, who may be more likely to 
receive training, “grooming”, and other changes in perks that do not require mobility. I 
reject hypothesis 3a. While few gender differences exist, the difference tied to VM runs 
counter to the hypothesis. I further reject hypothesis 3b. Although men are not hindered 
by IVM, neither are women. Men benefit from IVM in terms of satisfaction with pay, 
and women are penalised in terms of satisfaction with work, but otherwise few 
differences exist.  
The findings do not offer support for overt discrimination, as women rely on mobility 
more than men, at least for the outcomes listed. However, neither does the output 
suggest that casualised labour markets leave women at a disadvantage at the point of 
inter-firm VM as proposed by the counter argument. Specifically, the results above 
suggest women who work in the inequality regimes proposed by Acker (2006) may gain 
more than men when promotions are offered and lose more than men when demotions 
are imposed. Thus, women may be particularly reliant on gaining satisfaction from 
positions in a structure rather than their fixed resources, like education and human 
capital. I move on to models with objective outcomes, paying special attention to time 
and pay; two outcomes which appear important in the output above.  
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5.4.2. Gender Differences in Objective Outcomes: 
This section lists the results for gross monthly wages, subjective health, and the weekly 
hours normally worked by respondents, divided by gender. The models for men draw on 
13,000+ observations for pay and hours, and 11,000+ observations for health, the 
observations come from 1,800+ respondents. The models for women are similar in size. 
Models estimating the number of hours worked for women explain a greater portion of 
variance (7%) than the same models for men (1%), as before time appears to be a major 
point of contention for women. Variance explained is similar for men and women in the 
remaining models. Again, due to the inefficient nature of fixed-effects models, estimates 
with p-values of less than 0.1 are considered significant.  
The constant term in each model provides insight into the basic difference between 
genders, all things considered. Looking at gross monthly pay, women (7.3) and men 
(7.36) earn a similar amount; no gender pay gap emerges. Again, this is largely the 
product of the sample design. Further, it is also likely that controlling for industry and 
occupation has closed some of the gap in earnings between genders. In subjective 
health, women (5.59) are similar to men (5.18). In terms of weekly working hours, 
women (34.12) work a similar number of hours compared to men (34.8). The estimates 
below still provide important insight into mobility and gender. Table 5.6 lists these. 
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Table 5.6: Results, UK 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of moving on gross monthly pay, subjective 
health, and weekly hours worked. Models estimated separately for each gender. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Male: Log gross 
monthly wage 
Female: Log 
gross monthly 
wage 
Male: 
Subjective 
health 
Female: 
Subjective 
health 
Male: weekly 
work hours 
Female: 
weekly work 
hours 
       
2.Inter-firm, 
voluntary 
0.01 0.02* 0.09** 0.16*** 0.15 0.86*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.26) (0.26) 
3.Inter-firm, 
involuntary 
-0.06*** -0.08** 0.10 0.13 -0.73 -0.68 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.10) (0.56) (0.61) 
5.Intra-firm 
voluntary 
0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.07 -0.57** 0.28 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.27) (0.28) 
6.Intra-firm, 
involuntary 
-0.08 -0.11* 0.26** -0.09 0.99 -1.90 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.19) (1.11) (1.44) 
Constant 7.36*** 7.30*** 5.18*** 5.59*** 34.80*** 34.12*** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.43) (0.45) (2.69) (2.34) 
       
Observations 13,309 12,922 11,662 11,294 13,294 12,901 
R-squared 0.28 0.26 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.07 
Number of pid 1,905 1,819 1,890 1,808 1,905 1,819 
Waves 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 
Weights Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models control for age, contract, firm size, whether the respondent has children, the size of the firm, the industry, and survey 
wave.  I also control for two macro variables- the unemployment rate, and the rate of economic growth. I do not list these estimates 
in the appendix due to limitations of space. However, a baseline model is listed in the appendix. 
 
Five gender differences emerge above. These are as follows; first, women see increased 
pay after a quit (inter-firm VM), while men do not. Second, women see a cut in pay 
after a demotion (intra-firm IVM), men do not. Third, men who experience a demotion 
(intra-firm IVM) report increased health, while women do not. Fourth, women work 
longer hours after a quit (inter-firm VM), while men do not. Last, men work fewer 
hours after a promotion, while women see no change. At first, it seems that women have 
the most to gain from inter-firm VM, but the most to lose from intra-firm IVM, at least 
in terms of pay. Men appear more protected from the effects of mobility overall, at 
times even benefitting from IVM, which runs completely counter to several theories. 
Starting with gross monthly pay (models 1 and 2), VM leads to higher wages for 
women but not men, independent of their resources as workers, a finding that runs 
completely counter to both discrimination theory and attainment theory. Women who 
quit see an average 2% increase in wages, beyond what can be explained by their 
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resources. Men do not experience the premium. However, the positive effect of intra-
firm VM is no longer present (Table 5.3 on p 154), possibly due to the smaller sample 
size in the models above. Regarding IVM, both men and women see a decrease in 
wages after the change. Respondents who are redundant or laid-off move to positions 
with 6%-8% lower wages with a new employer. However, only women are significantly 
affected by demotion. Women who are demoted move to objectively worse paid jobs 
than men. They see an 11% fall in wages, which cannot be explained by their resources, 
suggesting they move to low paid positions despite their ability. Men are unaffected.  
Regarding subjective health (models 3 and 4), VM improves outcomes for both men 
and women, roughly equally. Those who quit their job and move to a new employer 
may be taking better working conditions which increase their subjective health. The 
estimates for intra-firm VM are insignificant, most likely because the conditions of 
vacancies vary more between firms than they do within firms.  
Finally, weekly hours are affected by mobility (models 5 and 6), but the effect relies on 
gender. VM increases the weekly hours of women, but not men, who see a fall in hours 
after VM (intra-firm). Women who quit their job take up longer weekly working hours 
with a new employer, while men do not. Women who take a promotion with the same 
employer see no change in working hours, while men see a fall in weekly working 
hours. Importantly, the weekly working hours worked by both men and women at the 
baseline do not differ significantly. IVM has a significant effect on neither men nor 
women. Here, women use mobility as a means of finding better hours with a new 
employer, rather than reducing hours or taking more flexible forms of work. 
Previously the change in pay was explained by a change in hours, suggesting inter-firm 
VM was closer tied to renegotiating hours than attainment. This appears to be the case 
for women in the models above. Estimating the models for pay a second time while 
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controlling for hours eliminates the positive effect of VM for women. This further 
confirms that VM in the UK is closer tied to improving working conditions and hours, 
than attainment Sørensen (1977), (Sørensen, 1975). From the output, it cannot be said 
that men benefit from mobility more than women. Rather, women appear to be using 
VM to improve working time, but are subject to penalties for IVM in terms of pay. The 
results strongly resemble the findings of Cha (2014), who finds that certain women 
benefit from mobility. The output above appears to be closely tied to hours, and 
although children are controlled for, I argue that the bargain over working time largely 
determines how women benefit from mobility. I reject hypothesis 3a. Instead women 
may be more reliant on mobility, where as men use other mechanisms to reach 
attainment. 
Regarding IVM, men are affected by job loss and redundancy (inter-firm) but not 
demotion and lateral changes (intra-firm), women are affected by both. Further, men see 
“gains” in health after a demotion, where women are unaffected by the change. For 
these reasons I cautiously accept hypothesis 3b. Women are more affected by 
involuntary change than men, as men are able to avoid penalties in pay, and improve 
health after the move.  
5.4.3. Gender and Mobility in the UK: 
A number of gender differences emerge in the models above, but most run counter to 
the hypotheses. Gender is an important configuration of the mobility-outcomes 
relationship, but results show there are complexities to this relationship. Women appear 
to make trades in terms of outcomes using mobility, while men do not. The idea that 
women are at an obvious disadvantage is unlikely, instead women appear reliant on 
intra-firm mobility when outcomes are subjective, and inter-firm mobility when 
outcomes are objective; with a number of penalties added to IVM. Men are unaffected 
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by mobility, recreating their conditions after each change. This suggests they reach 
attainment using some other mechanism, possibly firm or occupational tenure. This may 
be the product of inequality regimes as outlined by Acker (2006). While men see 
resources and supports at work, grooming them for higher positions, women must rely 
on the rewards tied to positions themselves, improving and worsening rewards 
depending on voluntary and involuntary movement.  
The findings above support those of previous authors, but add further nuance. Firstly, 
the output closely matches that of Cha (2014), women benefit over men when outcomes 
are objective. Regarding subjective outcomes, Gesthuizen (2009) finds no difference 
between men and women in VM’s effect on subjective outcomes, but expects women to 
see smaller returns on mobility. The tables above find only a few differences, but they 
run counter to the hypotheses presented here and in Gesthuizen (2009). Latzke et al. 
(2016) find that women are rewarded less pay for mobility when compared to men. 
They find that both women and men benefit subjectively from mobility equally. 
Although the difference in pay is significant, it is minor. The results above find the 
opposite, and when hours are considered neither men nor women benefit from mobility 
directly, although minor differences exist in subjective outcomes. Keith and 
McWilliams (1999) also find no gender differences in the “wage” premium tied to VM, 
their results for gender are identical but do not control for hours. In the results above, 
weekly working hours emerge as a significant point of contention. Thus models which 
consider hours may offer insight that models estimating pay cannot.  
How do these findings reflect the theories of Becker (2010) and Kalleberg and Marsden 
(2005)? It cannot be said that women use mobility to correct for overt or statistical 
discrimination for each outcome. Quitting (a voluntary inter-firm change) does not 
increase a woman’s pay without increasing her weekly hours. However, neither does 
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promotion reward men best, forcing women to look beyond their current firm to correct 
a mismatch. If attainment and career progress are “a person’s attempts to maximise their 
status and income” through mobility (Sørensen, 1975, Gesthuizen, 2009, Gesthuizen 
and Dagevos, 2008), it seems that women benefit slightly more from mobility than men. 
Both gain minor improvements in satisfaction and condition where they can. Acker’s 
(2006) inequality regime may come the closest to explaining the inter-firm results 
above. Women improve outcomes somewhat by changing employers, but intra-firm 
mobility within the inequality regime also affects women significantly; improving 
subjective measures through promotion, but carrying significant penalties with 
demotion. Men on the other hand, rely on separate mechanisms to reach attainment in 
the UK. I turn now to the impact of education on the relationship between mobility and 
outcomes.  
5.4.4. Education Differences in Subjective Outcomes: 
This section splits the models in Table 5.2 by education, running separate models for 
those with basic, secondary, and third level qualifications. Thurow (1976) proposes that 
educational credentials are not symbols of “ability” as suggested by marginal-
productivity theory, but rather symbols of training potential. Workers with lower 
qualifications are perceived as less deserving of training, through statistical 
discrimination. Further, Sørensen (1975, 1977, 1978) claims education groups differ in 
terms of “resources” attained before labour market entry. Those with lower education 
qualifications will see a disadvantage in the attainment they can reach though job 
mobility. The relevant hypotheses are listed at the start of this chapter. Results reveal 
complicated differences which go beyond what is expected by attainment theory and 
statistical discrimination. Again, education differences are configurations of mobility 
and outcomes. Although the theories above suggest those with higher qualifications 
should see the largest premiums, results are more complex. As before, complex bargains 
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emerge through mobility. Instead secondary educated workers rely on VM for 
subjective outcomes, while tertiary educated groups rely on VM for objective outcomes.  
The models below differ heavily in the number observations respondents. Models for 
those with a basic level of education rely on 5,500+ observations. Models for those with 
a secondary level of education draw on 15,700+ observations. Lastly, models for those 
with a third level education draw on 4,700+ observations. The R-squared figures do not 
differ significantly between educational groups, except for satisfaction with hours, 
where those with a basic education see 20% of the variance explained using the controls 
and those with a third level education see only 11% of the variance explained using the 
controls. The models are split in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8. The constant terms in each 
model provide insight into differences between groups. Workers with a basic education 
consistently list the highest levels of satisfaction, although the difference is 
insignificant. Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 list the estimates. 
Table 5.7: Results, UK 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of satisfaction with work, and satisfaction 
with pay. Models estimated separately for each educational group. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Basic lvl 
education: 
satisfaction 
with work 
Secondary lvl 
education: 
satisfaction with 
work 
Third lvl 
education: 
satisfaction 
with work 
Basic lvl 
education: 
satisfaction 
with pay 
Secondary lvl 
education: 
satisfaction with 
pay 
Third lvl 
education: 
satisfaction 
with pay 
       
2.inter-firm 
voluntary 
0.27*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.13** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) 
3.inter-firm 
involuntary 
0.02 0.14 -0.16 -0.01 0.04 0.18* 
 (0.13) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14) (0.07) (0.09) 
5.intra-firm 
voluntary 
0.32*** 0.18*** 0.10* 0.11 0.12*** 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) 
6.intra-firm 
involuntary 
-0.63** -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 0.17 -0.24 
 (0.31) (0.17) (0.15) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) 
Constant 1.37** 0.07 0.49 -0.54 -0.32 0.03 
 (0.55) (0.32) (0.55) (0.71) (0.31) (0.48) 
       
Observations 5,525 15,712 4,799 5,519 15,701 4,796 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.06 
Number of pid 798 2,252 733 798 2,252 733 
Waves 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 
Weights  Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models control for age, contract, firm size, whether the respondent has children, the size of the firm, the industry, and survey 
wave.  The models also control for general satisfaction with work (except for models predicting satisfaction with work). I also 
control for two macro variables- the unemployment rate, and the rate of economic growth. I do not list these estimates in the 
appendix due to limitations of space. However, a baseline model is listed in the appendix. 
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Table 5.8: Results, UK 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of satisfaction with security, and satisfaction 
with time. Models estimated separately for each educational group. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Basic lvl 
education: 
satisfaction 
with security 
Secondary lvl 
education: 
satisfaction with 
security 
Third lvl 
education: 
satisfaction 
with security 
Basic lvl 
education: 
satisfaction 
with time 
Secondary lvl 
education: 
satisfaction 
with time 
Third lvl 
education: 
satisfaction 
with time 
       
2.inter-firm 
voluntary 
0.13** 0.11*** 0.07 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.08* 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) 
3.inter-firm 
involuntary 
0.10 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.08 0.02 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11) 
5.intra-firm 
voluntary 
0.10 0.13*** 0.03 0.09* 0.06** -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
6.intra-firm 
involuntary 
0.93*** -0.11 -0.19 -0.26 0.06 -0.08 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.19) (0.47) (0.17) (0.15) 
Constant 0.47 -0.41 0.43 0.77 -0.19 -0.07 
 (0.56) (0.31) (0.56) (0.51) (0.30) (0.54) 
       
Observations 5,499 15,693 4,792 5,524 15,709 4,799 
R-squared 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.20 0.14 0.11 
Number of pid 798 2,252 733 798 2,252 733 
Wave 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 
Weights Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models control for age, contract, firm size, whether the respondent has children, the size of the firm, the industry, and survey 
wave. The models also control for general satisfaction with work (except for models predicting satisfaction with work).  I also 
control for two macro variables- the unemployment rate, and the rate of economic growth. I do not list these estimates in the 
appendix due to limitations of space. However, a baseline model is listed in the appendix. 
 
As before, workers see improved outcomes after VM and see no effect after IVM. 
Overall, third level educated workers appear to gain the least from VM, while those 
with a basic or secondary level of education gain the most; this is especially true for 
promotions (intra-firm VM). Three distinct education differences appear in the tables 
above. First, those with a basic level of education see a fall in satisfaction with work 
after demotion (intra-firm IVM), the other groups are unaffected. Second, those with a 
secondary level of education see improved satisfaction with pay, security, and time after 
a promotion (intra-firm VM); those with a third level education are not affected. Lastly, 
those with a basic education see increased satisfaction with security after a demotion 
(intra-firm IVM); the other groups are not affected. 
Starting with satisfaction with work, each group gains from VM roughly equally, 
improving their satisfaction with work by either quitting or taking a promotion. Thus 
each education group moves on to subjectively “better” work after the change. 
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Regarding IVM, workers are not affected, except for those with a basic level of 
education. After, a demotion, these workers move to subjectively worse jobs, 
independent of their fixed resources. The findings above (models 1, 2, and 3) go against 
attainment theory, where education groups are expected to benefit differently from 
mobility. 
Satisfaction with pay (models 4, 5, and 6) appears split by inter-firm and intra-firm 
mobility. Each education group benefits from inter-firm VM, but only those with a 
secondary level education see improved satisfaction after a promotion (intra-firm VM). 
The remaining groups are unaffected. Regarding IVM, each educational group is 
unaffected by IVM, although those with a third level education appear to benefit from 
involuntary change. Thus, secondary educated workers may be reliant on the firm when 
the outcome is related to pay, since they see satisfaction in pay beyond what can be 
explained by their (limited) resources. 
Satisfaction with security contains several differences. VM appears to benefit only those 
with a secondary or a basic education. Third level educated workers do not see 
increased security after VM. Those with a third level qualification may feel less 
attached to an employer, or more committed to an occupation, hence mobility in itself 
does not change feelings of security. Regarding IVM, education groups are not affected 
by the change, and those with a basic education even see increased satisfaction with 
security, which is most likely the product of avoided unemployment. 
Finally, regarding satisfaction with working time, VM increases satisfaction for all 
education groups. However, those with a third level education do not benefit from intra-
firm VM. IVM does not affect worker satisfaction with time.  
Overall, respondents with a third level education see few subjective benefits from 
mobility, especially promotions. Other education groups are more dependent on the 
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firm, gaining subjective satisfaction from both VM and IVM. Thus, I reject hypothesis 
3c. Education differences between workers exist, but they run counter to the hypothesis, 
suggesting workers without third level degrees gain more from mobility in terms of 
subjective outcomes. Further, I reject hypothesis 3d. Respondents with secondary or 
basic levels of education are unaffected by IVM, at times even benefitting from 
demotion. This suggests mobility for involuntary reasons sometimes moves workers to 
more satisfactory positions, given their fixed resources. Where attainment theory 
predicts high qualified workers will have the most to gain from mobility, the results 
above suggest these workers rely on mechanisms other than mobility to improve 
outcomes. It may be that other education groups, with less access to training and 
investment rely on the rewards tied to positions, whereas third level educated groups 
use other means to reach attainment. 
The next section considers objective outcomes, testing for differences between 
educational groups in models estimating gross pay, subjective health, and weekly hours 
worked. Here, significant differences offer insight, different to those above.   
5.4.5. Education Differences in Objective Outcomes: 
While the models above show third-level educated workers do not rely on firms, and are 
marginally affected by mobility, a different set of results emerge below. For those with 
a basic education, the estimates draw from 5,000+ observations from 790+ respondents. 
Models for secondary level educated workers are the largest, with 15,000+ observations 
from 2,200+ respondents. The smallest group is that of third level educated workers, 
with 4,000+ observations from 700+ respondents. The constant terms reveal a 
significant wage difference between education groups; those with a basic level of 
education earn the least, and those with a third level education earn the most. The same 
can be seen in the models estimating weekly hours worked. Those with a basic level or 
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secondary level education work 31 hours, those with a third level education work 43 
hours. These differences are significant, as the constants’ standard errors do not overlap. 
The estimates are listed below. 
Table 5.9: Results, UK 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of gross monthly pay, and subjective health. 
Models estimated separately for each educational group. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES basic education 
lvl: log gross 
monthly wage 
secondary 
education lvl: log 
gross monthly 
wage 
third lvl 
education: log 
gross monthly 
wage 
basic lvl 
education: 
health 
secondary lvl 
education: 
health 
third lvl 
education: 
health 
       
2.inter-firm 
voluntary 
0.00 0.01 0.03* 0.17** 0.09** 0.11* 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) 
3.inter-firm 
involuntary 
-0.08* -0.06** -0.11*** 0.04 0.12* 0.13 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.14) (0.07) (0.15) 
5.intra-firm 
voluntary 
0.03 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.06 -0.07 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) 
6.intra-firm 
involuntary 
-0.10** -0.07 -0.12* 0.10 0.12 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.30) (0.18) (0.18) 
Constant 7.06*** 7.31*** 7.71*** 5.67*** 5.05*** 6.03*** 
 (0.19) (0.10) (0.12) (0.72) (0.40) (0.70) 
       
Observations 5,525 15,712 4,799 4,815 13,765 4,208 
R-squared 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Number of pid 798 2,252 733 795 2,235 725 
Waves 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 
Weights Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models control for age, contract, firm size, whether the respondent has children, the size of the firm, the industry, and survey 
wave.  I also control for two macro variables- the unemployment rate, and the rate of economic growth. I do not list these estimates 
in the appendix due to limitations of space. However, a baseline model is listed in the appendix. 
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Table 5.10: Results, UK 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of gross weekly hours worked. Models 
estimated separately for each educational group. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES basic lvl education: weekly 
working hours 
secondary lvl education: weekly 
working hours 
third lvl education: weekly 
working hours 
    
2.inter-firm 
voluntary 
0.75* 0.38 0.41 
 (0.39) (0.24) (0.42) 
3.inter-firm 
involuntary 
-1.10 -0.41 -0.98 
 (0.87) (0.52) (1.06) 
5.intra-firm 
voluntary 
-0.43 0.03 -0.38 
 (0.47) (0.23) (0.49) 
6.intra-firm 
involuntary 
-1.34* -0.18 -0.86 
 (0.73) (0.88) (2.14) 
Constant 31.98*** 31.90*** 43.23*** 
 (3.63) (2.51) (3.09) 
    
Observations 5,520 15,694 4,786 
R-squared 0.05 0.03 0.03 
Number of pid 798 2,252 733 
Wave 10-18 10-18 10-18 
Weights Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models control for age, contract, firm size, whether the respondent has children, the size of the firm, the industry, and survey 
wave.  I also control for two macro variables- the unemployment rate, and the rate of economic growth. I do not list these estimates 
in the appendix due to limitations of space. However, a baseline model is listed in the appendix. 
 
The output above resembles the objective models discussed in the first section, where 
VM contains minor premiums but IVM has significant penalties for respondents. 
Regarding education, 5 differences stand out, although few are in line with predictions 
made by attainment theory. First, third level educated workers increase gross monthly 
pay through VM, unlike the other groups. Second, the gross monthly pay of those with a 
secondary level degree is unaffected by intra-firm IVM, the other education groups are 
negatively affected by the change. Third, respondents with a secondary level education 
improve subjective health through inter firm IVM, the other groups are unaffected. 
Lastly, respondents with a basic education see significant changes in weekly working 
hours, with an increase following VM, and a decrease following IVM. The other 
educational groups are unaffected by the change. 
 The first set of models estimates objective gross monthly pay (Models 1, 2, and 3  
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Table 5.9). Regarding VM, only those with a third level education see positive changes 
in gross monthly pay, the other education groups are unaffected, as predicted by 
attainment theory. Those with a basic level of education or a secondary level of 
education see no change in gross monthly wages following VM. This suggests 
respondents with the most “resources” are better able to navigate vacancies to make 
“gains”. These vacancies contain premiums which cannot be explained by worker 
characteristics themselves. Regarding IVM, all education groups see a wage penalty, 
losing gross monthly wages by roughly 7%. This too is not predicted by attainment 
theory which assumes a fall in wages, but expects a fall that affects non-tertiary 
educated groups the most. Strangely, secondary level educated workers see no wage 
penalty tied to demotion (intra-firm IVM), while other education groups fall into lower 
paid vacancies that do not match their resources. 
The next set of estimates considers subjective health as an outcome (models 4, 5, and 6 
in Table 5.9). Few differences exist in terms of VM, education groups all benefit in 
terms of subjective health, moving to jobs with better working conditions following the 
change. As mentioned, this runs counter to attainment theory, which expects higher 
educated respondents to gain more from VM than those with less education (or 
resources). Regarding IVM, few differences emerge between education groups except 
that secondary educated workers see improved health outcomes following the change, 
suggesting dismissal, firm closure, and redundancy leads workers with poor health into 
better working conditions following the change; as mentioned, firms which are about to 
close may contain poorer conditions than the average firm. Further, respondents who are 
about to be laid-off may work in poorer conditions than the average worker.  
Lastly, the final set of estimates (models 1, 2, and 3 Table 5.10) considers weekly hours 
worked. Only those with a basic education are affected by mobility, the remaining 
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educational types are able to recreate their working hours in a new job. Respondents 
with a basic education gain hours after VM but lose hours after IVM. These results 
should be considered alongside the results for pay; those with a basic education see no 
change in pay despite an increase in weekly hours after a change. Those with third level 
education see an increase in pay, without an increase in hours.  
The output suggests those with a tertiary education gain the most from VM, while those 
with a basic or tertiary education see fewer effects on outcomes. Regarding IVM, all 
groups see a fall in pay, although secondary educated groups are protected when the 
change occurs with the same employer (demotion). Crucially, IVM does not reduce 
working hours, despite reductions in pay for each group. This suggests workers move to 
vacancies with lower pay, which cannot be explained by their fixed resources (like 
education). Education differences among groups are more apparent in objective models, 
and more in line with previous hypotheses. Workers with a third level degree gain the 
most from VM, and indeed see an increase in wages, without an increase in weekly 
working hours. Those with a basic education gain little from VM, and maintain the 
same pay while seeing increased weekly working hours. Those with a secondary level 
of education are somewhat protected from IVM, seeing no change in pay and no change 
in weekly hours. I accept hypothesis 3c. Those with a third level degree have an 
advantage over educational groups, at least for inter-firm mobility. I reject hypothesis 
3d. IVM has an effect on workers, but this effect applies uniformly across education 
groups, regardless of resources. The findings above capture the predictions made by 
attainment theory, and somewhat resemble the statistical discrimination described by 
Thurow (1976), although promotions are a crucial part of his theory, a type of mobility 
which yields no significant change in pay. 
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5.4.6. Education and Mobility in the UK: 
Several differences emerge in the output above. First, results illustrate the complexity of 
mobility-outcomes discussed previously. There is a mismatch between the group which 
improve subjective outcomes (secondary level education groups) and the group 
improving objective outcomes (tertiary level educated groups), yet theory predicts that 
workers should gain in both. Second, linked to the first point, attainment theory expects 
tertiary educated workers to gain the most when compared to secondary educated 
workers, yet results suggest both groups see advantages and disadvantages in the 
mobility-outcomes relationship. 
It could be that workers with non-tertiary degrees are particularly reliant on mobility to 
attain satisfactory jobs, while those with a third level degree see satisfactory jobs as 
standard. As with women in the previous section, non-tertiary groups may be less 
inclined to receive training and as a result rely on mobility within the firm to move to 
satisfactory positions. When outcomes are objective, this group’s wages are subject to 
market competition and efficiency, and so do not contain added premium beyond the 
worker’s “fixed worth”.  
Similar findings do not emerge in the wider literature. Gesthuizen (2009) finds no 
difference in the “premium” tied to VM depending on worker “years of education”, 
using data from the Netherlands. His results suggest that workers with few years of 
education gain roughly as much utility as better educated workers, between and within 
firms (also using subjective outcomes). Latzke et al. (2016) consider class differences in 
mobility’s impact on satisfaction with work and gross pay. The sample is taken from 
Germany. Professional, white collar and blue collar categories are compared. The 
authors find no class differences in VM’s impact on satisfaction with work, but find 
significant class differences in the pay-premium attached to mobility. Here professionals 
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earn the most after a change, followed by white collar workers, and lastly blue collar 
workers. Importantly, all groups benefit but their “premiums” are significantly different 
from one another. Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) report the opposite, considering the return 
on VM in Germany and the UK. In both countries the authors claim low-paid workers 
see the highest returns on inter-firm VM. Results for the UK also show that intra-firm 
mobility benefits low-paid workers the most. The results presented in this chapter are 
closer aligned to Latzke et al. (2016) and their analysis of Germany than Pavlopoulos et 
al. (2014) and their analysis of Germany and the UK, although this thesis’ definition of 
job mobility is also closer tied to Latzke et al. (2016) than Pavlopoulos et al. (2014).  
Regarding the theories cited, the subjective models (and several of the articles above) 
cast doubt over the theory of attainment proposed by Sørensen (1975, 1977, 1978). 
Specifically regarding educational differences, those with tertiary education should 
benefit the most from VM, while those with a basic education should see the smallest 
returns. Education and skills are important resources which capture “...the extent to 
which they are able to take advantage of the opportunities [in a given labour 
market]”((Sørensen, 1977) p 971). He further suggests “...one should expect that the 
effect of a major determinant of resources such as education should have an observed 
effect on status that increases with time in the labor force” (p 975). Instead, results 
reveal that secondary educated workers appear to make the largest gains in subjective 
outcomes from VM. They are also able to improve their conditions within the firm, 
while the tertiary educated workers only “gain” through VM between firms, if at all.  
The results for objective models offer some support to attainment theory, and further 
support the theories laid out by Thurow (1976) in terms of statistical discrimination. 
Workers with a third level of education are able to increase their pay (possibly through 
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longer hours), while other groups are seen as less productive and therefore less 
deserving.  
The results between education groups further highlight the core argument in this thesis, 
attainment theory may apply to some worker types, but the majority of mobility in the 
UK is used to correct job mismatch and bargain over conditions and responsibilities. 
Non-tertiary level education groups use mobility to make gains in subjective feelings 
about time, pay, work, and security, possibly because they rely on mobility events to 
move into vacancies with better conditions. Few of these improvements take the form of 
objectively higher pay, lower hours, and better conditions (although subjective health 
indicates inter-firm changes improve the outcome). Thus movement in the UK, mobility 
is a process of finding subjectively better working conditions or more interesting work, 
not attainment as proposed by utility driven models.  
5.5. Summary 
The previous chapter outlined the key features of the UK system, which were further 
developed in this chapter. The market is highly mobile, and most of this mobility is 
voluntary, a finding similar to previous authors researching mobility in liberal market 
economies. Further, worker outcomes in the UK are less equal than they are in 
coordinated Germany, suggesting that the labour market is individualised and less 
predictable overall. Lastly, the institutions in the UK push for individual bargaining 
which likely shapes not only outcomes, but also the rate of mobility. The argument at 
the end of that chapter proposed that the UK’s rate of mobility is shaped by the varied 
nature of outcomes, and mobility is driven by a desire to improve outcomes, using 
individualized bargaining. This chapter tackles the main research question “what do 
workers get from job mobility in the UK?” 
185 
 
The theory of attainment would see the UK’s mobile labour market as a structure with 
more vacancies, and more utility tied to the process of moving. At its heart, voluntary 
mobility is high because it leads to better jobs. However, results suggest a more 
nuanced answer. There are two complexities with the assumption that mobility leads 
workers to better jobs (noted in the literature review). First, results show that VM 
affects some outcomes over others, suggesting workers make trades in outcomes using 
mobility. For example, VM has a strong positive effect on worker satisfaction with 
work. However, it also has a strong positive effect on the weekly hours respondents 
must work. Here, workers make trades, increasing some outcomes but sacrificing in 
other outcomes. Second, results show that subjective and objective measures of the 
same outcome react differently to VM. Results show VM produces several positive and 
significant effects on subjective outcomes, but few significant effects on objective 
measures of the same outcome. This is most evident in the relationship between 
subjective pay and objective pay. VM has a strong positive effect on the subjective 
outcome, while barely affecting the objective measure of the same outcome. The two 
complexities are not addressed in the theoretical literature and are not considered by 
previous authors who use the theory, despite the fact that they emerge in empirical 
works (Gesthuizen and Dagevos, 2008, Latzke et al., 2016).  
Instead, British workers use mobility to bargain with employers, compromising with 
certain outcomes for gains in others. This is confirmed by the first configuration 
discussed above, the effect of mobility types on outcomes. Since the British labour 
market is largely governed by market forces, respondents cannot gain premiums in pay 
(beyond the efficiency wages found in intra-firm mobility). As a result, they turn to 
bargains tied to responsibility and working conditions overall, ensuring their pay better 
matches their responsibility in new vacancies. Because of this, the “rewards” tied to VM 
appear largely subjective, with few objective improvements after VM. Further IVM is 
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not without penalties, with significant falls in wages tied to IVM. This is further 
supported by the nuance of inter-firm and intra-firm mobility. The act of quitting has a 
stronger effect than the act of promotion because working conditions vary more 
between firms that they do within them. Workers who take promotions in the same firm 
report better working conditions, but not better than those who quit. Overall the results 
suggest internal structures improve objective outcomes best (as argued by efficiency 
wage theory), while external structures improve subjective outcomes best. Similar 
results are reported by Gesthuizen and Dagevos (2008) and Kalleberg and Mastekaasa 
(2001), although neither comments on the distinction. The crux of the UK market is one 
where mobile workers make bargains for better working conditions and longer hours, 
but not attainment as it appears in the literature, at least in the immediate sense.  
This is further confirmed when looking at differences between workers. The second 
configuration looked at the importance of worker-characteristics. Although Sørensen 
(1975) accepts worker inequality in the distribution of attainment, he presents gender or 
class differences as differences at the point of skill acquisition, not at the point of 
mobility itself. Instead Hachen (1990) and Acker (2006) consider the inequalities past 
the point of skill acquisition, within the wider market citing overt and statistical 
discrimination. Yet, women appear to gain more from mobility than men, counter to 
predictions. Women see larger returns from voluntary mobility and larger penalties from 
involuntary mobility, while men are hardly affected. Expanding the models further 
women improve hours through mobility, thereby earning more. To say that men hold an 
advantage over women in the premiums tied to VM would be inaccurate. It could be 
that the structure of inequality as presented by Acker (2006) make women more 
dependent on mobility, and men more dependent on training and “grooming”, where 
mobility is less able to improve outcomes. 
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Differences between education groups reveal a similar relationship. Education 
differences emerge in the mobility-outcomes relationship, but these are affected by the 
complexities mentioned earlier. Although attainment theory and statistical 
discrimination expect higher premiums to go to those with a third level education, 
results reveal that different groups benefit from VM depending on the outcome. 
Secondary level educated workers gain subjective improvements from mobility, while 
third level educated workers are hardly affected by VM when outcomes are subjective. 
This makes sense; secondary educated workers may rely on the firm more than third 
level educated workers who rely on occupational protections, or better opportunities 
elsewhere. Further, the variance of working conditions for secondary level educated 
workers is likely wider than third level educated workers, who may be operating in 
more predictable markets, in the same argument as that which applied to the men above, 
third level educated workers may be improving outcomes using mechanisms other than 
mobility, like training or training.  
This picture changes when outcomes are objective, third level educated workers gain 
objectively from inter-firm mobility, without increasing their working hours; but 
secondary level educated workers see no objective financial gain in VM, suggesting 
their wages are closely tied to their personal characteristics. This finding too supports 
the argument of the chapter, non-tertiary level educated groups (and to lesser extent, 
women) make gains in subjective outcomes through mobility, while third level educated 
groups (and men) are able to make gains in objective outcomes, above their worth. As 
mentioned, different groups use mobility to improve outcomes, but attainment in the 
sense of higher earnings through mobility, is specific to those with a third level 
education. The next chapter considers the German case, using the German Socio-
Economic Panel to estimate worker return on mobility, answering the research 
questions considered throughout the British chapter.  
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6. Germany 
This chapter develops the argument from chapter 4 with the German case in mind. 
Chapter 5 explored the dynamics of mobility and outcomes in the UK, arguing that 
mobility lead to improved subjective outcomes, which did not materialise in terms of 
objective outcomes. The current chapter explores the German case, where mobility is 
uncommon and outcomes are more equal, it contains a similar argument. Germany’s 
low rate of mobility stems from its minor returns from mobility since working 
conditions and pay are set at the industry level (Streeck, 2009b). Both pay and working 
conditions rely on collective bargains and are not individually bargained for. As a result 
voluntary movement has a minor effect on outcomes and workers remain in the same 
job with the same employer for longer, pursuing promotions with a given structure.  
As before, the chapter considers two configurations of the mobility-outcomes 
relationship. First, it explores the relationship between mobility types and outcomes, 
which go beyond the typical voluntary-involuntary dimension. Second, it outlines the 
gender and education differences in the relationship between mobility and outcomes. In 
each configuration, a central assumption in attainment theory is tackled. This is that 
voluntary (and involuntary) mobility leads to good (and bad) jobs. In this view, no 
bargains or conflict exist between workers and employers, and all vacancies lead 
workers to better jobs. The two complexities with this assumption have been discussed 
throughout this work. First, VM is not utilitarian and differs in effectiveness on 
outcomes; this point is especially evident in the German output. Second, there is a 
mismatch between subjective outcomes and objective measures of the same outcome. 
Curiously, the effect in Germany runs counter to the effect in the UK, yet again, pay is a 
good example. VM has no effect on subjective satisfaction with pay, the measure is 
completely unaffected by mobility. However, when the measures consider gross weekly 
wages, VM has a strong positive effect.  
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The key argument of the chapter goes as follows; in Germany, workers gain little from 
mobility since outcomes are roughly standardised. VM has positive and negative effects 
on subjective outcomes, suggesting workers who leave the firm must make 
compromises in new positions while finding overall satisfying work. Meanwhile intra-
firm mobility has strong positive effect on earnings. Hence, Germany’s low rate of 
mobility stems from the mixed effects of inter-firm mobility coupled with the strong 
effect of intra-firm mobility on objective outcomes. This argument is slightly different 
to the one presented for the UK, where mobility affects almost all subjective outcomes, 
but rarely affects objective outcomes.  
The chapter reports strong support for efficiency wage theory and internal labour market 
theory (Althauser and Kalleberg, 1981, Akerlof and Yellen, 1986) where intra-firm 
mobility correlates with a positive change in wages, beyond what can be explained by 
worker characteristics. However these theories fail in predicting the impact of IVM, 
which has no effect on any of the outcomes used, suggesting workers are able to fully 
recreate their pay and conditions after an involuntary change (assuming they avoid long 
term unemployment). One distinct characteristic of the German output is the mixed 
effect mobility has on subjective outcomes. 
The argument is further supported by models considering differences between workers. 
Comparing genders, women and men see identical objective premiums for intra-firm 
mobility, while women are largely unaffected by mobility in terms of subjective 
outcomes. Although the labour market is less open than the UK’s, collective bargaining 
ensures both genders see the same premiums for intra-firm change. However, IVM 
disproportionately affects the working hours of women. Comparing education groups, 
secondary level educated workers see the highest returns from VM, suggesting these 
workers move between clearly defined pay brackets. Third level educated workers are 
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unaffected by mobility itself, suggesting they improve outcomes through some other 
mechanism, possibly tenure or training. The crux of the German model is its emphasis 
on intra-firm mobility, with strong rewards for promotions, and mixed results for quits.   
Germany’s “learning” production regime (O Riain, 2011), its collectivist form of 
bargaining (Hall and Soskice, 2001)  and its Christian Democratic welfare state 
emphasise protection for labour market insiders (usually male breadwinners). These 
protections foster long term careers with minimal interruption, and limit the amount of 
mobility in Germany as working conditions differ little between firms. The results 
throughout this chapter best resemble efficiency wage theory, where employers 
internalise the workforce as much as possible. Attainment theory and value-rewards 
theory do not emerge, as workers make compromises after every move. The section 
below lists the hypotheses, presents the data, discusses the results, and the German 
market overall. Mobility types are explored first, differences between workers are 
considered later.   
6.1. Hypotheses and Aims: 
The aims and hypotheses of this chapter are discussed in depth in the literature review 
(chapter 2). Each set of hypotheses is tied to a research aim; these are listed below for 
reference.   
1) To estimate the relationship between job mobility and outcomes. 
a) Hypothesis 1a: Voluntary mobility will have a positive effect on outcomes 
(Attainment theory).  
b) Hypothesis 1b: Voluntary mobility will differ based on movement between and 
within firms. Intra-firm mobility will have a positive effect on objective outcomes 
(Efficiency Wage theory/Internal Labour Market theory)  
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c) Hypothesis 1c: Voluntary inter-firm mobility will have a positive effect on 
subjective outcomes (Job mismatch).   
d) Hypothesis 2a: Involuntary mobility will have a negative effect on outcomes 
(Attainment theory/Values-Rewards theory). 
e) Hypothesis 2c: Inter-firm involuntary mobility will have a negative effect on 
subjective outcomes (Job mismatch). 
2) To test between-worker differences in this relationship: 
a) Hypothesis 3a: Gender differences will exist between workers. Men will benefit 
from voluntary mobility more than women. 
b) Hypothesis 3b: Men will be hindered by involuntary mobility less than women. 
c) Hypothesis 3c: Education differences will exist between workers. Those with a 
third level education will benefit from voluntary mobility more than those 
without.  
d) Hypothesis 3d: Those with a third level education will be hindered by 
involuntary mobility less than those without. 
Overall, the proposed argument is supported by 4 findings, which emerge from the 
hypotheses. First, VM contains a mix of positive and negative effects on outcomes (this 
is the first complexity mentioned earlier). Workers who move voluntarily gain in 
subjective feelings about work, but lose in subjective feelings about time. Regarding 
objective outcomes, VM has mixed effects on gross monthly pay, and weekly hours 
depending on whether workers leave their employer. Second, involuntary movement 
has no negative impact on outcomes whatsoever. Third, there is nuance to VM which 
suggests workers make bargains based on the type of mobility they experience. Intra-
firm mobility (promotion) has no effect on subjective outcomes, but affects objective 
outcomes positively. Inter-firm mobility has significant positive effects for (some) 
subjective outcomes, but contains negative effects for objective outcomes, suggesting 
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those who leave an employer must compromise elsewhere. Here workers make “gains” 
by moving to “interesting” jobs, but lose weekly working hours and, as a result, gross 
monthly pay. Fourth, differences between workers are minor, but can be summarised in 
terms of time (for gender) and pay (for education).  
6.2. Data and Variables:  
The full discussion of the analytical strategy and research design is presented in chapter 
3 (p 58). Descriptive statistics for each outcome can be found in chapter 4 (Table 4.9 on 
p 118). Table 6.1 lists the variables considered in each of the models below. The sample 
is drawn from nine rounds from the SOEP (2000-2008). Respondents must appear in a 
minimum of eight rounds to be considered in the sample. 
Table 6.1 Summary statistics of variables used for Germany. (SOEP 2000-2008) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ref: Same job, same employer     
Changed employer, voluntary 38,683 0.023 0.15 0 1 
Changed employer, involuntary 38,683 0.01 0.097 0 1 
Changed job, kept employer 38,683 0.007 0.084 0 1 
            
z_work satisfaction  38,288  -0.010   0.947 -3.562  1.460  
z_pay satisfaction 38,434 0.000 0.952 -3.144 1.654 
z_time satisfaction 38.585 0.0156 0.945 -2.861 1.577 
      
Weekly number of hours worked 38,687 41.683 10.931 0 143.173 
Gross monthly pay 34,720 2772.464 1584.566 0 50,000 
Log gross monthly wage 34,686 7.796 0.519 5.030 10.819 
      
w11103 (weights) 38,669 1.071 0.351 0 9 
      
Educ: (ref: basic)         
secondary-vocational 38,369 0.438 0.496 0 1 
tertiary 38,369 0.239 0.427 0 1 
      
Agecat ref: (16-30)      
31-45 38,683 0.496 0.5 0 1 
46-65 38,683 0.438 0.496 0 1 
66-84 38,683 0.004 0.06 0 1 
      
Children (ref: no children)           
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1 38,683 0.208 0.406 0 1 
2 38,683 0.167 0.373 0 1 
3+ 38,683 0.047 0.212 0 1 
            
Ref: permanent      
temporary 34,982 0.024 0.153 0 1 
      
Firmsize (Ref: 1-20)           
20-200 38,210 0.293 0.455 0 1 
200-2000 38,210 0.246 0.431 0 1 
2000+ 38,210 0.238 0.426 0 1 
      
isco10           
professionals 38,295 0.176 0.381 0 1 
technicians 38,295 0.242 0.428 0 1 
clerical workers 38,295 0.117 0.321 0 1 
services and sales 38,295 0.081 0.273 0 1 
skilled agriculture 38,295 0.008 0.09 0 1 
craft and related work 38,295 0.167 0.373 0 1 
plant and machinery workers 38,295 0.088 0.284 0 1 
elementary workers 38,295 0.054 0.225 0 1 
      
Syear (ref: 2000)         
2001 38,683 0.112 0.315 0 1 
2002 38,683 0.113 0.316 0 1 
2003 38,683 0.112 0.316 0 1 
2004 38,683 0.113 0.316 0 1 
2005 38,683 0.113 0.317 0 1 
2006 38,683 0.113 0.317 0 1 
2007 38,683 0.113 0.317 0 1 
2008 38,683 0.104 0.305 0 1 
      
industry           
[2] Energy 37,817 0.013 0.114 0 1 
[3] Mining 37,817 0.004 0.061 0 1 
[4] Manufacturing 37,817 0.218 0.413 0 1 
[5] Construction 37,817 0.133 0.34 0 1 
[6] Trade 37,817 0.132 0.338 0 1 
[7] Transport 37,817 0.052 0.223 0 1 
[8] Banking 37,817 0.044 0.205 0 1 
[9] Services 37,817 0.391 0.488 0 1 
 
The baseline number of observations stands at 38,000+.  Three subjective outcomes are 
used throughout the chapter, satisfaction with work, pay, and hours, which are 
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converted to z-scores. Three objective outcomes measuring gross monthly pay, 
subjective health, and the number of hours worked per week are also used. Health is a 
subjective outcome, which acts as a proxy for working conditions. The SOEP-long file 
does not consider the weekly number of hours worked, but considers annual hours 
worked. As noted in the methodology, this value is divided by 52 in order to make the 
measure more comparable with the British case. This is a compromise. VM and IVM 
are determined subjectively. The strategy is similar to Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) 
and is summarised in Table 3.6 on p 74. Respondents who move for family or other 
reasons are listed in the “other” category. The SOEP does not distinguish between 
voluntary and involuntary changes within the firm (Kattenbach et al., 2014). Therefore, 
promotions, demotions, and lateral movements are considered together in one category, 
labelled “changed job, kept employer”.  
The models are estimated using linear fixed-effects and are split into two sets, 
subjective outcomes and objective outcomes which are considered separately. Since 
linear fixed-effects models cannot use between-respondent variance, the models are 
unbiased but inefficient (Allison, 2009). As a result estimates with p-values less than 
0.1 are considered statistically significant, instead of the traditional 0.05 threshold. 
6.3. Types of Mobility and Outcomes: 
This section considers the first aim and the first configuration between mobility and 
outcomes. It presents the effects of VM and IVM on outcomes between and within 
firms.  
6.3.1. Fixed-effects Estimates and Subjective Outcomes: 
Results are summarised in Table 6.2, the estimates draw on 32,500+ observations, 
clustered by 4,000+ respondents. When estimating the effect of intra-firm mobility, the 
standard errors are higher, since this category contains far fewer observations than the 
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other mobility types. Further, intra-firm mobility is especially sensitive since it contains 
a mix of mobility types. All estimates are weighted using the panel weight w11103, 
which corrects for attrition. The R-squared values are low with only 2% and 3% of 
variance explained for satisfaction with work and satisfaction with personal time, 
respectively. Satisfaction with pay is an exception with 10% of variance explained using 
the measures. With this in mind, significant relationships exist in the models but they do 
not predict outcomes well, and may have limited usefulness, at least in the case for 
Germany. This supports the argument of the chapter; mobility is not a strong predictor 
of subjective outcomes. 
Table 6.2 Results, Germany 2000-2008: Estimated fixed-effects of moving on subjective outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES z-score satisfaction with work z-score satisfaction with pay z-score satisfaction with time 
    
Inter-firm voluntary  0.27*** 0.02 -0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Inter-firm involuntary 0.12** -0.02 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Intra-firm change 0.02 0.01 -0.12** 
 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 0.09 0.25 0.16 
 (0.18) (0.25) (0.20) 
    
Observations 32,908 32,749 32,871 
R-squared 0.02 0.10 0.03 
Number of pid 4,181 4,180 4,181 
Weight w11103 w11103 w11103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models control for age, contract type, the number of children in the house, the size of the firm, the year of the survey, the industry 
worked, and the occupation of the individual. All models controls for general worker satisfaction with work (except models 
predicting satisfaction with work). Models originally controlled for economic growth and unemployment rates. However, since 
these vary little throughout the panel both measures were dropped due to collinearity with the survey year dummies. A full model is 
listed in Table 1.3 of the appendix.  
 
Overall, mobility has a minor effect on outcomes and depends on whether the change 
occurs in the same employer, or a new employer. This dimension appears more 
important than whether the change is voluntary or not. The most obvious result is the 
mixed effect of VM, which highlights the first complexity mentioned throughout this 
work; mobility does not have a uniform effect across outcomes.  
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Starting with satisfaction with work (model 1) VM between firms has a positive effect, 
but so does IVM (intra-firm mobility has no impact on satisfaction with work). Moving 
to a new employer, either voluntarily or involuntarily improves satisfaction with work, 
beyond what can be explained by worker characteristics alone. Taking a new job with 
the same employer has no effect on satisfaction with work. Inter-firm mobility may be 
driven by job mismatch, or dissatisfaction with an employer instead of attainment as it’s 
described in the literature. 
Satisfaction with pay (model 2) is completely unaffected by mobility. Respondents, who 
quit or resign, move to equally satisfactory jobs with a new employer. This suggests pay 
is not affected by mobility. It could also be that whatever rewards the new vacancy 
offers are explained by personal characteristics of the worker, like experience, 
education, or class, instead of mobility itself. Lastly, the result could be due to the 
standardised working conditions and responsibilities in Germany, which align perfectly 
with pay after a change. Thus satisfaction does not change as workers expect changes in 
pay with corresponding changes in responsibility. IVM too has no effect on outcomes. 
Respondents who lose their job to redundancy, firm closure, or dismissal see no change 
to their satisfaction with pay, suggesting they are able to recreate their conditions 
roughly equally. Overall it could be that German workers spend less effort thinking 
about pay, or that they move through carefully defined pay categories, making pay 
roughly predictable, which would explain the lack of effect for quits, promotions, and 
dismissals.  
Satisfaction with time (model 3) is negatively affected by mobility, suggesting workers 
may have to work longer or shorter hours than desired (the next section considers the 
effect of mobility on hours). VM to a new employer lowers satisfaction with time. This 
suggests quitting a job means compromising on satisfaction with time. It could be, 
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moving to a new employer means workers must invest more time in the new position, 
leaving less personal time. The reverse could also be true; workers may need to build up 
tenure before getting longer hours, entering a new firm would mean workers are not 
getting enough hours. In any case VM leads workers to more satisfying work (model 1) 
at the expense of satisfaction with time (model 3). Taking a new position with the same 
employer (intra-firm) also negatively affects satisfaction with time, which may be the 
result of greater responsibility and longer working hours tied to a promotion. Gross 
weekly working hours are considered later, for the moment VM’s effect on time runs 
counter to the hypothesis.  IVM appears to have no impact on satisfaction with time, 
suggesting workers are able to recreate their conditions after an involuntary change to a 
new employer.  
As a summary, the models provide mixed results. I reject hypothesis 1a, results show 
that VM is nuanced, changes between firms yield different results to changes within 
firms. However, I also reject hypothesis 1c. Although inter-firm VM has a stronger 
effect on satisfaction with work, it reveals bargains, where workers trade satisfaction 
with time for satisfaction with work. Beyond this intra-firm mobility has no effect on 
subjective outcomes, except for a negative effect on satisfaction with time, which could 
stem from increased responsibility. I also reject hypothesis 2a. From the output, it’s 
clear that IVM has no effect on subjective outcomes; workers are able to recreate their 
conditions after an involuntary change to a new employer. Crucially, this group contains 
workers who move directly to a new form of employment, and so is not representative 
of the wider unemployment experience in Germany.  
The findings above support the argument of the chapter. German workers are moving 
less than British workers, partly because of EPL, but also because there are few 
consequences to mobility. VM is not an adequate strategy for improving working 
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conditions, partially because working conditions vary less than the UK, and partially 
because they are set at an industry level. Although authors have criticised the German 
model for its creeping liberalisation (Streeck, 2009b), the output shows that industrial 
relations still support predictable working conditions and tenured forms of work, at least 
in the models above (especially when compared to the UK (Streeck, 2009b, Bosch et 
al., 2009, Lehndorff et al., 2009)). Further, results clearly illustrate the first complexity 
in assuming VM leads to “better jobs”. The theoretical literature sees mobility as fuelled 
by utility, where mobility takes place if positive changes occur for workers. However, 
the empirical literature shows that mobility does not affect all outcomes equally, and 
often workers make trades through mobility. In the models above, they trade 
satisfaction with time (which decreases) for satisfaction with work (which increases). 
IVM has no effect on outcomes, a finding which runs counter to several hypotheses, 
including attainment theory by Sørensen (1975) and values-rewards theory presented by 
Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001). Both argue involuntary mobility should have 
negative effects on “rewards”. This is also a central claim in the sociological perspective 
of labour markets; if inequality is tied to vacancies instead of workers, then moving 
down the structure of vacancies should punish workers beyond their fixed 
characteristics. This emerges in the British models when predicting pay, but not in the 
British models predicting subjective outcomes, nor the German models predicting 
subjective outcomes. A number of factors could be causing the effect.  
First, workers may be moving from poor quality jobs to overall better conditions, 
organisations which are approaching firm closure or mass layoffs may also be ones with 
poor working conditions, hence workers see themselves as “breaking even” after a 
move. Second, German working conditions vary little between firms; workers use 
occupational licenses (citing an example Marsden (1999) considers German welders) to 
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move through carefully defined occupations which differ little. Third, the effect could 
be the result of workers comparing themselves against the prospect of moving into long 
term unemployment, as argued (but ultimately dropped) by Kalleberg and Mastekaasa 
(2001).  
Germany does not resemble the UK, this is especially true for models predicting 
satisfaction with pay (model 2), and satisfaction with time (model 3). Values-rewards 
theory and attainment theory are both of limited use in Germany, but both have 
predictive power in the UK. The next section substitutes the subjective outcomes above 
for objective measures of the same outcome, in an effort to understand the effects in 
greater detail. Time emerges as an important outcome in the models above, the next 
section pays considerable attention to its objective measure. 
6.3.2. Fixed-effects Estimates and Objective Outcomes: 
This section considers gross monthly wages, subjective health, and the weekly hours 
normally worked by respondents. Models draw on 30,000+ observations from 4,000+ 
respondents. The R-squared value, or the portion of the variance explained by the 
independent measures differs from 1% (hours) to 18% (log hourly wages). This 
suggests the variables used explain variance in pay well, but not weekly hours worked, 
or health. The results are summarised in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3 Results, Germany 2000-2008: Estimated fixed-effect of moving on objective outcomes. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log gross monthly 
pay 
Satisfaction with health Annual hours worked, e11101 (divided by 52 
for weekly hours) 
    
2.Inter-firm voluntary  -0.02* -0.13** -1.06** 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.34) 
3.Inter-firm 
involuntary 
-0.01 0.04 -4.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.56) 
5.Intra-firm change 0.07*** 0.11 1.67* 
 
 
(0.02) (0.10) (0.91) 
Constant 7.71*** 7.51*** 43.03*** 
 (0.04) (0.37) (0.54) 
    
Observations 30,013 32,898 33,522 
R-squared 0.18 0.11 0.01 
Number of pid 4,066 4,181 4,223 
Weight w11103 w11103 w11103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models control for age, contract type, the number of children in the house, the size of the firm, the year of the survey, the industry 
worked, and the occupation of the individual. Models originally controlled for economic growth and unemployment rate. However, 
since these vary little throughout the panel, both measures were dropped due collinearity with the survey year dummies. Full model 
is listed in Table 1.4 of the appendix. 
 
 
The previous dimension of inter and intra-firm mobility emerges again. It seems that the 
dimension is more important than the voluntary-involuntary dimension. Inter-firm 
changes lower the pay, health, and hours of workers. Intra-firm mobility increases the 
pay and hours of workers. Both of the complexities with treating seeing mobility as 
driven by utility emerge. The first is the negative effect mobility has on certain 
outcomes. The second is the mismatch between subjective and objective measures of 
the same outcome. Results show intra-firm mobility itself rewards objective outcomes, 
while inter-firm mobility contains significant penalties which cannot be explained by 
worker characteristics. Strangest of all, is the fact that IVM has no effect on pay or 
health. 
Starting with gross monthly pay (model 1) respondents who change firms for voluntary 
reasons see a 2% fall in gross monthly wages. The finding runs counter to attainment 
theory, human capital theory, and the theory of values-rewards. Respondents who 
change employer for involuntary reasons, firm closure, dismissal and redundancy do not 
see a fall in earnings and are able to recreate their pay with a new employer. Lastly, 
those who move with the same employer earn a 7% increase in gross monthly wages, a 
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finding that supports efficiency wage theory, where employers pay above market price 
in an effort to internalise worker skill and knowledge.  
Regarding subjective health (model 2); respondents who quit their job move to firms 
with poorer working conditions. This finding supports the argument that VM contains 
trade-offs, where workers gain more satisfying work (previous models), for poorer 
conditions. Those who lose their job and move to a new firm see no change in health, 
suggesting they recreate their conditions with new employers. Those who take a job 
with the same employer see no significant change in health, suggesting the see similar 
working conditions. This too makes sense, since working conditions within the firm 
likely vary less than they do between firms. However, this finding goes against the 
predictions made by attainment theory. 
In terms of weekly hours worked (model 3), inter-firm mobility lowers hours 
significantly, while intra-firm mobility increases hours significantly. Respondents who 
quit and move to a new employer, see a fall in weekly hours, which could explain the 
fall in gross monthly wages (running the model for gross pay while controlling for 
hours confirms this, the effect disappears). However, the effect is far larger for workers 
who change firms for involuntary reasons. When respondents lose their job to dismissal 
or redundancy, they lose approximately 4 hours of weekly working time in subsequent 
jobs. Strangely they do not see a change in pay after the redundancy, which could be the 
product of worker-specific characteristics. Respondents who take a job with the same 
firm (most likely a promotion) see a boost in hours. Further this increase in hours does 
not eliminate the positive effect on pay (running the model for gross pay while 
controlling for hours does not eliminate the positive effect of intra-firm change). Both 
types of voluntary mobility have different effects on weekly hours, yet both have a 
negative effect on satisfaction with time.  
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The results suggest workers who move between firms make compromises, while 
internal career ladders improve pay and time alone. I reject hypothesis 1a, VM is highly 
nuanced and contains compromises for workers. However, I accept hypothesis 1b, intra-
firm mobility increases pay significantly as laid out by attainment theory and efficiency 
wage theory. Further, change in working time does not remove the effect. Lastly, I 
reject hypothesis 2a, IVM has no negative effect on pay and conditions, although the 
change decreases working hours. The results above resemble a classic internal labour 
market, where workers rely on firm tenure to gain favourable outcomes. By switching 
employers, workers give up firm tenure and begin at a lower position in a new firm. 
Thus, they may gain more “interesting” forms of work by resigning, but objectively, 
their pay, time, and working conditions do not match whatever resources and experience 
they accumulated with the previous employer.  
The evidence in Table 6.3 supports the argument of the chapter and further supports 
efficiency wage theory. The rate of quits in Germany is low because they carry few 
objective benefits. Instead quitting results in compromises where workers trade 
objective outcomes for “satisfying work”. This is a key reason behind Germany’s lack 
of inter-firm mobility, which may be fuelled by an overall dissatisfaction with work and 
a need for more interesting forms of work, although this cannot deducted from the 
output. EPL has its place in regulating the hiring and firing of workers, but ultimately 
working conditions vary less between firms, and the best mechanism for improving 
outcomes and reaching attainment is intra-firm change. As a result, workers gather 
tenure in a given firm, pursuing promotion. Workers who leave the firm move to 
vacancies with more satisfying forms of work, that contain less pay and hours. They do 
not improve satisfaction with pay (most likely due to the decline in pay) satisfaction 
with hours (most likely due to a decline in weekly working hours). Meanwhile 
respondents who pursue new jobs with the same employer see increased pay and 
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increased hours, although satisfaction with hours after the change declines (possibly due 
to increased responsibility). It seems that efficiency wages may be at play in Germany. 
Although the theory applies the same prediction to working conditions as it does to 
wages, results suggest working conditions are not improved after intra-firm mobility.  
6.3.3. Mobility Types and the German Model: 
The output above falls in line with the “German model” as it appears in the literature. 
Lehndorff et al. (2009) lament the labour market institutions of the “old Germany” as 
one which ran internal and occupational labour markets, protected workers, and 
bargained collectively. There is evidence that these structures are still in place, at least 
when compared to the UK. The main distinction in Germany is not between VM and 
IVM, but inter or intra-firm mobility. Regarding intra-firm mobility, the change has 
almost no impact on subjective outcomes, beyond a fall in satisfaction with time, but 
brings significant changes in gross weekly wages. Inter-firm mobility entails gaining 
satisfaction with work, but losing satisfaction with hours, where workers make tradeoffs 
in certain conditions for more interesting work with a new employer.  
The results presented here do not resemble Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) nor Latzke et al. 
(2016) in terms of mobility’s effect on pay. For Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) Germany is a 
country which rewards inter-firm VM by improving gross monthly pay. Respondents 
who take promotions within the firm see no positive change in pay. The results above 
are the near opposite of Pavlopoulos et al. (2014), inter-firm VM has no positive effect 
on pay and even decreases it when working time is not considered, while intra-firm 
mobility increases gross pay substantially. This difference may stem from the different 
definitions of VM, since Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) consider all direct changes as 
“voluntary” (this is discussed in the literature review). However, the category of intra-
firm mobility should be roughly similar in both samples. Latzke et al. (2016) too, argue 
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that inter-firm VM increases pay and satisfaction with work among German 
respondents. The results above agree that changing employers has a positive effect on 
worker’s satisfaction with work, but the relationship between inter-firm mobility and 
pay is not replicated. This difference may stem from the period covered in both works. 
Here, a semi-balanced panel considers all waves 2000-2008. In Latzke et al. (2016) all 
waves 1985-2013 are considered. Further their findings suggest the premium tied to 
inter-firm mobility is in steady decline. Lastly, Reichelt and Abraham (2017) make the 
distinction that inter-firm mobility must be split by regional and occupational mobility, 
in order to understand wage inequality. The results above may reflect this, inter-firm 
changes have no effect. However, the strongest effect seems to come from commitment 
to a given employer, something unmeasured by Reichelt and Abraham (2017). 
Overall, the German model is one which rewards firm tenure and commitment. Inter-
firm mobility leads workers to make compromises for satisfactory work. Intra-firm 
mobility improves pay alone, having almost no effect on every other measure of reward. 
No utilitarian view of labour markets emerges from the output above. Having outlined 
the effects of mobility types on outcomes, the next section explores worker differences 
in the mobility-outcomes relationship. 
6.4. Differences Between Workers: 
As in the previous chapter, this section considers the second aim of the thesis, asking 
whether workers differ in the mobility-outcomes relationship. Mobility and outcomes 
are socially organised, as a result they may provide advantages and disadvantages to 
certain groups of workers. These differences are summarised by the limited-opportunity 
model (Hachen, 1990), which predicts group differences in job mobility (promotion, 
resignation, demotion etc). This section pushes these predictions further, testing if the 
consequences of mobility differ by groups. The models in the section above assume all 
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workers are affected equally by mobility. This assumption is made in an effort to 
capture the distinct differences in mobility types and outcomes. The following section 
considers if groups differ in the premiums tied to VM and the penalties tied to IVM. 
These often go beyond human capital, labour supply, or job characteristics (Cooke, 
2014, Blau and Kahn, 2003, Goldthorpe, 2000, Goldthorpe, 2002) . As before, the 
models split previous output by gender (Cooke, 2014, Mills et al., 2008, Acker, 2006), 
and education (Mills et al., 2008, Goldthorpe, 2000, Goldthorpe, 2002, Rosenfeld, 
1992). The relevant hypotheses are listed above. 
The models in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 are first split by gender and later education. The 
discussion does not consider the nuance of mobility types, since this configuration has 
been covered. Instead it focuses on worker-differences by VM and IVM alone. 
Differences in inter and intra-firm mobility are apparent but largely ignored in terms of 
the hypotheses. Worker differences are minor in each model, but time emerges as a 
point of contention for gender groups, as pay does for education groups, similar to the 
UK. Most importantly, results show that the complexity of treating mobility as driven 
by utility. Here, it does not appear that men gain from mobility at the expense of 
women, while third level educated workers gain at the expense of other groups. Instead, 
women are hardly affected by mobility, while men make more complex bargains 
through mobility. Further, secondary level educated workers improve several subjective 
outcomes through mobility, more than third level educated workers. Secondary 
educated workers also rely on the firm to improve objective pay, while third level 
educated workers see no change in pay after VM. Results suggest nuance in terms of 
who “benefits” from mobility depending on the outcome used. 
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6.4.1. Gender Differences in Subjective Outcomes 
The discussion opens with gender. In the UK, results run against the hypothesis, women 
are more dependent on mobility than men, particularly mobility within the firm. Men 
see few premiums from VM and no penalties from IVM (except for wages). It was 
suggested that the inequality regimes, presented by Acker (2006), may apply. Here men 
may be more reliant on training and grooming, while women are more reliant on the 
premiums which come with specific jobs themselves. This relationship is now 
considered for German data. This section splits the models in Table 6.2 by gender. The 
results show that women are completely unaffected by mobility when outcomes are 
subjective, men make trades in satisfaction with time for satisfaction with work. As 
before, the women considered in the models below are part of the core economy and are 
unlikely to represent the experience of the average German woman. This is especially 
true in Germany since the country’s welfare state holds a strong commitment to the 
male breadwinner model (Esping-Andersen, 2013, Mau and Verwiebe, 2010). 
Becker (2010) proposes that coordinated or closed labour markets lead to significant 
discrimination between genders, when compared to liberal or open labour markets. He 
cites overt discrimination for the result. In coordinated models, men should see higher 
premiums tied to change when compared to women, due to employers having a 
“preference” for certain workers over others. Since there is less mobility between and 
within firms, there is more reliance on a single employer as implied by internal labour 
market theory (Arthur and Rousseau, 2001, Tolbert, 2001). Thus, employers find 
discrimination easy, and so choose the employees they wish to promote and hold on to 
as a matter of “taste”. Given this prediction, women should see smaller returns from 
mobility when compared to men. Opponents of the theory claim it has an over emphasis 
on “human capital”, which ignores structural discrimination based on gender (Mills et 
al., 2008, Cooke, 2014, Acker, 2006). Kalleberg and Marsden (2005) propose that 
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coordinated labour markets produce less gender inequality than liberal markets, since 
they tackle existing systems of inequality which stem from casualised labour market 
agreements. The main issue with Becker’s proposal, is that he views employer decision-
making as an issue of “taste”, ignoring wider social structures which dictate life chances 
and skill acquisition patterns, like those outlined by Acker (2006).  
As before, it is important to note the criticism from Cooke (2016) (page 46) “gender 
inequalities are seldom produced by firms paying gender wage differentials for the 
same job; instead the disparities result from the sorting women and men into different 
jobs.” However, the process of “sorting” relies on promotions from the part of the 
employer, and quits from the part of wider social structures, the differences in how these 
mechanisms reward workers still inform researchers of gender divides, although the 
criticism above is also noted. The subjective models are listed below.  
The models for men draw on 19,000+ observations from 2,500+ respondents. The 
models for women contain fewer respondents and therefore fewer observations. There 
are approximately 1,000 fewer women in each model. The R-squared estimates in the 
models explain between 2% variance (satisfaction with work) and 13% variance 
(satisfaction with pay). Genders do not differ in terms of model fit, except for models 
estimating satisfaction with pay. The constant term in each model shows the baseline 
difference between genders, all things considered, although there is no significant 
difference between genders. Looking at satisfaction with work, women (0.24) are more 
satisfied than men (0.06). In terms of satisfaction with pay, men (0.30) are more 
satisfied than women (-0.19). Lastly, satisfaction with time suggests men (0.30) are 
more satisfied than women (-0.02). Table 6.4 lists the results.  
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Table 6.4: Results, Germany 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of moving on satisfaction with work, 
pay, and time. Models estimated separately for each gender. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Male: z-score 
satisfaction 
with work 
Female: z-score 
satisfaction 
with work 
Male: z-score 
satisfaction 
with pay 
Female: z-score 
satisfaction 
with pay 
Male: z-score 
satisfaction 
with time 
Female: z-score 
satisfaction 
with time 
       
2.Inter-firm 
voluntary  
0.29*** 0.24*** 0.01 0.03 -0.10*** -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) 
3.Inter-firm 
involuntary 
0.19*** 0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 0.12 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) 
5.Intra-firm 
change 
-0.04 0.10 -0.01 0.04 -0.14* -0.10 
 
 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Constant 0.06 0.24* 0.30 0.19* 0.30 -0.02 
 (0.26) (0.13) (0.39) (0.10) (0.27) (0.16) 
       
Observations 19,720 13,188 19,622 13,127 19,703 13,168 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.03 
Number of pid 2,536 1,645 2,535 1,645 2,536 1,645 
Weight w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models control for age, contract type, number of children in the house, the size of the firm, the year of the survey, the industry 
worked, and the occupation of the individual. All models controls for general worker satisfaction with work (except models 
predicting satisfaction with work). Models originally controlled for economic growth and unemployment rates. However, since 
these vary little throughout the panel both measures were dropped due collinearity with the survey year dummies. The estimates are 
not featured in the appendix although a baseline model appears. 
 
 
 
The most obvious result is that women are almost completely unaffected by mobility. 
Women see just one significant effect (model 2, inter-firm VM on satisfaction with 
work), while several are evident for men. Three gender differences emerge in the 
models above. First, German men benefit from IVM between firms when it comes to 
satisfaction with work, women are unaffected. Second, German men become 
significantly less satisfied with time after VM between firm, women are unaffected. 
Lastly, German men become significantly less satisfied with time after an intra-firm 
move, women are unaffected. Overall, women are affected by one type of mobility for 
one outcome, while men gain satisfaction with work but lose satisfaction with time from 
VM. Overall women are unaffected by both VM and IVM. Men, make compromises 
through VM.  
Starting with satisfaction with work (models 1 and 2); men who leave the firm for 
voluntary or involuntary reasons improve their satisfaction with work. Suggesting 
leaving an employer in itself, leads workers to more satisfying vacancies elsewhere. 
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Women, who move for involuntary reasons between firms, are not penalised, but do not 
see the improvement in the outcome that men do. At the same time, both men and 
women who take a new job with the same employer, see no change in job satisfaction 
after the move, suggesting promotions do not specifically guarantee better quality 
positions in terms of satisfaction with work.  
Regarding satisfaction with pay (models 3 and 4); mobility of any kind has no effect on 
the outcome. Men and women who move to a new employer (for voluntary and 
involuntary reasons) are able to recreate their subjective satisfaction roughly equally. 
Men and women who take a job with the same firm are also unaffected in terms of 
subjective pay. This could be the product wage-setting at an industry or occupational 
level. Workers know what their earnings will be relative to their responsibilities, and so 
their satisfaction does not change.  
Finally, two of the gender differences above are tied to satisfaction with time (models 5 
and 6). As stated, women are unaffected by both VM and IVM, but men see negative 
effects in satisfaction with time following mobility. VM between firms leads men to 
jobs with lower satisfaction with time. Thus quitting for a new employer moves men to 
positions with less favourable time demands. This could be the product of changed 
working hours, which emerged in the previous section. Again, this suggests men make 
compromises through mobility, gaining “interesting work” in exchange for dissatisfying 
hours. Further men who take jobs with the same firm report lower satisfaction with 
hours, whereas women are unaffected. It’s possible that men must work longer hours 
after a promotion and after a quit, while women move to jobs with the same time 
requirements. It’s also possible that women remain satisfied despite seeing increased or 
decreased hours, whether as men are more sensitive to changes in weekly working hours 
or responsibilities.   
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Overall, women are not disadvantage in the coordinated German market. Instead they 
appear unaffected by mobility and although they do not make subjective gains from 
VM, they do not make the compromises made by men. I reject hypothesis 3a. While 
few gender differences exist, they run counter to the hypothesis and reveal that men 
must trade subjective satisfaction with time, for subjective satisfaction with work. I 
further reject hypothesis 3b. Although men are not hindered by IVM, neither are 
women. It’s true that men who change employers (due to VM and IVM) improve their 
satisfaction with work, while women are unaffected, but overall both genders are not 
penalised by mobility. 
What do the findings mean for discrimination theory as presented by Becker (2010) and 
critiqued by Kalleberg and Marsden (2005)? The results above do not find that men 
benefit over women in terms of mobility to “better” vacancies. However, neither do the 
models reveal that women are better able to improve their conditions through mobility. 
It seems that the German labour market protects women’s working conditions, but 
men’s mobility is motivated by factors other than working conditions, since they trade 
some of these through mobility. This is considered further in the section below using 
objective outcomes. Overall, it appears that gender differs in terms of the advantages 
and disadvantages they gain from movement. Men are able to use mobility to find more 
satisfying jobs in exchange for more demanding jobs, women are able to locate more 
satisfying jobs without being able to improve the other outcomes. The section below 
trades the subjective outcomes for objective measures of the same concepts. 
6.4.2. Gender Differences in Objective Outcomes 
This section splits the models in Table 6.3 by gender. As before the usual limitations of 
fixed-effects estimation apply, and models with few observations will likely have wider 
standard errors. Theoretically, discrimination theory expects women to benefit from 
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mobility less than men, especially after an intra-firm change in a closed or coordinated 
labour market. Further, inequality regimes (Acker, 2006) within a firm will shape the 
impact of mobility on outcomes by giving certain groups preference and training over 
others, before mobility takes place. 
The models for men draw on 19,000+ observations from 2,500+ respondents. The 
models for women contain fewer respondents and therefore fewer observations. Models 
estimating gross monthly pay contain fewer respondents, drawing on 2,400+ men and 
1,600+ women. The R-squared values suggest the listed controls explain between 1% 
variance (weekly hours) and 21% variance (Log of gross monthly pay). Genders do not 
differ in terms of model fit, except for models estimating pay. The constant term in each 
model provides insight into the basic difference between genders, all things considered. 
These are also statistically significant. Looking at logged gross monthly pay, men (7.91) 
earn more than women (7.38). In terms of health, a proxy for working conditions, men 
(0.30) are more satisfied than women (-0.19). Lastly, weekly hours worked differ by 
gender, with men (45.97) working longer hours than women (39.25). Men earn more, 
work longer hours, and have a higher level of satisfaction with health. The results are 
presented in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5: Results, Germany 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of moving on gross monthly wages, 
health, and weekly hours. Models estimated separately for each gender. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Male: Log 
gross wages 
Female: Log 
gross wages 
Male: satisfaction 
with health 
Female: 
satisfaction with 
health 
Male: Weekly 
hours 
Female: 
Weekly 
hours 
       
2.Inter-firm 
voluntary 
-0.01 -0.03 -0.18*** -0.04 -1.271** -0.520 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.10) (0.407) (0.621) 
3.Inter-firm 
involuntary 
0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -3.35*** -5.338*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.10) (0.14) (0.616) (1.122) 
5.intra-firm 
change 
0.07** 0.07** 0.13 0.07 1.615 1.765 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.15) (1.263) (1.277) 
Constant 7.91*** 7.38*** 8.00*** 6.88*** 45.973*** 39.248*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.45) (0.20) (0.663) (1.024) 
       
Observations 17,979 12,034 19,712 13,186 19.858 13,319 
R-squared 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.01 0.02 
Number of pid 2,466 1,600 2,536 1,645 2,555 1,664 
Weight w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models control for age, contract type, number of children in the house, the size of the firm, the year of the survey, the industry 
worked, and the occupation of the individual. All models controls for general worker satisfaction with work (except models 
predicting satisfaction with work). Models originally controlled for economic growth and unemployment rates. However, since 
these vary little throughout the panel both measures were dropped due collinearity with the survey year dummies. The estimates are 
not listed in the appendix, although a baseline model appears.  
 
 
As before, the most obvious result from the output is how little women are affected by 
mobility. Women who experience mobility see just two significant effects. VM 
increases pay, and IVM lowers working hours. However two key gender distinctions 
can be made from the output. First, men who experience VM between employers see a 
fall in subjective health, while women are unaffected. Second, men who experience VM 
between employers see a fall in weekly hours, but women are unaffected. Although it 
appears that a third, relevant distinction can be made about women’s weekly working 
hours after an involuntary change, the effect is not statistically different from men’s 
negative effect. 
Regarding gross weekly wages (models 1 and 2); both men and women see no 
significant change in monthly wage after VM between firms. Men and women are also 
equally unaffected by involuntary change to a new employer. This is likely the product 
of Germany’s strong welfare state and collectively bargained wages. Workers who lose 
their job are not penalised for the change and do not move to lower paid vacancies with 
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a new employer (unlike British respondents). Finally both men and women experience 
the exact same premium after an intra-firm change (most likely a promotion). No gender 
difference exists in the estimates, or even the standard errors of the estimates. Becker’s 
(2010) theory of discrimination predicts that closed labour markets would limit the 
premium that women could gain from promotions, yet the results suggest both men and 
women see equal premiums from the change. This suggests both genders move to 
higher paid vacancies, whose premiums cannot be explained by worker characteristics. 
The first gender difference emerges in models estimating subjective health (models 3 
and 4), which try to capture working conditions. Men who move to a new employer 
report lower subjective health after the change, women are unaffected. This suggests 
men move to vacancies with poorer working conditions when leaving an employer, 
while women are able to recreate their conditions. However the constant term in both 
models suggest that men report significantly higher satisfaction with health than 
women. In this way, those who leave a firm may see a “regression to the mean” in 
working conditions. Inter-firm IVM has no effect on either gender, suggesting those 
who lose their job are able to recreate their conditions with a new employer. Lastly, 
mobility within the firm has no effect on either gender’s working conditions. This 
makes sense, since working conditions likely vary less within the firm than they do 
between firms.  
Finally, a gender difference emerges in terms of weekly working hours. Men, who quit, 
move to vacancies with lower working hours. However, as with subjective health it is 
possible the experience is a regression to the mean. The constant term reveals men work 
far longer hours than women, yet women are not affected by the change. Thus men who 
move to a new employer may simply see a “normalisation” of working time, whereas 
women’s working time is far lower to begin with. IVM affects both men and women’s 
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working hours negatively, yet the effect appears far larger for women than men. The 
standard errors suggest the difference between men and women is insignificant, but this 
could be the result of few observations in the women’s model, due to the large standard 
error.  Finally respondents who move with the same firm report no change in hours, 
with no gender difference. Here too, the estimate for women is large, as is the standard 
error. The estimate for men is close to zero. This result is strange, since subjective 
models show men see a negative effect in satisfaction with time after the same change.  
Overall, I reject the gender related hypotheses. Again, men appear to make trades in 
outcomes through VM, while women are unaffected. On one hand, it seems that gender 
differences persist despite mobility. For example there are significant differences in pay 
evident in the constant terms of model 1 and model 2. These capture a crude gender pay 
gap. Women are unable to close this gap using mobility, as inter-firm change does not 
reward workers and intra-firm change contains the same premiums for both men and 
women. On the other hand, the gender differences cannot be explained by mobility 
premiums for men. Men are not rewarded higher earnings through open discrimination 
at the point of promotion, and thus likely accrue higher wages through some other 
mechanism, possibly tenure or training. The same can be said for hours. Women work 
fewer hours than men, as revealed by the constant term. However mobility does not 
help them “close the gap” between men. Here too, hours may be distributed using some 
other mechanism.  
I reject hypotheses 3a and 3b for objective outcomes. Interestingly, men see a fall in 
satisfaction with time following VM between firms and within firms, yet only see a fall 
in hours after VM between firms. Women see no change in satisfaction with time and 
see no effect on time following VM. This suggests women are able to recreate their 
conditions when the change is voluntary, but not when the change is involuntary (at 
215 
 
least for hours). Gender differences in time and pay emerge, but these are not the 
product of statistical or overt discrimination which emerges through mobility.  
6.4.3. Gender and Mobility in Germany: 
There are few gender differences between workers, where they emerge they run counter 
to the hypotheses. Men appear to make compromises through mobility, losing in some 
outcomes, but improving in others, while women appear unaffected by mobility. 
However, in terms of objective outcomes, men hold better pay, longer hours, and better 
subjective health than women. Because of this, IVM may capture a regression to the 
mean for men who leave a position but see a fall in time and wages after the change. 
The configuration of gender and the mobility–outcomes relationship appears more 
complicated than theories allow, specifically because there are complexities in how 
mobility affects outcomes. As previously, the idea that all outcomes are affected by 
mobility does not hold. Men appear to trade satisfaction with time, and subjective health 
for more interesting jobs, while women are largely unaffected by VM. 
These results could be the product of Germany’s coordinated labour market. Differences 
between groups persist despite movement, and neither gender is affected by mobility 
which maintains occupational rather than firm-specific differences in wages and 
conditions. Thus both men and women experience similar outcomes after moving, as 
proposed by Sørensen (1975). However, internal career ladders reward workers best and 
reward workers roughly equally for both genders, supporting the argument made by 
internal labour market theory (Althauser, 1989, Royal, 2000) and efficiency wage 
theory. The arguments made by overt discrimination theorists do not stand, suggesting 
both genders earn the same premium from internal structures, and are equally 
unaffected by voluntary inter-firm change. Although a gender pay gap persists, mobility 
does not “favour” one gender over the other.  
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The findings above are similar to Keith and McWilliams (1999, 1995, 1997); inter-firm 
VM produces no gender differences when estimating pay. IVM also produces no 
significant gender difference for pay. Gesthuizen (2009) finds no gender differences in 
the Netherlands using several subjective outcomes. Finally, Latzke et al. (2016) find no 
gender difference in VM’s premium when the outcome is subjective satisfaction, 
although a gender difference exists in the premium tied to objective pay. However, even 
here the premium is significant but small, suggesting women gain a smaller portion of 
the 5% premium given to men. The next section turns to educational differences 
between workers, checking if those without a third level degree move to vacancies with 
premiums when compared to those with a third level degree. 
6.4.4. Education Differences in Subjective Outcomes: 
A key factor in attainment theory is that workers resources (education at the point of 
entering the labour market), will dictate the opportunities available to workers. Thus 
workers with higher resources (education) are better able to climb the “structure of 
inequality”, and better able to increase attainment through mobility. In a different 
argument Thurow (1976) proposes that educational credentials are signals for training 
potential, not ability, citing statistical discrimination. Therefore workers without 
specific qualifications will benefit the least from VM and penalised the most for IVM. 
These workers struggle to “signal” their worth to existing or new employers, and are not 
able to secure further resources (training or experience) needed for attainment. 
Regarding IVM, those with fewer educational characteristics are perceived as less 
productive or less trainable, and therefore fall into precarious or lower valued forms of 
work, which often leads to dismissal, redundancy, or layoff. The relevant hypotheses 
are listed at the start of the chapter. 
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The section starts by considering models with subjective outcomes. These differ in 
observations and number of respondents, due to large differences in education groups 
within the sample. Models for those with a basic level of education rely on 10,000+ 
observations. Models for those with a secondary level of education draw on 14,000+ 
observations. Models for third level educated workers draw on 7,000+ observations. 
Splitting the estimates in this way reduces the number of observations severely; 
however, the final estimates are unbiased. The R-squared figures do not differ 
significantly between educational groups, suggesting the variable explain the variance 
in outcomes roughly equally for each group. The output is split in Table 6.6 
(satisfaction with work and satisfaction with pay) and Table 6.7 (satisfaction with time). 
The constant terms in each model provide insight into differences between groups, 
although the wide standard errors suggest these are insignificant. Workers with a 
secondary level of education consistently list the highest levels of satisfaction. 
Satisfaction with pay is the only exception. Those with a third level degree are most 
satisfied with pay. Results are listed in Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 below. 
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Table 6.6: Results, Germany 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of satisfaction with work and pay. 
Models estimated separately for each educational group. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Basic lvl Educ: 
z-score 
satisfaction 
with work 
Secondary lvl 
Educ: z-score 
satisfaction with 
work 
Tertiary lvl 
Educ: z-score 
satisfaction 
with work 
Basic lvl Educ: 
z-score 
satisfaction 
with pay 
Secondary lvl 
Educ: z-score 
satisfaction with 
pay 
Third lvl Educ: 
z-score 
satisfaction 
with pay 
       
2.Inter-firm 
voluntary 
0.25*** 0.27*** 0.30*** -0.08 0.05 0.07 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
3.Inter-firm 
involuntary 
0.03 0.23*** 0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) 
5.Intra-firm 
change 
0.01 0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.17) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) 
Constant 0.18 0.28*** 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 0.11 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) 
       
Observations 10,711 14,552 7,645 10,636 14,488 7,625 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.11 
Number of pid 1,368 1,848 993 1,367 1,848 993 
Weight w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models control for age, contract type, number of children in the house, the size of the firm, the year of the survey, the industry 
worked, and the occupation of the individual. Models originally controlled for economic growth and unemployment rates. However, 
since these vary little throughout the panel, both measures were dropped due collinearity with the survey year dummies. A baseline 
model appears in the appendix. 
 
Table 6.7: Results, Germany 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of moving on gross monthly wages, 
health, and weekly hours. Models estimated separately for each educational group. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Basic Education: z-score 
satisfaction with time 
Secondary Education: z-score 
satisfaction with tim 
Third level: z-score 
satisfaction with time 
    
2.Inter-firm 
voluntary 
-0.05 -0.15*** -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
3.Inter-firm 
involuntary 
0.01 -0.01 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) 
5.Intra-firm change -0.29 -0.07 -0.08 
 (0.18) (0.08) (0.09) 
Constant 0.01 0.07 0.02 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) 
    
Observations 10,692 14,538 7,641 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Number of pid 1,368 1,848 993 
Weight w11103 w11103 w11103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models control for age, contract type, number of children in the house, the size of the firm, the year of the survey, the industry 
worked, and the occupation of the individual. Models originally controlled for economic growth and unemployment rates. However, 
since these vary little throughout the panel. Both measures were dropped due collinearity with the survey year dummies. A baseline 
model appears in the appendix. 
 
 
The most striking result from the output, is that third level educated workers are almost 
completely unaffected by mobility. The output suggests secondary level educated 
workers rely on change the most; however, two distinct differences between groups can 
be picked out, both involving those with a secondary level of education. First, those 
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with a secondary level of education are negatively affected by VM between firms in 
terms of “satisfaction with time”. Leaving the firm has a negative effect on time for this 
group, while the other education groups are not affected. Second, those with a 
secondary level of education benefit from IVM between firms, in terms of satisfaction 
with work. Leaving the firm has a positive effect on working conditions for this group, 
while the other groups are not affected. Both differences contradict the theory of 
attainment and the statistical discrimination argument proposed by Thurow (1976). 
Those with a third level education and a basic level of education are unaffected by 
mobility.  
Starting with satisfaction with work, each education group benefits from VM between 
firms (models 1, 2, and 3, Table 6.6). Changing employers benefits respondents roughly 
equally, suggesting workers fill vacancies with subjectively better conditions. This runs 
counter to attainment theory, which predicts education differences in “gains”. Further 
intra-firm mobility has no effect for each education group, suggesting no one group 
benefits subjectively from intra-firm movement. Again, this may be the product of 
working conditions varying less within firms than they do between firms. This is 
especially true in Germany which typically has flatter organisation structures as argued 
by DiPrete et al. (1997). However, these results run counter to attainment theory. 
Regarding IVM, those with a basic level of education and those with a tertiary level of 
education are not affected by the change, suggesting they are able to recreate their 
working conditions with a new employer. Again, those with a secondary level of 
education see increased satisfaction with work after an involuntary change, a finding 
that also runs counter to attainment theory and the overt discrimination argument. Here, 
it could be that secondary educated workers, who avoid unemployment, move to more 
satisfying positions relative to their limited resources.   
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Regarding satisfaction with pay, no significant effect emerges (models 4, 5, and 6, 
Table 6.6). Each education group is unaffected by both VM and IVM. This was 
discussed wider in the sections above. Neither an advantage nor a disadvantage exists 
between education groups, possibly because of sectoral wage agreements. In this way, 
German workers may move between carefully defined and known pay categories, which 
reflect their resources and expectations. Since these are knows, vacancies do not contain 
particularly “satisfying pay”, in that changes in pay match the responsibility of the 
worker.     
Lastly, satisfaction with time contains the second education effect (models 1, 2, and 3, 
Table 6.7). No education group is affected by mobility, except for those with a 
secondary level of education. This group sees a fall in satisfaction with time after inter-
firm VM, suggesting workers who quit their job for a new employer move to vacancies 
with less satisfying working time. No other education effect exists for satisfaction with 
time. IVM between employers too has no effect on satisfaction with time.  
Overall, few education differences exist in terms of mobility’s effect on outcomes. Two 
differences emerge, and both are minor. Results suggest that secondary educated 
workers must compromise satisfaction with time for satisfaction with work following a 
change to a new employer. Third level educated workers do not have to make the 
bargain, but neither do they gain much beyond basic satisfaction with work. I reject 
hypothesis 3c. I further reject hypothesis 3d. Not only does IVM hold no penalties for 
workers overall, but those with a secondary level degree sometimes benefit from the 
change, while other groups do not. It is possible that third level educated workers are 
unaffected by the “gains” of mobility because they rely on other credentials like 
occupational licenses and tenure based adjustments to pay and satisfaction. Those with a 
secondary level education may make the largest gains from mobility to a new employer 
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because they rely on job hopping for changes to satisfaction. However, they must make 
compromises from the change.  
What do the findings mean for attainment theory (Sørensen, 1977)? The idea that those 
with higher education are better able to “gain” from VM does not emerge. From the 
output, it seems that third level educated workers are unaffected by mobility except for 
an improvement in satisfaction with work. Further Thurow’s (1976) argument that job 
queues and statistical discrimination would split workers by qualification type, does not 
emerge in the output. The results also question the effects of intra-firm mobility, a 
central concept in Thurow’s prediction. Instead it appears that higher educated and 
lower educated groups are unaffected by mobility, while secondary groups make 
bargains, improving certain outcomes at the expense of others.  
Lower educated groups may move in the secondary labour market as described by Piore 
(1970), where pay is hourly and conditions do not vary. Upper educated groups may 
rely on mechanisms other than mobility for career progress, which could be 
occupational tenure, or employer tenure. This is explored further using objective 
outcomes. 
6.4.5. Education Differences in Objective Outcomes 
This section considers the models in Table 6.3 separated by highest level of education 
achieved. The models for those with a basic level of education draw on 10,700+ 
observations from 1,300+ respondents. Models for those with a secondary level of 
education are drawn from 14,000+ observations from 1,800+ respondents. Lastly, 
models for those with a tertiary level of education rely on 7,000+ observations from 
900+ respondents. The constant term in each model reveals education differences at the 
baseline. Gross monthly pay is significantly higher among those with a third level 
education (7.85). Those with a secondary level education (7.59) and a basic level of 
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education (7.60) have a similar rate of pay. Regarding health, those with a basic 
education have the highest subjective health (7.13), followed by third level educated 
workers (7.03), and lastly by those with a secondary level of education (6.85). However, 
the large standard errors suggest the differences are not significant. Last, each education 
group works a similar amount of weekly hours. Those with a secondary level of 
education work the longest hours (43.00), those with a basic education work the least 
(41.55). These differences are minor and insignificant. The results are listed in Table 6.8 
and Table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.8: : Results, Germany 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of gross monthly pay and subjective 
health. Models estimated separately for each educational group. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Basic level of 
Education: log 
gross wages 
Secondary level of 
Education: log 
gross wages 
Third level: 
log gross 
wages 
Basic level of 
Education: 
health 
Secondary level 
of Education: 
health 
Third 
level: 
health 
       
2.Inter-firm 
voluntary 
-0.03* -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.12 -0.24** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) 
3.Inter-firm 
involuntary 
0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.05 0.06 0.08 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.15) (0.12) (0.16) 
5.Intra-firm 
change 
0.08 0.06** 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.16 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.20) (0.16) (0.15) 
Constant 7.60*** 7.59*** 7.85*** 7.13*** 6.85*** 7.03*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.21) (0.14) (0.18) 
       
Observations 9,680 13,282 7,051 10,706 14,550 7,642 
R-squared 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.10 0.12 0.13 
Number of pid 1,323 1,803 964 1,368 1,848 993 
Weight w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 w11103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models control for age, contract type, number of children in the house, the size of the firm, the year of the survey, the industry 
worked, and the occupation of the individual. All models controls for general worker satisfaction with work (except models 
predicting satisfaction with work). Models originally controlled for economic growth and unemployment rates. However, since 
these vary little throughout the panel both measures were dropped due collinearity with the survey year dummies. A baseline model 
appears in the appendix. 
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Table 6.9: Results, Germany 2000-2008: Linear estimated fixed-effects of weekly hours worked. Models 
estimated separately for each educational group. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Basic lvl education: weekly 
hours worked 
secondary lvl education: weekly 
hours worked 
third lvl education: weekly 
hours worked 
    
2.Inter-firm 
voluntary 
-1.45** -0.57 -1.08 
 (0.59) (0.52) (0.72) 
3.Inter-firm 
involuntary 
-4.06*** -4.33*** -3.53*** 
 (1.09) (0.85) (0.97) 
5.Intra-firm change 3.37* 1.77* 0.02 
 (1.87) (1.04) (1.63) 
Constant 41.55*** 43.00*** 42.69*** 
 (1.14) (0.81) (1.14) 
    
Observations 10,719 14,552 7,653 
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Number of pid 1,369 1,848 994 
Weight w11103 w11103 w11103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models control for age, contract type, number of children in the house, the size of the firm, the year of the survey, the industry 
worked, and the occupation of the individual. All models controls for general worker satisfaction with work (except models 
predicting satisfaction with work). Models originally controlled for economic growth and unemployment rates. However, since 
these vary little throughout the panel both measures were dropped due collinearity with the survey year dummies. A baseline model 
appears in the appendix. 
 
Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 show five key differences between education groups. However, 
few are in line with attainment theory or statistical discrimination. Firstly, workers with 
a basic level of education lose earnings after VM between firms; the other education 
groups are not affected. Second, staying with gross wages, secondary level educated 
workers gain the most from VM within the firm, the other groups are not affected. 
Third, those with a tertiary level education see a decline in subjective health after VM 
between firms; the other groups are not affected. Fourth, those with a basic level of 
education see a fall in hours after VM between firms. Lastly, intra-firm mobility does 
not affect the hours of those with a third level education, but increases the weekly hours 
for other education groups.  
Starting with gross monthly wages (models 1, 2, and 3 Table 6.8); VM between firms 
only affects those with a basic education. These workers see a fall in wages after 
quitting a job and changing employers, suggesting they move to vacancies with lower 
pay. Since this corresponds with a fall in hours (model 1 Table 6.9), the result is likely 
product of reduced hours in the new position (estimating wages while controlling for 
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weekly working hours eliminates the effect). Third level educated workers are expected 
to gain the most from VM, yet they are unaffected, moving to vacancies which contain 
no premiums in pay that cannot be explained by worker resources. IVM between firms 
does not affect any education group in terms of wages, experiencing job loss allows 
workers to recreate their pay and conditions elsewhere no matter their educational 
resources. This finding also goes against attainment theory. Lastly those with a 
secondary level of education see an increase in wages after intra-firm VM. Taking a 
promotion or another job with the same employer rewards workers with secondary or 
vocational qualifications best, suggesting they move to internal vacancies with higher 
premiums. These workers see a 6% rise in pay, while those with a basic level of 
education or third level of education are not affected by the change itself.  
Although the estimate is positive for the other groups it is insignificant and likely to be 
zero, which could be the result of fewer observations in the models. This finding runs 
counter to attainment theory where workers with higher education are expected to gain 
the most from mobility; however, it is possible that efficiency wages are at play in the 
results above. Workers with a secondary level of education may depend more on firm-
specific training than those with a tertiary or a basic level degree. Those with a third 
level education may have a greater reliance on an occupational status, instead of 
mobility events. In this way employers ensure that secondary educated workers earn 
more from promotion, by paying above market wages, in an effort to hold on to key 
firm-specific skills.  
Regarding subjective health (models 3, 4, and 5, Table 6.8), workers are completely 
unaffected by mobility, except in one type of change. Respondents with a third level 
education, who quit or resign, move to vacancies where their health declines slightly, 
suggesting they move to poorer working conditions. All education groups are 
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unaffected by IVM, suggesting workers are able to recreate their conditions with a new 
employer after losing their jobs. Lastly, all groups see no benefit in working conditions 
after an intra-firm change. Taking a promotion does not improve the subjective health of 
respondents, suggesting workers do not move to objectively better (or worse) vacancies 
after the change. 
Lastly, weekly working time is affected by mobility, and a difference in education exists 
(models 1, 2, and 3, Table 6.9). Respondents with a basic education see a significant fall 
in hours after a quit; this leads to a decline in pay, noted earlier. No other group is 
affected by the change. Workers with a basic education may be struggling to recreate 
their working hours after a quit or resignation. The other education groups are able to 
achieve this, without moving to vacancies with lower hours and pay. Regarding IVM, 
the change negatively affects all workers. Each group loses weekly working time after a 
dismissal, which curiously does not affect gross monthly pay. Regarding intra-firm 
mobility (most likely a promotion), respondents with a basic and secondary level of 
education see an increase in hours, while those with a third level qualification see no 
change in hours.  
Thinking of the results overall, education differences among groups are more apparent 
in objective models, but these run against the hypotheses. For example, workers with a 
third level degree are expected to gain the most from VM, but appear to gain nothing 
and move to objectively worse working conditions in terms of “health”. Those with a 
basic education have the most to lose from mobility, this appears to be the case, losing 
hours and pay after a quit in order to work “interesting jobs” (as laid out in the 
subjective models). Those with a secondary level of education gain the most in terms of 
wages after a career ladder move (intra-firm). This effect remains even when controlling 
for hours. I reject hypothesis 3c. Those with a third level degree do not have an 
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advantage over those with a secondary level education, and may hold a disadvantage in 
terms of intra-firm mobility. I also reject hypothesis 3d. IVM has no effect on workers, 
regardless of their resources. The findings above run counter to attainment theory, and 
the theory of statistical discrimination as proposed by Thurow (1976). There are minor 
education differences between workers, and these differences do not favour those with a 
third level education. It could be that statistical discrimination is at play for those with a 
basic education. Since employers are most concerned with internalising a core 
workforce, they may discriminate against those with a basic education, by offering them 
part-time positions more often than other groups. However, the highest educated group 
is not able to secure the premiums that come with intra-firm mobility, a finding that 
runs counter to statistical discrimination and attainment theory more widely.  
6.4.6. Education and Mobility in Germany 
All of the hypotheses regarding differences between workers have been rejected, as 
most differences are minor, and the effects run counter to expectations. Important 
distinctions can still be made between educational groups and the mobility-outcomes 
relationship in Germany. As a configuration, worker differences in the mobility-
outcomes relationship are fruitful, but cast doubt over attainment theory. Thinking of 
subjective outcomes, few differences emerge between groups, since mobility in itself 
has little effect on workers. Secondary level workers appear to be affected by mobility 
the most, and those with a basic level of education and a third level of education see 
little change in outcomes. Thinking of objective outcomes, differences between 
educational groups also emerge. Those with a basic education see a fall in wages after a 
voluntary change due to a fall in hours, suggesting they are penalised for inter-firm 
mobility. Those with a secondary education earn more after a voluntary change 
(provided the change is intra-firm), while other educational groups do not benefit from 
intra-firm mobility.  
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The results above could be the product of Germany’s strict laws around job design 
(Marsden, 1999). Thurow (1976) and Sørensen (1977) would expect third level workers 
to gain the most from intra-firm change, but it could be that this group of workers 
improves their pay and conditions using firm tenure or a mechanism different to 
mobility. In terms of theory, efficiency wages as described by Akerlof and Yellen 
(1986) may be at play in Germany however, the effect applies only to those with a 
secondary education.  
Overall, Germany resembles a strong coordinated market where personal characteristics 
are not strong determinants of outcomes (Mills et al., 2006b, Mills et al., 2006a, Mills et 
al., 2008). The main argument of the thesis is supported further, since wages and 
conditions are collectively bargained, they vary little between educational groups. 
Knowledge and credentials are protected by occupation or industry (which the models 
above control for). There are significant differences in baseline pay between those with 
a third level education and those without. However mobility does little to change these 
differences. Mobility is not an important predictor of outcomes, as outcomes vary little 
between and within workers. Career progress and occupational achievement (Sørensen, 
1975) occurs best within the firm as explained by internal labour market theorists and 
efficiency wage theorists (Althauser, 1989, Althauser and Kalleberg, 1981, Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1986). Differences between workers are minor, but advantage lies with those 
with a secondary level of education.  
The findings presented here contradict other authors summarised in the literature 
review. In the Netherlands Gesthuizen (2009) finds no education differences in 
mobility’s effect on outcomes; he finds minor education differences in push factors 
driving mobility, which are not relevant to the output above. However, the relationship 
is operationalised by interacting years of education with VM, which ignores specific 
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qualifications. In Germany, Latzke et al. (2016) find minor class differences in 
mobility’s effect on pay and satisfaction with work; where professionals earn the lion’s 
share of mobility’s premium, and blue collar workers earn the least. The results above 
suggest that secondary educated workers gain the most when the change is intra-firm, a 
type of mobility not considered by Latzke et al. (2016). Further, the findings listed here 
see inter-firm mobility as an insignificant predictor of changes in pay, while Latzke et 
al. (2016) see them as crucial for every class group. Lastly, focusing on pay alone, 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) report low-earners gain the most from inter-firm mobility 
(gaining nothing from intra-firm mobility) in Germany. The authors cite attainment 
theory and efficiency theory in their work, but find support for neither in their results. 
The findings here are the near opposite of Pavlopoulos et al. (2014), inter-firm mobility 
does almost nothing for workers and lowers the pay of those with a basic level of 
education; further intra-firm mobility is a significant predictor of higher pay for 
secondary or vocationally educated workers, which could be in the low-paid category.  
6.5. Summary 
Setting up the research questions and puzzles, chapter 4 argued that Germany’s lower 
mobility rate is the product of its coordinated labour market. It showed that Germany 
and the UK have comparable rates of IVM and the difference between both countries 
lies in their rate of VM. Chapter 4 also shows that outcomes vary less between and 
within German workers when compared to British workers. Ultimately, collective 
bargaining and industry standards are shaping the rate of VM in Germany, where 
mobility between firms is limited in terms of rewarding workers due to Germany’s 
standardised employment system.  
Looking at Germany, the theory of attainment would predict that the minor rate of VM 
is due to fewer vacancies, and less utility tied to change. Results suggest this is an 
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oversimplification, given the two complexities between mobility and outcomes 
(discussed throughout). Results reveal that VM affects some outcomes over others, 
suggesting workers move to vacancies where they make trades in outcomes. For 
example, satisfaction with work is increased by VM in Germany, but mobility has no 
effect on satisfaction with pay, and a negative effect on satisfaction with time. Here, 
workers compromised satisfaction with time (and other outcomes) for more interesting 
or satisfying work. Beyond this, attainment theory predicts that VM will affect 
subjective and objective outcomes similarly. Yet, this too does not appear to be the case. 
Workers who see promotions in Germany report a sharp rise in pay, despite the fact that 
satisfaction with pay is not affected. Further, workers who quit see a fall in pay, but 
satisfaction with pay is not affected. As with British workers, Germans too make 
bargains though mobility; compromising on pay and time, for subjective satisfaction at 
work.   
These complexities appear in both configurations of the mobility-outcomes relationship, 
discussed throughout the chapter. Regarding mobility types, inter-firm mobility leads 
workers to improved subjective outcomes best, while intra-firm mobility leads to 
objective outcomes best. This shows two separate mechanisms are at work, with the 
external labour markets on one hand, and internal career ladders on the other. Quitting 
affects subjective measures best, but promotions although rare, lead to improve 
objective outcomes, beyond the characteristics of the worker. Further quitting lowers 
the earnings and weekly working hours of workers, a finding that runs completely 
counter to attainment theory, and may touch on the importance of the firm as a key 
mechanism for attainment in Germany. This penalty which stems from VM goes 
beyond the complexity of objective-subjective mismatch noted earlier. Even when 
models consider subjective outcomes, negative effects emerge from VM. Here workers 
may be sacrificing satisfaction with time, and subjective health for “interesting work”. 
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Thus German mobility between employers may be driven less by dissatisfaction with 
conditions, and more by the general want for more satisfying or interesting work. 
Similar results appear in Gesthuizen and Dagevos (2008) and Kalleberg and Mastekaasa 
(2001) (although neither comments on the distinction). Most of all, these results further 
support the main argument of this chapter, German mobility is not driven by a need to 
improve working conditions or pay, but instead a desire to move to more satisfying or 
interesting jobs. 
These results emerge somewhat in the models which consider worker differences. 
Although Sørensen (1975) accepts worker inequality in the distribution of attainment, 
he sees gender or class differences as stemming from the point of skill acquisition, not 
at the point of mobility itself. Instead Hachen (1990) and Acker (2006) consider the 
inequalities past the point of skill acquisition, as differences in limited-opportunities. 
They cite overt and statistical discrimination. Yet the output suggests a more 
complicated relationship than one where men hold an advantage over women, and non-
tertiary educated groups lose out to tertiary educated ones. When outcomes are 
subjective, men appear to use mobility to bargain for subjective improvement with 
work, losing out in several other measures, while women see none of these penalties but 
few rewards. When outcomes are objective it is men who are further penalised by 
mobility while women see no effect. Although VM improves subjective satisfaction 
with work for men and women, men make bargains (losing other subjective and 
objective outcomes) while women are unaffected. This goes against the predictions of 
overt and statistical discrimination. To say that men hold an advantage over women 
regarding the premiums of VM would be inaccurate. Instead men and women make 
separate bargains when moving to more interesting forms of work, where women are 
less affected by the risks of VM. Importantly the sample considered for women, may 
not be representative of the average German woman’s experience overall.  
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Regarding differences between education groups, secondary educated workers make 
gains when outcomes are subjective, while other groups are protected. However, they 
gain the most when outcomes are objective. Third level educated workers see few 
improvements as a result of mobility since it is secondary level educated workers who 
benefit from change. This runs completely counter to attainment theory, and statistical 
discrimination. Instead third level educated groups may rely on mechanisms other than 
mobility in order to improve outcomes, possibly tenure or training, while secondary 
groups rely on internal changes in a career ladder.  
 The results listed here are in conflict with a number of other authors previously 
mentioned. Several consider Germany specifically, and most use the same dataset 
(Pavlopoulos et al., 2014, Latzke et al., 2016, Kattenbach et al., 2014, Schmelzer, 
2010). The finding that inter-firm mobility yields no significant objective reward (and 
constitutes a penalty when working hours are not controlled for) is in direct conflict 
with the authors above. Pavlopoulos et al. (2014) argues the near opposite of this, 
suggesting that intra-firm mobility yields no effects, and inter-firm mobility increases 
pay. Latzke et al. (2016) too find that inter-firm mobility rewards workers, and that 
professionals earn the most from these changes, although they do not consider intra-firm 
mobility, and further consider several years together (1985-2013). Schmelzer (2010) 
argues that job mobility in Germany is crucial to future wage growth, especially direct 
job mobility. Whether the changes contain immediate benefits for workers, or whether 
mobility is part of a long term strategy of finding a suitable career ladder, is not 
explored. The output in this thesis suggests the best strategy for increasing immediate 
earnings is to pursue promotion or an intra-firm job change, as laid out by efficiency 
wage theory or internal labour market theory. It may be that earnings growth is 
positively affected by mobility, where workers use job changes to find career ladders 
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with high paying vacancies. However, this mobility in itself does not lead workers to 
higher paying positions; rather it is part and parcel of a wider strategy of increasing pay.   
As a concluding argument, German working lives may be less mobile because the 
immediate outcomes after an employer change are also minor. In fact respondents who 
quit their job for a new vacancy make compromises in time, pay, and general 
conditions. These new vacancies contain premiums in some outcomes and penalties in 
others. Mobility leads workers to objectively better outcomes, but only when the change 
occurs with the same employer, offering some support for internal labour market theory 
and efficiency wage theory. Differences between workers cast doubt on Becker’s theory 
of discrimination, and Sørensen (1977) theory of attainment. While the British chapter 
paints mobility as a process where movement leads to improved working conditions, the 
German chapter illustrates mobility as a bargaining process for gaining “interesting” or 
“satisfying work”. 
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7. Country Analysis and Conclusion 
This chapter considers the final aim and concludes the work overall, tying together the 
key points. First, it compares both countries with reference to time and pay, two 
outcomes that have reacted to mobility in unique ways. This is the final aim of the thesis 
and the last configuration of mobility and outcomes. Second, it interprets the results for 
each configuration, lists the implications of the work, and considers the 
recommendations for future research.  
7.1. Country comparisons 
The third aim of the thesis is to explore the institutional context, focusing on the 
consequence of mobility in Germany and the UK. The section considers the final 
configuration of the mobility-outcomes relationship, country differences. As before, the 
complexities between mobility and outcomes also emerge. Treating the relationship 
between mobility and outcomes as utilitarian would mean a simple relationship between 
countries. The country with the most mobility has the highest reward tied to mobility. 
However, treating mobility as a process of bargaining reveals a different process. First, 
in both countries, mobility has a multi-faceted effect on outcomes, which is rarely 
uniform. Second, in both countries there is a mismatch between mobility’s impact on 
subjective and objective measures of the same outcome. Results reveal that “quits” and 
“promotions” lead workers to separate outcomes in both countries. Evidence suggests 
these are motivated by different bargains in both countries. A set of hypotheses is 
offered in chapter 2; these are listed below for reference. 
Hypothesis 4a: Voluntary mobility will have a positive effect on outcomes in the UK. 
Hypothesis 4b: Involuntary mobility will have a negative effect on outcomes in the UK. 
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Hypothesis 5a: Voluntary mobility will have a positive effect on outcomes in Germany 
only if it is intra-firm. 
Hypothesis 5b: Involuntary mobility will have no effect on outcomes in Germany. 
This section considers the hypotheses above with reference to country specific chapters. 
It pays attention to two sets of outcomes specifically; mobility’s impact on pay and 
mobility’s impact on time. Since satisfaction with work reacts predictably in both 
countries (VM increases subjective satisfaction with work, IVM has no effect), the topic 
is avoided to save space. Pay and time however, reveal interesting differences in both 
countries which are worth revisiting. 
Due to a lack of space the nuance of VM and IVM are ignored, the discussion instead 
focuses on the effect of VM and IVM overall. Nuance emerges, but it is discussed only 
briefly, the larger focus is on the main country differences. Pay (subjective and 
objective) and time (subjective and objective) show two points of contention in both 
countries regarding how they react to VM and IVM.  
An argument running throughout this thesis claims that the German labour market is 
more predictable, where conditions vary less between firms (due collective bargaining), 
and within firms (due to a flatter organisation design). As described by Hall and Soskice 
(2001), the German labour market is “rigid” while the UK and US labour markets are 
“fluid” (similar distinctions are common, for example Mills et al. (2006b) consider the 
UK market as “open” and the German market as “closed”). This rigidity is a 
consequence of tripartite bargaining, between employers, unions, and the state. It allows 
firms to consider investment and internalisation of skills, however, this section 
disregards the perspective of the firm focusing on the perspective of workers. In 
Germany, mobility’s impact is limited due to collectively agreed wages and conditions 
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(this is especially true when estimating outcomes tied to pay). As a result the vacancies 
available to workers vary less in the rewards they offer to workers.  
This is not true for the UK. The country has greater inequality in earnings and a wider 
span of working conditions. Further, the process of bargaining is individualised, 
meaning bargains take place between employers and employees. This fluid nature stems 
from low union power, and low union coverage, discussed in detail in chapter 4. Thus 
firms are able to hire and fire workers easily focusing their efforts on a core team of 
workers, by the same token workers are able to move between firms quickly, comparing 
and contrasting various different vacancies to their own resources. Theoretically, the 
large mobility found in the UK should be the result of workers moving to better jobs 
where workers make gains. However, mobility’s effect on outcomes is almost 
exclusively subjective. Mobility is institutionalised into the process of bargaining, but 
wages and other compensation are driven by efficiency alone, leaving workers to 
bargain over subjective concepts and (possibly) responsibilities. 
The models below compare and contrast Germany and the UK using two outcomes, 
time and pay. The models below begin by listing the effect of mobility on subjective 
and objective measures of time.  
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Table 7.1: Results for BHPS & SOEP (2000-2008), subjective and objective measures of time.  
 BHPS SOEP BHPS SOEP 
 Number of hours 
worked weekly 
Annual hours 
worked, e11101 
(divided by 52 for 
weekly hours) 
Satisfaction with time, 
linear z-scores 
Satisfaction with time, 
linear z-scores 
VARIABLES     
2.Inter-firm 
voluntary 
0.47*** -1.06** 0.14*** -0.08*** 
 (0.18) (0.34) (0.02) (0.03) 
3. Inter-firm 
involuntary 
-0.68 -4.09*** 0.05 0.02 
 (0.42) (0.56) (0.05) (0.05) 
5.Intra-firm 
voluntary 
-0.14 1.67* 0.04* -0.12** 
 (0.19) (0.91) (0.02) (0.06) 
6.intra-firm 
involuntary 
-0.48  -0.00  
 (0.95)  (0.12)  
     
Constant 34.93*** 43.03*** 0.01 0.16 
 (1.94) (0.54) (0.24) (0.20) 
     
Observations 26,020 33,522 26,032 32,871 
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.03 
Number of pid 3,698 4,223 3,698 4,181 
Wave/Years 10-18 2000-2008 10-18 2000-2008 
Weights Clustered SE w11103 Clustered SE w11103 
 
Note: Estimates taken from Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 for the UK; and Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 for Germany. All estimates consider 
measures of time alone (subjective and objective). 
 
 
The output is summarised in Table 7.1. The constant coefficients reveal baseline 
differences for Germany and the UK.  In terms of objective working hours, German 
respondents work 43 hours at the model’s baseline. It should be noted that the hours 
outcome was operationalised using the annual working time measure, and so may not be 
fully accurate. British respondents work 35 hours at the model’s baseline. The 
prevalence of part-time and casual forms of work is likely pulling down the UK 
average. The models in each country do not control for part-time work, but part time 
workers are considered in the sample (see Table 3.6 on p 74). These contracts are less 
prevalent in Germany, although forms of mini-work exist. This is evident in the 
standard error of both countries, listed below the constant terms. The German constant 
is more predictable (0.54) than the UK’s constant (1.94) suggesting working time varies 
far more in the UK than Germany. In terms of satisfaction with working time, German 
satisfaction is above the mean (0.16), when compared to UK satisfaction, which sits at 
the mean (0.01); the standard errors reveal that this difference is not significant at the 
baseline.  
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Inter-firm VM in both countries produces different estimates depending on the 
institutional context. The change has a positive effect on both subjective and objective 
outcomes in the UK. The change has a negative effect on both subjective and objective 
outcomes in Germany. Clearly, the assumption that voluntary mobility leads workers to 
vacancies with “better” working time does not hold for both countries. 
British respondents who move voluntarily see increased hours, and increased 
satisfaction with hours with a new employer. Germans see hours as a point of 
contention, or a point of compromise after moving to a new vacancy, giving up 
objective hours and satisfaction with hours but gaining in other outcomes (satisfaction 
with work, not listed above but discussed previously).   
Regarding intra-firm VM, results in both countries appear mixed, but an institutional 
difference is again apparent. British workers who take a promotion see no change in 
objective hours, but a minor positive change in satisfaction with hours. Here mobility 
has a surplus effect on satisfaction with hours, without changing the objective hours 
themselves. This may be the results of better control over hours following a promotion, 
where workers are better able to organise their working time, without seeing an increase 
or decrease in actual working time. In Germany, workers see an increase in weekly 
working hours after (what is most likely) a promotion, followed by a fall in their 
satisfaction with time. Changes in working hours (either an increase or a decrease) lead 
to dissatisfaction with time among German workers. This could stem from the nature of 
promotions in Germany, which could contain sharp increases in responsibility, where 
workers must work longer and more demanding hours.  
Lastly, IVM also has country-specific effects. In the UK, IVM has no significant effect 
on time, using neither objective nor subjective outcomes. Here, workers do not see a 
change in hours which cannot be explained by personal characteristics, and so 
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subsequent vacancies themselves do not affect working time. In Germany, IVM has an 
effect on objective measures of time alone. Workers who lose their job move to 
positions with far lower working time than can be explained by their resources. 
However, the same change does not have an effect on satisfaction with time in 
Germany. Despite a fall in hours, workers remain equally satisfied with working time 
after the change. This could reflect a change in the responsibility of workers, suggesting 
they move to less demanding jobs with shorter hours. 
Overall, mobility is a significant predictor of working time in the UK. The German 
models too produce significant effects, but several run counter to the hypothesis. In the 
UK, IVM has no significant effect on outcomes, while in Germany IVM has a negative 
effect on weekly working time alone. I accept hypothesis 4a for the UK, but reject 
hypothesis 5a for Germany.VM has a positive effect on working time in the UK, but in 
Germany intra-firm mobility has a positive effect on subjective time, but a negative 
effect on satisfaction with time. Finally, I reject hypothesis 4b for the UK, but accept 
hypothesis 5b for Germany. In both countries, IVM is largely unimportant, at least for 
measures of working time.  
In both countries the complexities of seeing mobility as a utilitarian process emerge. 
First, the assumption that VM (or IVM) has a similar effect across a range of outcomes 
does not hold. In fact VM often leads to compromises, with workers who move gaining 
in some outcome and losing in another, both of which try to capture utility. This is 
evident in the German results, where workers see a fall in hours and satisfaction with 
hours after a voluntary change. Second, there is a mismatch between mobility’s effect 
on objective and subjective measures of the same outcome; the assumption that both 
react similarly to mobility does not hold. This is evident in the UK, where positive 
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change in satisfaction with time, does not mean increased time, but may instead mean a 
greater control over time. The next section turns to measures of pay. 
Table 7.2: Results for BHPS & SOEP (2000-2008), subjective and objective measures of pay.  
 BHPS SOEP BHPS SOEP 
VARIABLES Log Gross monthly 
pay 
Log gross monthly 
pay 
Satisfaction with pay, linear z-
scores 
z-score satisfaction with 
pay 
     
2.Inter-firm voluntary 0.01* -0.02* 0.24*** 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
3. Inter-firm 
involuntary 
-0.07*** -0.01 0.05 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) 
5.Intra-firm voluntary 0.01* 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) 
6.intra-firm 
involuntary 
-0.09*  0.02  
 (0.05)  (0.11)  
     
Constant 7.47*** 7.71*** -0.19 0.25 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.27) (0.25) 
     
Observations 26,057 30,013 26,016 32,749 
R-squared 0.25 0.18 0.07 0.10 
Number of pid 3,698 4,066 3,698 4,180 
Wave 10-18  10-18  
Weights Clustered SE w11103 Clustered SE w11103 
 
Note: Estimates taken from Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 for the UK, and Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 for Germany. All estimates consider 
measures of pay alone (subjective and objective). 
 
Table 7.2 considers subjective and objective measures of pay in both countries. The 
constant terms reveal baseline differences in Germany and the UK. In terms of objective 
gross monthly pay, both countries use different currencies and are not directly 
comparable. Both are in natural logs. However, the standard errors reveal minor 
differences between countries. German baseline gross monthly pay has a smaller 
standard error (0.04) than the standard error for British workers (0.08) suggesting the 
average is more predictable in Germany than the UK; the difference is statistically 
significant as the standard errors do not overlap. Again, this could be the product of 
Germany’s coordinated market where earnings inequality is lower than in the UK. As 
an aside, the German 90/10 ratio22 of income inequality is listed as 3.25 (2000-2002), 
                                                 
22 The 90/10 ratio is a measure of inequality. It captures the size of income of the top ten 
percent compared to the bottom 10 percent. The coefficient focuses on income as a 
whole, not just wages.  Thus Germany’s top ten percent earns three times more than its 
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while the same measure for the UK is 4.67 (O Riain, 2014). Regarding satisfaction with 
pay, the UK’s baseline satisfaction was below the average (-0.19), while baseline 
satisfaction in Germany was above the average (0.25). The standard errors reveal the 
differences at baseline may not be significant.  
Considering inter-firm VM first; British respondents who quit their job move to 
vacancies with better subjective and objective pay. The results in Germany are different. 
Here respondents who quit move to lower paid vacancies. However the change has no 
effect on workers’ subjective satisfaction with pay. In this way quitting leads workers to 
lower paid jobs but does not affect how workers evaluate their pay. This could be the 
product of reduced responsibility after the change. German workers resign from a firm 
and move to a position where pay is lower but responsibility is also lower, aligning both 
the pay and the role filled by the worker. As mentioned in the country specific chapters, 
this result is closely tied to weekly working hours. Controlling for weekly hours 
eliminates the negative effect on objective pay in Germany, and the positive effect on 
objective pay in the UK. 
The effects of intra-firm VM also differ by country. In the UK, intra-firm VM has a 
significant positive effect on pay, and a significant positive effect on satisfaction with 
pay. However, the objective effect is minor, a 1% increase in monthly earnings after the 
change. The estimate remains significant even when controlling for weekly hours, 
confirming the change resembles a type of attainment (Sørensen, 1975, Sørensen, 
1977). In Germany, intra-firm mobility has a strong positive effect on pay, but no 
significant effect on satisfaction with pay. Again, this could be due to respondents 
earning more as they move through an internal career ladder, but experiencing no 
                                                                                                                                               
bottom ten percent, and the UK’s top ten percent earns four times more than its bottom 
ten percent.    
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change in satisfaction due to increased responsibility in a new role. The effect remains 
even after controlling for weekly hours. It is far greater in Germany than the UK.  
There is a sharp contrast between the German effect and the British effect, which could 
be the product of frequency. In Germany, intra-firm mobility is less common, hence 
throughout an average respondent’s time in the labour market, she may see just one or 
two promotions, which carry a significant change in pay. These changes are more 
common in the UK, due to the higher organisational structures (DiPrete et al., 1997). 
Hence workers may need to experience a number of promotions before seeing a 
substantial change in pay. Common in both countries is the fact that movement in the 
firm itself has a positive effect tied to earnings, independent to the characteristics of the 
worker.     
Lastly, the effects of IVM differ by country. In the UK, IVM has a strong negative 
effect on objective pay, but no significant effect on satisfaction with pay. In Germany, 
IVM has no effect on pay whatsoever, neither subjective nor objective. This could be 
the product of Germany’s welfare state which supports workers during their 
unemployment with generous benefits (as suggested by Kalleberg and Mastekaasa 
(2001) and Fasang et al. (2012)). The opposite is true in the UK, where workers strive to 
take the quickest available job after an involuntary change. Thus IVM is most 
consequential for workers in “liberal” economies, but not “coordinated” markets. It’s 
possible that workers who experience a fall in wages (in the UK) take lower paid 
vacancies in an effort to leave unemployment as quickly as possible. The fact that 
satisfaction with pay is unaffected by moving to the vacancy may be due to workers 
moving to less demanding positions where their lowered pay corresponds to a lowered 
set of responsibilities. As mentioned, it is expected that both objective and subjective 
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outcomes improve with voluntary mobility, and worsen with involuntary mobility. The 
results above are far more nuanced.   
I reject hypothesis 4a for the UK, despite the fact that mobility’s effect is significant it is 
weak and disappears once weekly hours are controlled for. I accept hypothesis 5a for 
Germany. Intra-firm mobility is a strong predictor of wages, and is more important than 
inter-firm change as laid out by efficiency wage theory and internal labour market 
theory. Finally, I accept hypothesis 4b for the UK models predicting pay, and hypothesis 
5b for Germany. In the UK IVM has a significant negative effect on objective pay. In 
Germany this effect is absent. 
The complexity with seeing country differences as fuelled by utilitarian gain does not 
emerge. First, the assumption that VM (or IVM) has a similar effect across a range of 
outcomes does not hold. VM means compromises for workers. As with hours, this 
complexity emerges best in the German results. Workers who change employers see a 
minor fall in pay and no change in satisfaction with pay. In fact, workers use mobility to 
gain more interesting or satisfying forms of work, compromising on pay. Second, the 
assumption that VM affects subjective and objective pay equally does not hold, this is 
another complexity that is not considered by utility-driven theories. This is evident in 
the UK’s results, where the positive change in satisfaction with pay following a quit 
equates with a minor increase in actual pay, one which disappears when controlling for 
weekly working hours. 
In both countries the relationship between mobility and outcomes appear to shape 
worker action, but not through utilitarian gain. The highly mobile market of the UK 
does not improve objective wages which are set by efficiency and competition. 
However, mobility gives workers a chance to negotiate their conditions and 
responsibilities, which may better align with their pay after a move. By the same token, 
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the German market, with clearly defined pay and conditions, internalises workers with 
high premiums tied to internal change. The results of intra-firm mobility in Germany 
could also be the product of increased responsibility, but it is clear that objective 
increases in pay depend on intra-firm change. Workers who take a promotion see a 
sharp increase in objective pay, but the new responsibilities tied to the promotion may 
keep satisfaction with pay from rising.  
Beyond the hypotheses and complexities above, one similarity in both countries is the 
fact that inter-firm mobility does not suggest immediate financial gain for workers, and 
instead contains tradeoffs and compromises. This finding runs counter to a wider 
narrative on mobile labour markets. The idea that mobile markets give workers the 
chance to improve pay and status with a new employer does not emerge in either set of 
models. Quitting in an open market (UK) and a closed market (German) affects workers 
roughly equally. Inter-firm mobility (and on a broader note, mobile labour markets 
overall) may be a tactic for placing oneself near strong career-ladders, but it does not 
immediately reward workers with attainment. The findings above show that career 
progress and increased pay occur best with a given firm or a given employer, which is 
especially true in Germany.  
Authors argue that turbulence and movement is good for workers over the long term 
(OECD, 2010, Brown et al., 2008, Direnzo and Greenhaus, 2011). However the output 
above suggests that workers gain little from mobile markets, at least in the immediate 
sense. Brown et al. (2008) specifically cite turbulent markets as important to workers’ 
pay and conditions. Where France limits the ease with which employers are able to fire 
workers, the US allows for “dynamic markets”, where labour is mobile, and firms are 
born and die regularly. This is framed as a better deal for all, although throughout their 
argument it becomes apparent that the deal benefits employers best. “...economic 
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turbulence results in stronger industries, as more productive firms tend to replace less 
productive ones... Although there are costs to workers... who are caught up in the 
adjustment process, most... handle economic turbulence well. Over time, their job 
changes result in improved jobs, although job change often involves a period without 
work. Workers who initially find a good job with a firm—for whatever reason—typically 
do better than workers who change jobs [own emphasis]. When workers do lose... good 
jobs because of firm downsizing, they may end up in an inferior job. Those workers who 
start out on bad job ladders with low earnings and low earnings growth usually are 
able to land on better job ladders by changing jobs.” ((Brown et al., 2008):p120) 
The gains of mobile labour markets for employers are obvious; any long term 
commitment previously held to hiring workers is loosened. The gains of a mobile labour 
market for labour are vague, framed as something to be gained over time. Even in the 
passage above the premiums of mobile markets appear more complex than a simple 
win-win for capital and labour. Those who are mobile are not always rewarded for this 
mobility. Brown et al. (2008) concede that those who join strong and secure firms and 
limit their mobility do better than mobile workers. It also seems that the passage above 
describes internal career ladders as the best way to improve working conditions and 
pay; mobility in itself is the best strategy for one day becoming immobile or mobile in 
the intra-firm sense alone. 
The vague suggestion that workers have much to gain from mobile markets also appears 
in the OECD (2010) Employment Outlook report. It writes “labour reallocation” 
(mobility), is an important element in productivity growth. As argued above, the point is 
appealing; mobile labour markets move workers through industries, passing on skills 
and knowledge. The chapter highlights that inefficient businesses close, forcing workers 
to be laid off, dismissed, or mobile for other involuntary reasons. In contrast productive 
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firms grow, forcing employers to expand, hire new workers, and invest in some of the 
workers left behind by a closing firm. There are country differences in the rates of 
mobility (or reallocation), which are summarised as barriers to be removed. Removing 
these will “enhance growth”. As argued throughout, many of these points may be true. 
Employers can make obvious gains from flexible markets; the point is not contested. 
However, authors are vague about the gains offered to employees. These are less clear. 
The OECD concedes that reallocation can have disruptive “distributional effects”, 
specifically for those who experience IVM. Regarding an upside, the report finds mixed 
evidence of a wage “premia” and improved conditions for those who move, depending 
on the country considered. Overall the OECD (2010) points out that mobile markets 
offer opportunities and costs. Those who quit typically progress their career and pay, 
those who lose their job, typically experience penalties in pay and conditions. The 
findings in this thesis, builds on the nuance in this statement. First, VM contains few 
benefits for workers, beyond the subjective. Second, IVM indeed contains penalties for 
workers, but these appear sharpest in markets where mobility is most common (the 
UK). Finally, in terms of objective gains, the largest premiums in both countries come 
from internal promotions in the form of efficiency wages. The OECD ultimately 
conclude that partial reforms may “result in no or negative productivity gains” and that 
the effect on workers will likely be heterogeneous: 
(page 200 (OECD, 2010))“There is… evidence suggesting…  the effect of selected 
labour…  policies and institutions (including employment protection, unemployment 
benefits, and product market regulation) on the wage share in value added is limited, 
which…  leads to the conclusion that the benefits of… reforms in this area are likely to 
be shared with workers in the form of higher average wages. However, not all workers 
are likely to gain from these reforms in the same way. In particular, the evidence… 
suggests that reforms involving the relaxation of regulatory provisions on individual 
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and collective dismissals are likely to increase the number of workers who are affected 
by labour mobility at the initiative of the employer.” 
Despite finding mixed results for an upside to mobile labour markets for workers, the 
report concludes this can be fixed by limiting the negative effects of IVM “Indeed, 
without impairing labour reallocation, unemployment benefits designed [to be 
generous] will sustain income during job search and might promote better job matches 
and hence reduce wage losses at re-employment …”  Ultimately, a series of policy 
recommendations are proposed to make the market more mobile for the sake of 
efficiency. While this is understood, the idea that workers can make gains from the 
changes is underdeveloped and does not fit the findings presented in this thesis.  
Considering the assumption directly, Direnzo and Greenhaus (2011), citing Brown et al. 
(2008), suggest workers must focus on maximizing their employability in the new, 
volatile, economy. Job turnover provides opportunities for gaining skill, building human 
capital, and improving job satisfaction, even when their base level of satisfaction is 
relatively high. As with other papers above, the idea that unsatisfactory jobs exist 
because of the market’s insistence on low quality conditions is not mentioned. Instead, 
it is taken for granted that these positions must exist, and that although bad, they are 
stepping stones to something better in a volatile economy. Mobility is framed as a 
consequence of developing “career competencies” where workers enhance their 
employability and move to more satisfying jobs. Thus, mobility is presented as 
opportunity. Portions of this argument appear in the UK chapter of this thesis; several 
subjective measures of work are improved by mobility. The problem is the strong 
implication that mobility will move workers to better jobs overall, ones with higher pay 
and overall better positions. In truth mobility leads workers to improve unfavourable for 
similar pay, or a similar rate of pay (higher pay for longer hours). On the other hand, 
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mobility in Germany is limited partially because good working conditions are more 
widely available. 
Overall, each of the authors sees the interest of employers and the interest of labour as 
one and the same. Each suggests that both gain from competitive markets, where 
turbulence produces strong firms, industry winners, and good working conditions. It is 
inconceivable that poor pay and poor working conditions for staff could be a part of the 
winning formula, which creates strong firms and industry winners (yet these emerge 
constantly). The findings in this thesis would further challenge Brown et al. (2008), the 
OECD (2010), and Direnzo and Greenhaus (2011). Ultimately, results suggest that 
workers gain little from inter-firm mobility, and largely see improved subjective 
improvements which possibly stem from working in poor conditions. Objectively, 
workers gain the most through intra-firm mobility within a secure firm, which improves 
both the pay and the subjective working conditions of staff. From the perspective of the 
authors above, less mobile labour markets like Germany’s are limiting the opportunity 
structure of the workforce, not pursuing good working conditions and industry pay for 
the majority. 
Even in the literature of economics, there is little evidence that mobile markets carry 
direct benefits for workers. Bertola (1990) tests the assumption that protected markets 
lead to higher unemployment rates for those who move for IVM. As before, mobile 
labour markets may be more “efficient” for the economy, and more profitable for the 
employer, but the question of whether these have unwanted penalties for workers, is a 
good one. Bertola (1990) tests whether immobile and protected labour markets lead to 
inflated wages, for those in permanent and stable jobs. He finds no relationship between 
changes in job protection strength, and the level of unemployment. Pushing the 
argument further, he finds such changes do not lead to artificially increased wages for 
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insiders. In fact, in less mobile and secure labour markets, wages tend to be lower “and 
more sensitive to outside unemployment”, especially in times of economic downturn. 
This suggests that those who fall into unemployment are not “crowded out” of a secure 
labour market, and although unemployment may be extended it is not increased by 
changes in protection. Elsewhere, Bertola and Rogerson (1997) test the assumption that 
high protection leads to lower turnover, an argument presented by Brown et al. (2008). 
In fact, a country’s wage negotiation is said to have a larger effect on labour market 
turnover, than the strength of job protections legislation. Further, both papers find that 
the impact of protection and turnover has a limited effect on earnings, and in fact, both 
may be shaped by institutions governing earnings. 
Despite these findings, flexibility is still on the agenda for most European countries 
(Thelen, 2014). The idea that this flexibility has something to offer workers, should be 
contested and challenged. 
7.2. Interpretation, Meaning, and Discussion 
The sociological perspective on labour markets sees inequality as tied to position in a 
social structure, not to the characteristics of individuals. As a result, the concept of job 
mobility is particularly important for capturing premiums tied to vacancies (Sørensen 
and Kalleberg, 1981). The theoretical reasons for job mobility rely on utilitarian gain, 
where change is driven by the promise of better vacancies with better outcomes, 
independent of the worker’s resources (Sørensen, 1975, Sørensen, 1977). In this view, 
every configuration of the mobility-outcomes relationship is theoretically simple. For 
mobility types, VM will be driven by utility and gain; IVM will result in loss. For 
differences between workers, dominant groups (with resources) will gain the most from 
VM, while others will gain less (Sørensen, 1975). For country differences, markets 
where workers have the most to gain from mobility will have the most mobility (Brown 
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et al., 2008). This thesis tests this assumption and outlines two complexities. First, 
mobility does not improve all outcomes equally, bargains and compromises are 
inevitable since employer and workers are in conflict. Second, mobility affects 
subjective and objective measures of the same outcome differently. Although new 
vacancy contain better rewards, the vacancy also brings new demands from employers, 
which must be weighed up to gage utility. The central assumption, that VM is uniformly 
good, does not hold. Instead results show the complexities above work to the advantage 
and disadvantage of workers in each configuration. These are discussed in reverse order 
below.  
7.2.1. Country differences in mobility and outcomes 
If VM is assumed to lead to better jobs, then countries with less VM are seen as limiting 
workers. However, once the complexities described above are considered, both 
countries reveal advantages and disadvantages of mobility’s impact on outcomes. 
Inter-firm mobility in Germany results in slightly lower pay and fewer hours for 
workers. However, respondents who experience the change move to vacancies with 
more satisfactory work. Employer change may be fuelled not by attainment as described 
in the literature, but by a need for more satisfying forms of work, or a need to correct for 
work mismatch. Inter-firm mobility in the UK results in slightly higher pay coupled 
with longer hours. However, the largest effects of VM are subjective satisfaction These 
subjective satisfactions do not manifest in an objective sense. Here it is possible that 
employer change is fuelled by a need to correct for poor working conditions, or to 
improve subjective feelings about work.  
Country differences in the consequence of mobility, likely explain a larger portion of 
country differences than previous authors have considered. Mills et al. (2006a) discuss 
the importance of domestic institutions when explaining patterns of job mobility in 12 
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countries. Broadly, they identify two systems of labour markets; “open” and “closed” 
which are shaped by welfare regime, education and training, and employment systems. 
The typology is outlined in section 2.3.1 on p 46 alongside the worlds of welfare 
capitalism typology (Esping-Andersen, 2013). 
The key impact of institutions is not fully explored by Mills et al. (2006b). Authors cite 
the importance of employment protection systems and the strength of collective 
bargaining as important in shaping “openness”, but the mechanism of these suggests 
they influence the rate of involuntary change alone. Specifically, the authors cite 
employment relations systems, made up of work council strength, collective bargaining 
strength, and strength of unions. These are said to influence job protection, but job 
protection is concerned mostly with rates of IVM. The major difference between both 
countries lies in rates of VM, with a low rate in Germany and a high rate in the UK.  
In this way, Mills et al. (2006a) talk about institutions “shielding” workers from job 
mobility induced by globalization, but their mention of individualised bargaining is 
perhaps a better reflection of reality. This is further reflected in chapters 5 and 6 of this 
work. Focusing on what workers gain from mobility better illustrates the importance of 
collective bargaining as a dimension shaping mobility patterns. In the UK workers gain 
little in terms of intra-firm mobility, pursuing promotion leads to minor changes in pay 
and minor changes in satisfaction. Hence, workers move between firms in an effort to 
find better work. However, the utility they gain from such changes are largely 
subjective, with more satisfaction in pay, hours, and work. It could be that wages are 
competitive and driven by efficiency, that mobility leaves workers to instead try to 
correct for their role, responsibility, and conditions, in an effort to better align this with 
their pay. 
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In Germany workers gain the most from intra-firm mobility, at least when pay is the 
outcome. Pursuing promotion leads workers to vacancies with much higher pay, which 
goes beyond worker characteristics alone. Hence, workers limit mobility between firms, 
in an effort to pursue promotions and gain tenure.   
Further, the Varieties of Capitalism approach (which considers the perspective of firms 
not workers) makes a similar distinction; Germany is an example of a coordinated 
market economy, while the UK is a liberal market economy. The main perspective is 
summarised in section 2.3.1 on p 46.  
When discussing Germany Hall and Soskice (2001) cite industrial relations as important 
for maintaining coordinated market economies. They specifically note the importance of 
wage setting at the industry level. As an example, coordinated market economies rely 
on skilled production which leaves employers vulnerable to poaching. In an effort to 
correct this, collective agreements standardise wages and conditions in an effort to make 
firm commitment more likely. This is never tested in the literature, but the results 
produced in the thesis supports the view. VM between firms does not reward workers 
significantly, improving only subjective satisfaction at the cost of a fall in hours and 
pay. Intra-firm promotions provide workers with the biggest increase in pay, as workers 
try to internalise workers into the firm. 
Making the same argument for Liberal Market Economies, Hall and Soskice (2001) 
point out individualised bargaining between the individual and the employer, which 
leads to a wide variance in pay, and a freedom in firing and hiring for employers. Hall 
and Soskice cite heavy market competition which keeps “wages and inflation low”. But 
this is only part of the British system as a whole. While heavy market competition keeps 
workers moving, they also gain little from this competition. Most of the change in the 
British system is voluntary, but the reward tied to this voluntary mobility is largely 
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subjective. The best mechanism for improving wages beyond a respondent’s fixed 
resources is to pursue promotion within an internal career ladder. As a result, the 
mobility experienced in Liberal Market Economies is closer tied to job mismatch rather 
than career progress, where workers may be moving in an effort to improve their 
immediate conditions, they may also be looking for an internal career ladder to commit 
to. Hall and Soskice (2001) allude to this when they claim Liberal Market Economies 
offer a “general” skill-set to young workers which is transferable between firms, 
“Educational arrangements that privilege general, rather than firm-specific skills, are 
complementary to highly fluid labour markets; and the latter render forms of 
technology transfer that rely on labour mobility more feasible” (ibid: p30). This may be 
true, but what is left unsaid is the fact that workers move to vacancies with little more 
than subjective improvements from fluid labour markets. Some face significant 
financial penalties for involuntary mobility, pushing workers into lower valued jobs. 
Thus the observation that companies “developing an entirely new product line can hire 
in personnel with the requisite expertise, knowing they can release them if the project 
proves unprofitable” (ibid: p40) is true for firms, but carries few benefits for workers, at 
least in terms of immediate rewards. If the change is involuntary, it can result in 
significant penalties.   
For both authors, asking what workers get out of mobile or immobile labour markets 
sheds light on the wider system. The two labour markets described by Mills et al. 
(2006b) and Hall and Soskice (2001) thus have two different versions of “quits” for 
example, and two different versions of “promotion”. In Germany a quit may be driven 
by a want of interesting or more satisfying work, where compromises must be made. In 
the UK, a quit may be driven by a need to improve working conditions or increase 
working hours. Respondents who change firms see a change in their subjective feelings 
about work and pay, but not their objective pay. Thus when person-specific factors are 
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taken into account, workers are no better off in terms of earnings with a new employer 
than with an existing employer.   
By the same token, countries differ in terms of what workers get from a “promotion”. In 
the UK, a promotion carries a miniscule change in pay, and a minor improvement in 
subjective feelings about work; workers will likely need to experience several 
promotions before seeing a substantial change in earnings. In Germany, a promotion has 
no effect on subjective outcomes, but a large significant premium in pay, which 
possibly reflects the fact that promotions are uncommon in Germany. In both countries, 
workers see a type of efficiency wage, earning above what is expected according to 
human capital (Becker, 1994). However, in the UK promotion affects both objective 
and subjective outcomes positively, but in Germany only objective pay is affected. This 
could be the result of increased responsibility which follows promotion in Germany, in 
this way workers who receive promotions do not feel different about pay following the 
change, because they feel it reflects their added responsibility. Thus both countries 
contain advantages and disadvantages to voluntary mobility types. 
Two recommendations are considered for future authors hoping to compare country 
mobility regimes. First, more recent data should be considered for the UK. This is due 
to the profound changes in the British labour market that took place while the thesis was 
carried out. Research began in 2012, as Britain was emerging from the European Debt 
Crisis, returning to growth, and ending a period of austerity. Crisis years were not used 
in the research design as they were considered non-representative of the sample. 
However, by the summer of 2017, when the conclusion of this work was written, Britain 
had voted to leave the European Union. Although the impact of the move will not be 
clear until the terms are negotiated, it is likely that change will lead to further inequality 
in pay and working conditions. Many EU-level regulations of working conditions and 
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working time could no longer apply to the UK once agreements are finalised. This will 
lead to further dispersion of their quality. As a result, these changes will increase the 
rate of voluntary job mobility in the UK (after a period of low mobility due to lack of 
confidence after key agreements are made). Second, more country comparisons should 
be made between capitalisms and their consequence for the mobility-outcomes 
relationship. Many Eastern-European countries are routinely advised to deregulate their 
labour markets to ensure mobility. While this may work for attracting foreign direct 
investment, it will likely lead to precarity and instability for the workers themselves. 
The section below turns to models estimating worker differences and their meaning. 
7.2.2. Differences between workers 
Overall, authors have focused on the differences in rates of mobility between gender 
and education groups, framed as differences in life-chances. Hachen (1990) summarises 
these as the limited-opportunity model. This approach assumes mobility does not bring 
“universal utility” to workers. Instead overt or statistical discrimination limits the 
distribution of these opportunities, leaving vulnerable workers less able to seize the life 
chances of quits and promotions. This thesis pushed the argument further, exploring 
worker differences in the consequence of mobility. Mobility contains patterns of 
bargaining between groups through the medium of mobility. Once the complexities 
described above are considered, each group reveals subtle differences in how they react 
to VM.  
For example, it is untrue to say that British tertiary educated workers hold an advantage 
over workers with a secondary level education when it comes to benefiting from VM, as 
laid out by statistical discrimination (Thurow, 1976). Instead, secondary educated 
workers are able to improve subjective outcomes through VM, while tertiary educated 
workers improve objective pay through VM. This point is missed in the literature 
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because authors often focus on objective pay alone (Keith and McWilliams, 1999), or 
subjective satisfaction alone (Gesthuizen, 2009). Tertiary educated workers may have 
more control over their subjective conditions, improving them through mechanisms 
other than mobility. These may be bargaining, occupational licenses, or union voice. 
Secondary educated workers may be more reliant on mobility itself as the mechanism to 
move into vacancies with better conditions. It could also be that non-tertiary groups 
work in industries with a wider spectrum of working conditions.  
Considering gender, the results support the theories of Acker (2006), who highlights the 
importance of using varied outcomes to capture varied and complex inequality regimes 
within firms. Women (especially black women) are prone to falling into broadly defined 
occupations, with less training and less attention from managers. Within these 
occupations they are likely to be given less visible (but crucial) tasks. Further, the 
nature of inequality regimes, which stem from statistical discrimination among other 
reasons, will push women to depend on the firm more than men and force them to make 
complex tradeoffs within the regime. Women will depend on mobility itself for reward, 
while men can bargain for reward through training and “grooming”. According to Acker 
(2006) when leaving an inequality regime, women may move to objectively better 
conditions since there are vast differences between (firm-specific) inequality regimes. 
The results in UK’s subjective models (Table 5.4 and Table 5.5) support these theories. 
Women rely on promotions for subjective improvements in outcomes, but they are also 
strongly affected by demotion. Men are slightly less affected by the changes, suggesting 
they may have more control over their conditions while with an employer. At first it 
appears that women benefit more than men in objective models. Results show women 
earn more after a quit to a new vacancy, when compared to men (Table 5.6). However 
subsequent analysis shows that women use this mobility to move to vacancies with 
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longer working hours, which reflects the increase in pay. Thus women do gain 
objectively from inter-firm mobility, but this gain is not a form of attainment. Instead it 
is the result of bargaining for longer hours. Strangely promotion does not carry 
increased hours, but increases women’s satisfaction with hours, possibly signalling 
greater control over working time overall, men are unaffected by the change and 
typically use promotion to lower their working hours.  
The inequality regime perspective emerges less in Germany, where women are 
completely unaffected by VM, and men make compromises in outcomes (one of which 
is lower working hours). Women may be reliant on the firm when the outcome is 
working time, as they see a sharp decline in hours (and satisfaction with time) after 
IVM. However several outcomes do not affect women in the German models, 
suggesting men are those most affected by firm-specific inequality regimes. Leaving a 
firm forces men to make compromises in hours and pay, for more interesting forms of 
work.  
In the results above, there are wider gender differences in mobility’s impact on time, 
than there are on mobility’s impact on pay. This finding fits with previous authors who 
find no gender difference in the effect mobility has on earnings (Keith and McWilliams, 
1995), but does not fit with the idea of overt discrimination, which is predicted to shape 
the chances of promotion or demotion, as well as its consequences. This lack of effect 
could be the product of controlling for occupation and industry categories when 
estimating pay, since gender differences less often emerge from employers paying 
different rates for the same role. Rather, they emerge from the filtering of women and 
men to specific occupations and industries with fewer or more opportunities (Cooke, 
2016, Cooke, 2014). It is possible that overt discrimination is shaping the working time 
available to women, forcing them to look beyond a single employer in the UK, and to 
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stick to a given employer in Germany. In this way, women are seen as less capable of 
working full time within the inequality regimes described by Acker (2006), by changing 
employers women are able to correct this. No systemic gender differences in the 
relationship between VM and outcomes emerge. This is true in both countries. 
However, while no systemic difference between genders emerges, men and women 
make different gains in mobility in both countries.  
Considering educational differences, the limited-opportunity model (Hachen, 1990) 
again assumes that differences between workers are largely difference in the chance of 
promotion or quit. But the approach does not consider the effects of these on outcomes. 
Thurow (1976) proposes that less educated workers are blocked from opportunity and 
training in the labour market since they are unable to signal their “usefulness” to 
employers, statistical discrimination. Sørensen (1977) also argued that education is an 
important part of attainment theory, and that worker education credentials (and other 
resources like class, status) are particularly important since they remain unchanged 
throughout a person’s time in the labour market. Those with high education use 
mobility to close the gap between their resources and their reward (pay, status etc). Thus 
more educated workers would be more mobile and gain the most from mobility.   
However the results above show that secondary level educated workers use mobility to 
improve subjective outcomes (often relying on the firm), while third level educated 
workers improve objective outcomes using mobility, seeing only minor changes in 
subjective outcomes. In the UK for example, secondary and basic educated workers 
often gain the most from intra-firm VM (increased satisfaction with security, pay, and 
time). Third level educated workers are hardly affected by VM when outcomes are 
subjective. However, when the outcome becomes objective pay or working time, third 
level educated workers gain the most from inter-firm VM while other groups see no 
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change in pay but increased working hours. The results are somewhat different in 
Germany, the effect of VM on subjective outcomes differs little by educational group, 
but secondary educated workers must make bargains between satisfaction with work 
and satisfaction with time following mobility. Third level educated workers are less 
affected by mobility. However, secondary educated workers also see significant pay 
premium for intra-firm VM, earning more after intra-firm VM compared to third level 
educated workers. Several of these findings run completely counter to statistical 
discrimination.     
In the UK, it’s possible that third level educated workers have a greater control over 
their working conditions due to occupational license, while those with a secondary level 
or basic level of education fall into poorer working conditions, which are corrected 
using mobility. It’s also possible that secondary educated workers are aware of their 
limited prospects, and so appreciate the effect of promotion than those with a third level 
education. Lastly, it’s possible that British non-tertiary workers rely on moving through 
vacancies because they receive less training at work, similar to women in the inequality 
regime. Tertiary educated groups are able to improve outcomes through training and 
development, while non-tertiary groups move through vacancies searching for better 
outcomes. In Germany, workers with a secondary or vocational education may move 
through clearly defined pay grades, where a “promotion” or an intra-firm change, results 
in moving from one wage bracket to another. Those with a third level education may 
instead be following industry or occupational mechanisms guided by tenure or levels of 
experience, instead of specific mobility events. In short, the assumption that third level 
educated workers gain the most from mobility does not hold, as workers make trades in 
outcomes based on their resources. The section below considers the key 
recommendation for testing between worker differences.  
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Further work must compare and contrast worker groups in the mobility-outcomes 
relationship. New-career theorists (Arthur and Rousseau, 2001, Tolbert, 2001) suggest 
all groups benefit from mobility roughly equally. Further work should consider the 
impact of social class, testing the consequences of mobility between class groups. 
Theoretically, the “employment relationship” proposed by Goldthorpe (2000, 2002), 
implicitly considers the mobility-outcomes relationship. Class categories may better 
capture worker differences than educational categories. The final section turns to the 
micro relationship between mobility and outcomes, and its meaning. 
7.2.3. Types of mobility and outcomes 
Finally, all VM is assumed to benefit workers regardless of mobility type. Thus 
promotions are expected to lead to better vacancies as much as voluntary quits should 
lead to better vacancies with new employer. Yet, these are separate mechanisms with 
different consequences for workers.  
The theory of attainment (Sørensen, 1977), one of the simpler predictions of VM and 
outcomes, has usefulness. However throughout this work important distinctions and 
limitations emerge. The theory argues that VM is a key step to improving worker 
outcomes; it is beneficial to workers because vacancies always contain better jobs. Yet, 
results show that voluntary changes have different effects on subjective and objective 
outcomes, depending on whether the change is between or within firms. In the 
immediate sense, VM between firms lead to workers to improved subjective outcomes, 
and do little for objective outcomes, counter to both the theory of attainment and 
values-rewards theory (discussed in the review of chapter 2). Promotions however, 
contain objective improvements offering better earnings and hours. 
It is possible that workers who quit do so to pursue future promotion opportunities 
elsewhere, as suggested by Kronberg (2013, 2014) and Brown et al. (2008). It could 
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also be that mobility in itself does not improve career outcomes like pay, but is an 
artefact of worker characteristics. Both of these suggestions would explain the fact that 
cross sectional or OLS estimates produce significant effects of quitting on outcomes, 
but fixed-effects regression produces weak estimates for quitting on outcomes. Both of 
these suggestions run counter to attainment theory. In both countries mobility within the 
firm improves objective outcomes best, as predicted by efficiency wage theory.  
This section considers each theory in turn, comparing the findings with its prediction. 
Authors have also used the theory of values-rewards outlined by Kalleberg and 
Mastekaasa (2001) (page 188), which states that changes in work attitudes stem from 
changes in reward which are driven by job mobility; thus “...promotions and quits 
should result in higher satisfaction and commitment through increased job rewards 
such as better pay or more interesting work, whereas downward/lateral mobility and 
(especially) layoffs are likely to lead to less rewarding jobs and thus to lower 
satisfaction and commitment.” Here, the theory considers both VM and IVM, where as 
Sørensen (1975) previously warned against considering both processes together, 
possibly for good reason. As with other theories, values-rewards theory treats inter-firm 
and intra-firm mobility as the same. Results throughout the work routinely show this is 
not the case, almost each time models are estimated. Kalleberg and Mastekaasa (2001) 
consider subjective outcomes alone, without considering the impact of mobility on 
objective measures, although they heavily imply that increased “reward” is tied to 
greater wages or lower hours. Overall, their results contain three shortcomings, the 
conflation of inter- and intra-firm mobility, the universal application of the theory 
across outcomes, and the failure to distinguish between subjective and objective 
outcomes. Each of these stems from the utilitarian view that mobility leads to better 
jobs. 
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Efficiency wage theory (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986) has been discussed throughout the 
thesis and is often cited by authors summarised in the literature review. It predicts 
employers will offer above market wages (and in cases working conditions) in an effort 
to internalise key staff. Thus within firm mobility should produce increased wages, and 
improved working conditions for workers, at least in the immediate sense. Inter-firm 
mobility should produce a weaker effect, as workers will move to market rates, set by 
efficiency and competition. The output throughout confirms this is true in both 
countries, some nuance to the findings should be considered at this point. Several of 
these findings cross over with internal labour market theory (Althauser, 1989).  
In the UK intra-firm mobility carries minor improvements in subjective satisfaction but 
improves objective outcomes. The change increases pay and hours as predicted by 
efficiency wage theory. In Germany this mobility contains high premiums in terms of 
pay, while leaving the firm contains penalties. These findings also support efficiency 
wage theory. The theory explains the relationship best in both sets of estimates. 
Employers in Germany are offering high wages that are reliant on tenure and internal 
career structures, and movement between firms is possible but means making 
compromises, like losing working hours for more interesting forms of work. In the UK, 
the premium tied to intra-firm mobility is small, suggesting workers may have to 
experience more than one promotion before they see larger gains in pay, but this makes 
sense since firms structures in the UK tend to be taller. Since organisations are flatter in 
Germany, mobility within the firm carries larger premiums which likely correspond 
with increased responsibility.   
As a note of caution, the results above do not suggest internal labour markets are not in 
decline; the findings in chapter 4 agree with previous authors (Tilly, 1998, Kronberg, 
2013, Kronberg, 2014), rates of intra-firm changes are lower and falling compared to 
262 
 
inter-firm changes (Table 4.3 p106). Particularly in the UK, intra-firm mobility sees a 
sharp decline in the years approaching the 2008 European Debt Crisis. Instead, the point 
is that the rewards tied to intra-firm mobility have not been replaced by inter-firm 
mobility. Again, it could be argued that workers use inter-firm mobility to “settle” in a 
career ladder with prospects, yet this nuance is not considered in the theory of 
attainment or value-rewards. 
Throughout, this work questions the concept of “voluntary” mobility. The thesis uses 
the term out of convention, but calling such movements “voluntary” may be misleading. 
Instead, workers (especially in the UK) may be moved to new positions in an effort to 
maintain poor working conditions and inflexible hours in a wider economy. Within the 
firm too, mobility to new opportunities contains bargains and compromises which are 
“voluntary” only in that they allow workers to leave poorer conditions. What should 
replace the concept of “voluntary mobility”? This question is left to future work. Lateral 
changes, employee-initiated changes, and position changes may be useful concepts 
which avoid the agency-focused perspective of “voluntary mobility”.  
Future work should consider the following. First, the theoretical suggestion that mobile 
markets benefit both workers and employers should be questioned further. The idea that 
mobile markets lead workers to improve their pay and conditions with new employers is 
not supported in the results. Although the suggestion that mobility may be used to locate 
“good” career ladders is noted. Instead mobility has various effects on workers 
depending on the type of mobility, the worker’s characteristics, and the institutional 
context of the change. Second, more work is needed in developing the relationship 
between IVM and outcomes. Conceptually, the theory of attainment (Sørensen, 1977) 
does not give much thought to IVM. The predictions it does offer, often fail. Workers 
appear roughly capable of reproducing their working conditions after the change, 
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instead of moving to lower valued positions. Values-rewards theory tries to address this, 
but fails, as shown in the empirical chapters of this thesis, and in the work of those 
proposing it (Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 2001). This suggests the theory is 
underdeveloped. Third, future research must at least control for intra-firm mobility 
when considering mobile markets; these are complimentary to inter-firm changes yet 
are often left out of analysis. As mentioned throughout the thesis, the fact that intra-firm 
mobility is in decline is not contested. Instead it is a strong mechanism for rewarding 
workers which is not being replaced by the mechanism if inter-firm mobility. The fact 
that intra-firm changes are in decline should worry researchers further.  
Lastly, future work should limit the impact of past unemployment on outcomes. This is 
especially important in the UK data, where extended job history files exist as part of the 
larger spell dataset. These events were not controlled for, as this would have added to 
the large number of variables included. Since results show involuntary mobility has a 
scarring effect, greater effort should be made to parse out even brief periods of 
unemployment. 
Linked to the previous point, greater conceptual work is needed to distinguish between 
job mismatch and the process of advancing one’s career, whatever theory one chooses 
to focus on- economic advancement (Goldthorpe, 2000), attainment (Sørensen, 1975), 
efficiency wage theory (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986), or values-rewards theory (Kalleberg 
and Mastekaasa, 2001). Authors often imply that VM leads workers advancing their 
career, less often authors concede that mobility is a strategy for dealing with poor 
working conditions or a poor person-job fit. Brown et al. (2008) concede this point, but 
argue that overall mobile markets with the freedom to hire and fire will create strong 
and competitive firms that pass profits to workers in the shape of secure, good quality, 
and high paid work. As stated (even in their own findings), this hardly manifests for 
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mobile workers, as non-mobile workers earn more and are more satisfied with work 
than their counterparts. 
7.2.4. Summary 
This work contributes to the existing discussion of mobile labour markets and worker 
mobility (Gesthuizen, 2009, Gesthuizen and Dagevos, 2008, Kronberg, 2013, Kronberg, 
2014, Cha, 2014, Sallaz, 2017, Reichelt and Abraham, 2017). Specifically, it moves the 
focus away from previous analyses looking at the causes and consequences of mobility 
(seeing them as life-chances), and instead focusing on the key assumption that VM 
improves outcomes, rewards workers, and is inherently “good”. Throughout the 
literature, mobility is treated as a vehicle for positive change, career progression, and 
work improvement. This takes the shape of worker pursuit of utility (attainment theory 
and values-rewards theory), and an employer’s desire to internalise workers (efficiency 
wage theory).  
However, this approach is an oversimplification, as empirical papers and the results 
presented here have shown. Firstly, outcomes are multi-faceted. Pay, security, working 
conditions, and time require tradeoffs and compromises; workers use mobility to gain 
improvements in some outcomes for no change (or a penalty) in others. Second, the 
assumption that subjective and objective outcomes are similar measures of utility, does 
not hold. At times, mobility improves subjective outcomes, with no change in objective 
reality, at other moments it improves objective outcomes, with no effects on subjective 
feelings. These two complexities shed light on the effects of worker mobility and the 
reasons behind country differences in mobility.  
Mobile markets, are not functionalist or efficient social constructs where workers 
improve their lot every time they seize a new vacancy. More often, mobile markets 
appear to be mechanisms for improving poor working conditions, between and within 
265 
 
firms with advantages and disadvantages based on configurations. Regarding mobility 
type, inter-firm mobility improves subjective outcomes best, while intra-firm mobility 
improves objective outcomes best. Although compromises exist, workers who move 
between firms are mainly in search of subjectively better positions to work in. Intra-firm 
mobility is where workers improve objective pay best; climbing internal ladders in an 
effort to improve their rates of worth and get closer to attainment.  
Differences between workers are also nuanced. Women use mobility to make 
improvements while men appear to rely on other mechanisms in the UK. The opposite 
appears to be the case in Germany. A uniform effect across genders and contexts does 
not emerge. Educational groups too, show nuances that go beyond what is laid out in 
attainment theory. Lower educated groups depend on mobility for subjective outcomes, 
seeing improvements through change, while third level educated workers are unaffected 
by mobility relying on other mechanisms to change subjective satisfaction. However 
when outcomes are objective third level educated workers gain the most from VM in 
the UK, while secondary level educated workers gain the most in Germany; again 
suggesting that third level educated workers are not uniformly “above” other education 
groups.  
Lastly, the country specific mechanisms of mobility have their own nuance. In the UK 
mobility may be driven by workers improving subjective feelings about work, but 
gaining almost nothing objectively. Here, individualised labour markets mean wages are 
governed by efficiency and competition, pushing workers to negotiate for working 
conditions, and responsibilities instead. The country’s larger rate of mobility may be 
closer tied to its wide variance in working conditions than to a vehicle for attainment or 
class mobility. In Germany, mobility between firms may be fuelled by a desire for more 
satisfying types of work or a want for interesting work. Hence workers must make 
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compromises, sacrificing hours and pay for a new position with a new employer, for 
increased satisfaction with work. 
The assumption that workers have much to gain from mobile labour markets should be 
treated with scepticism, since the conclusion assumes the interests of labour and the 
interests of capital are the same. Instead mobile markets may act as a release valve for 
poor working conditions, or an alternative to the lack of career ladders which employers 
avoid constructing. As Sørensen (1983) noted later, “One may see the considerable 
amount of inequality in personal attainments found in labor markets... to be created in 
large organization as deliberate devices to move employee performance from 
perfunctory to consummate.” The large disparities in rewards act as incentives to gain 
more from workers. This catch may have spilled into the wider economy; where 
precarity and mobility are “deliberate devices”; keeping employees mobile means 
limiting the commitment of employers. Authors often suggest mobility is crucial in 
placing workers into organisations where they have better chances of improving 
outcomes and gaining attainment. Less often they consider the importance of ensuring 
that workers don’t need to chase attainment in a market with poor conditions. The 
mobile markets of the UK are fuelled by voluntary changes. The coordinated markets of 
Germany contain few of these. While one gives workers an opportunity structure to 
negotiate the working conditions they believe are fair, the other offers good conditions 
as standard. 
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1. Appendix: 
The table below considers the main models estimating the relationship between mobility 
and subjective outcomes for the UK.  
Table 1.1: Full models for subjective outcomes. UK (2000-2008) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Satisfaction with work Satisfaction with pay Satisfaction with security Satisfaction with time 
VARIABLES linear z-scores linear z-scores linear z-scores linear z-scores 
     
z_worksat  0.22*** 0.24*** 0.35*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Vol inter-firm 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Invol inter-firm 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Other inter-firm 0.08** -0.05 0.03 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Vol intra-firm 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.04* 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Invol intra-firm -0.09 0.02 -0.07 -0.00 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Other intra-firm -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 
 
Ref: (16-30) 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
agecat (31-45) -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
agecat (46-65) -0.02 -0.04 -0.08* -0.13*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
agecat (66-80) 0.20 0.19 0.08 0.03 
 
Ref: (permanent) 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
0.temporary -0.09 -0.02 -1.12*** 0.05 
 
Ref: (1-99) 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) 
jbsize1 (100-499) 0.05 -0.05* -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
jbsize1 (500-1000+) -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 
 
Ref: wave 10 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
11.wave -0.02 0.11*** 0.01 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
12.wave -0.05 0.09*** 0.04 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
13.wave -0.07* 0.08** 0.05 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
14.wave -0.05 0.13*** 0.07 0.07* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
15.wave -0.07 0.20*** 0.07 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
16.wave 0.00 0.18*** -0.01 0.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
17.wave 0.00 0.21*** 0.04 0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
18.wave -0.04 0.26*** -0.04 0.13** 
 
Ref: No children 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
1 child 0.04 0.07*** -0.02 0.05** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
2 children -0.01 0.07** -0.02 0.08** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
3+ children 0.05 0.10* -0.03 0.09* 
 
Ref:  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Agriculture -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.05* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Energy -0.01 0.25** 0.10 0.25*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) 
Mining  -0.06 0.13 -0.09 0.16** 
ii 
 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) 
Manufacturing 0.07 0.41* -0.25 0.18 
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.25) (0.23) 
Construction -0.12** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Trade 0.05 0.08 -0.07 0.11* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Transport -0.12** 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Finance -0.05 0.01 -0.12** -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Services  -0.12 -0.10 -0.00 0.18*** 
 
Ref: Managers 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Professionals -0.01 0.01 0.07** 0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Technician  0.01 0.04 0.09*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Clerical  -0.07** 0.04 0.06* 0.13*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Services  0.02 -0.08* 0.14*** 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Skilled agri 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.19* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) 
Craft workers -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Plant and machinery -0.13*** -0.01 0.04 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Elementary  -0.11** 0.03 0.10** 0.13*** 
 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Unemployment rate -0.06 0.01 0.03 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Growth -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 
 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.39 -0.19 -0.17 0.01 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.26) (0.24) 
     
Observations 26,231 26,016 25,984 26,032 
R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.14 
Number of pid 3,724 3,698 3,698 3,698 
Wave 10-18 10-18 10-18 10-18 
Weights Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE 
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The table below considers the main models estimating the relationship between mobility 
and objective outcomes for the UK.  
 
Table 1.2: Full models for objective outcomes. UK (2000-2008) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log Gross monthly pay Subjective health Weekly hours 
    
Vol inter-firm 0.01* 0.15*** 0.47*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.18) 
Invol inter-firm -0.07*** 0.12** -0.68 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.42) 
Other inter-firm -0.11*** 0.02 -1.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.30) 
Vol intra-firm 0.01* 0.05 -0.14 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.19) 
Invol intra-firm -0.09* 0.05 -0.48 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.95) 
Other intra-firm -0.03* -0.09 0.04 
 
Ref: (16-30) 
(0.01) (0.06) (0.31) 
agecat (31-45) 0.06*** -0.03 0.36 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.27) 
agecat (46-65) 0.05*** -0.07 0.70* 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.36) 
agecat (66-80) -0.29*** -0.16 -6.70*** 
 
Ref: (permanent) 
(0.06) (0.15) (1.31) 
temporary -0.10*** 0.07 -1.61*** 
 
Ref: (1-99) 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.58) 
jbsize1 (100-499) -0.05*** -0.01 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.22) 
jbsize1 (500-1000+) -0.02** -0.01 0.26 
 
Ref: wave 10 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.20) 
11.wave 0.04***  0.22 
 (0.01)  (0.22) 
12.wave 0.10*** 0.02 0.12 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.23) 
13.wave 0.15*** 0.23*** 0.20 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.24) 
14.wave 0.18*** 0.00 0.07 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.31) 
15.wave 0.23*** -0.11** 0.23 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.32) 
16.wave 0.28*** -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.22) 
17.wave 0.32*** 0.02 -0.34* 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.20) 
18.wave 0.33*** -0.02 -0.50 
 
Ref: No children 
(0.02) (0.08) (0.42) 
1 child -0.03*** 0.04 -1.67*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.23) 
2 children -0.07*** 0.07* -2.65*** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.28) 
3+ children -0.07*** 0.05 -3.29*** 
 
Ref:  
(0.02) (0.06) (0.47) 
Agriculture -0.02 -0.31*** -0.18 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.24) 
Energy -0.02 0.16 0.40 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.81) 
Mining  0.08** -0.00 0.26 
 (0.04) (0.13) (1.52) 
Manufacturing -0.00 0.28 1.11 
 (0.06) (0.19) (1.01) 
Construction -0.01 -0.04 -0.24 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.31) 
Trade 0.02 -0.00 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.41) 
Transport -0.06*** -0.05 -0.83** 
iv 
 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.34) 
Finance -0.02 0.06 -0.34 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.39) 
Services  0.00 0.10 -0.29 
 
Ref: Managers 
(0.02) (0.08) (0.43) 
Professionals -0.06*** 0.01 -0.68** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.28) 
Technician  -0.08*** -0.05 -0.97*** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.24) 
Clerical  -0.13*** 0.04 -1.34*** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.28) 
Services  -0.18*** 0.03 -1.61*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.38) 
Skilled agri -0.10** -0.03 0.49 
 (0.04) (0.13) (1.37) 
Craft workers -0.07*** 0.01 -0.49 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.32) 
Plant and machinery -0.07*** 0.02 0.14 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.38) 
Elementary  -0.19*** -0.01 -1.46*** 
 
 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.42) 
Unemployment rate -0.02* -0.03 0.42 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.30) 
Growth -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.08) 
Constant 7.47*** 5.54*** 34.93*** 
 (0.08) (0.33) (1.94) 
    
Observations 26,057 22,806 26,020 
R-squared 0.25 0.02 0.02 
Number of pid 3,698 3,672 3,698 
Wave 10-18 10-18 10-18 
Weights Clustered SE Clustered SE Clustered SE 
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The table below considers the main models estimating the relationship between mobility 
and subjective outcomes for Germany. 
Table 1.3: Full models for subjective outcomes. Germany (2000-2008). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Work satisfaction pay satisfaction time satisfaction 
    
z_worksat  0.27*** 0.16*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Vol inter-firm 0.27*** 0.02 -0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Invol inter-firm 0.13*** -0.01 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Other Inter-firm -0.13 -0.26*** 0.02 
 (0.36) (0.08) (0.46) 
Intra-firm mobility 0.03 0.01 -0.10 
 
Ref: (16-30) 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
agecat (31-45) -0.00 0.02 -0.06* 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
agecat (46-65) 0.00 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
agecat (66-80) 0.01 0.40* 0.45 
 
Ref: (permanent) 
(0.39) (0.24) (0.29) 
temporary -0.08* -0.04 0.03 
 
Ref: No children 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
1 child -0.00 0.04** -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2 children -0.01 0.05 -0.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
3+ children -0.00 0.12** -0.05 
 
Ref: 1-200 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Firmsize (201-2000) -0.12*** -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Firmsize (2000+) -0.05* -0.05** -0.01 
 
Ref: 2000 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
2001.syear -0.03 0.07*** 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2002.syear -0.08*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2003.syear -0.10*** -0.04** 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2004.syear -0.14*** -0.06*** 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2005.syear -0.17*** -0.03 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2006.syear -0.22*** -0.04** -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2007.syear -0.25*** -0.02 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2008.syear -0.25*** -0.02 0.08*** 
 
Ref:  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Agriculture 0.16 -0.08 0.12 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) 
Energy 0.01 -0.12* -0.04 
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) 
Mining  0.10 0.25** 0.47*** 
 (0.34) (0.13) (0.16) 
Manufacturing 0.02 0.03 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Construction -0.00 0.03 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Trade -0.04 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Transport -0.02 0.13** -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
Finance 0.15* 0.14* 0.02 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
vi 
 
Ref: Managers 
Professionals 0.03 -0.00 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Technician  0.01 -0.03 0.06* 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Clerical  0.04 -0.04 0.07* 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Services  -0.01 -0.05 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Skilled agri -0.15 0.16 0.09 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) 
Craft workers -0.08 -0.02 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Plant and machinery -0.09 0.03 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Elementary  0.01 -0.06 0.04 
 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 0.17*** -0.01 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
    
Observations 33,177 33,012 33,140 
R-squared 0.02 0.10 0.03 
Number of pid 4,219 4,218 4,219 
Weight w11103 w11103 w11103 
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The table below considers the main models estimating the relationship between mobility 
and objective outcomes for Germany.  
Table 1.4: Full models for objective outcomes. Germany (2000-2008). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES gross monthly pay health weekly working hours 
    
Vol inter-firm -0.02* 0.04 -1.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.33) 
Invol inter-firm -0.01 0.12 -4.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.56) 
Other inter-firm 0.13 -0.26 -7.06** 
 (0.16) (0.97) (3.06) 
Intra-firm mobility 0.06*** 0.13 1.67* 
 
Ref: (16-30) 
(0.02) (0.10) (0.91) 
agecat (31-45) 0.04*** 0.06 0.05 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.34) 
agecat (46-65) 0.04*** 0.05 -0.10 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.40) 
agecat (66-80) -0.27** 1.33*** -7.79*** 
 
Ref: (permanent) 
(0.11) (0.43) (2.52) 
temporary -0.06*** -0.14** -0.44 
 
Ref: No children 
(0.01) (0.07) (0.43) 
1 child 0.01 0.06* -0.57*** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.19) 
2 children 0.01 0.02 -0.70** 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.28) 
3+ children 0.00 0.03 -2.06*** 
 
Ref: 1-200 
(0.01) (0.09) (0.43) 
Firmsize (201-2000) -0.04*** -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.37) 
Firmsize (2000+) -0.01 0.01 0.02 
 
Ref:2000 
(0.01) (0.05) (0.26) 
2001.syear 0.03*** -0.04 -0.11 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.14) 
2002.syear 0.07*** -0.17*** -0.20 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.16) 
2003.syear 0.12*** -0.22*** -0.29* 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.17) 
2004.syear 0.14*** -0.34*** -0.37** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.18) 
2005.syear 0.15*** -0.35*** -0.25 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.18) 
2006.syear 0.16*** -0.40*** -0.11 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.18) 
2007.syear 0.18*** -0.52*** 0.04 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.18) 
2008.syear 0.20*** -0.56*** 0.04 
 
Ref:  
(0.01) (0.04) (0.19) 
Agriculture -0.01 0.11 -0.44 
 (0.03) (0.19) (0.75) 
Energy 0.03 -0.13 -0.52 
 (0.02) (0.18) (0.74) 
Mining  0.04 0.64 -0.63 
 (0.04) (0.59) (1.21) 
Manufacturing 0.03** 0.03 -0.80* 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.41) 
Construction 0.01 0.05 -0.47 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.42) 
Trade 0.01 0.07 -0.40 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.59) 
Transport 0.02 0.03 0.37 
 (0.02) (0.11) (0.67) 
Finance 0.00 0.14 0.44 
 
Ref: Managers 
(0.04) (0.15) (0.74) 
Professionals -0.01 0.11 -0.43 
viii 
 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.41) 
Technician  -0.03*** 0.17** -1.21*** 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.37) 
Clerical  -0.06*** 0.16** -1.38*** 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.42) 
Services  -0.06*** 0.03 -1.10** 
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.52) 
Skilled agri -0.07** 0.26 -0.45 
 (0.03) (0.22) (2.38) 
Craft workers -0.05*** 0.13 -1.38*** 
 (0.01) (0.09) (0.47) 
Plant and machinery -0.05*** 0.03 -1.55*** 
 (0.01) (0.10) (0.52) 
Elementary  -0.06*** 0.07 -1.56*** 
 
 
(0.02) (0.11) (0.48) 
Constant 7.67*** 7.02*** 43.03*** 
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.54) 
    
Observations 30,549 33,470 33,522 
R-squared 0.17 0.02 0.01 
Number of pid 4,107 4,222 4,223 
Weight w11103 w11103 w11103 
 
